"...[Iraq] could launch a biological or chemical attack 45 minutes after the order is given..."

"...We have seen intelligence over many months that they have chemical and biological weapons, and that they have dispersed them and that they're weaponized and that, in one case at least, the command and control arrangements have been established..."

Washington Post:
"...The administration maintained that Iraq was still producing deadly chemical agents such as mustard, sarin and VX. Mr. Kay reported that "multiple sources" have told his 1,200-member team "that Iraq did not have a large, centrally-controlled chemical weapons program after 1991." In the dozen summary pages of his report made public, Mr. Kay emphasized that after three months of work his conclusions are preliminary and that he may yet find chemical or biological munitions. Yet already enough is known to conclude that both the president and the nation's intelligence community must be accountable for misstating, or being mistaken about, the extent of the Iraqi threat. .."

"...Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent..."

Bush NIE

"...Although we have little specific information on Iraq’s CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents—much of it added in the last year..."

Bob Drogin (The New Republic):
"...Kay's interim report all but dismisses those claims as groundless. "Multiple sources," he wrote, indicate that Iraq "did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled C.W. program after 1991." Information found so far, he added, suggests Baghdad's large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new chemical munitions "was reduced--if not entirely destroyed" by the combined effects of the 1991 Gulf war, the 1998 Desert Fox air strikes, 13 years of U.N. sanctions, and nine years of U.N. inspections. Since large-scale facilities are needed to develop, produce, and fill chemical weapons for military use, the program was effectively dead..."

"...Let me remind you that -- of the 122 mm chemical warheads that the UN inspectors found recently. This discovery could very well be, as has been noted, the tip of a submerged iceberg.
The question before us all, my friends, is when will we see the rest of the submerged iceberg?..."

"...Iraqi practice was not to mark much of their chemical ordnance and [was] to store it at the same [sites] that held conventional rounds, the size of the required search is enormous..."

Also see: Bob Drogin (Los Angeles Times)

"...It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced four tons of the deadly nerve agent VX. A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes. Four tons. The admission only came out after inspectors collected documentation as a result of the defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's late son-in-law.
UNSCOM also gained forensic evidence that Iraq had produced VX and put it into weapons for delivery, yet to this day Iraq denies it had ever weaponized VX. And on January 27, UNMOVIC told this Council that it has information that conflicts with the Iraqi account of its VX program..."

"...We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry. To all outward appearances, even to experts, the infrastructure looks like an ordinary civilian operation. Illicit and legitimate production can go on simultaneously or on a dime..."

State Department for Bush

 "...Iraq continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could quickly divert to chemical weapons production, such as chlorine and phenol plants..."

Dana Milbank and Walter Pincus (Washington Post):
"...David Kay, the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq, presented a different view in his congressional testimony last week. For example, he said: "Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW [chemical weapons] munitions was reduced -- if not entirely destroyed -- during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of U.N. sanctions and U.N. inspections." ..."

"...Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons...we have sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them. He wouldn't be passing out the orders if he didn't have the weapons or the intent to use them..."

Bush

"...We have sources that tell us that Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons -- the very weapons the dictator tell us he does not have..."

Dana Milbank and Walter Pincus (Washington Post):
"...David Kay, the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq, presented a different view in his congressional testimony last week. For example, he said: "Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW [chemical weapons] munitions was reduced -- if not entirely destroyed -- during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of U.N. sanctions and U.N. inspections." ..."

"...At last week's Armed Services Committee hearing, Secretary [Donald] Rumsfeld said he had no knowledge of any such shipments and doubted that they ever occurred..."

"...From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs... Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them..."

"...In 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq's military industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents..."

"All chemical weapons were destroyed. I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons - biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed" Hussein Kamel 
UNSCOM/IAEA interview transcript, "UNSCOM/IAEA Sensitive," p. 13 08-22-95 http://www.casi.org.uk/info/unscom950822.pdf..."

Outlook India:
"..."Several inspections have taken place ... in relation to mobile production facilities," he [Blix] said. "No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found." Blix said his inspectors had looked into several mobile facilities as well as "large containers with seed processing equipment...."

Also see: The Guardian and see Glen Rangwala for a more detailed rebuttal of the claims regarding the "mobile" facilities.

"...All key aspects - R&D, production, and weaponization - of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war..."

A lot of quotes are here.

AFTER THE INVASION

"...the regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. The inspectors, however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for, and capable of killing millions..."

Joseph Cirincione and Dipali Mukhopadyay (Foreign Policy) via Corrente::
"...The U.N. inspectors did not reach this conclusion. Their final report in 1999 indicated that 520 kilograms (1,144 pounds) of yeast extract (bacterial growth media) remained unaccounted for and was "sufficient to produce 26,000 litres of Bacillus anthracis spores or over 3 times the amount declared by Iraq." Inspectors did not know if Iraq had actually used this growth media to produce more anthrax, nor did they draw any conclusions about what weapons Iraq might possess. Iraq's biological weapons, if they existed, could "kill millions" only if the regime had a large arsenal of highly-effective long-range missile, rocket, and airborne delivery systems, such as those that the United States and the Soviet Union perfected during the Cold War. There was no evidence that Iraq possessed such delivery systems..."

"...The UN Special Commission concluded that Iraq did not verifiably account for, at a minimum, 2160kg of growth media. (repeated by White House, January 2003, p.5)..."

"...By 1998, U.N. experts agreed that the Iraqis had perfected drying techniques for their biological weapons programs..."

"...The United Nations concluded that Saddam Hussein had materials sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin -- enough to subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure..."

Glen Rangwala and Raymond Whitaker (Traprockpeace.org):
"...In March, UN inspectors reported: "it seems unlikely that significant undeclared quantities of botulinum toxin could have been produced, based on the quantity of media unaccounted for."..."

"...We know from Iraq's past admissions that it has successfully weaponized [...] ricin..."

"...The al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility is one of two known biocontainment level-three facilities in Iraq that have an extensive air handling and filtering system. Iraq has admitted that this was a biological weapons facility. In 2001, Iraq announced that it would begin renovating the plant without UN approval, ostensibly to produce vaccines that it could more easily and more quickly import through the UN..."

"...From 1991 to 1995, the Iraqi regime said it had no biological weapons. After a senior official in its weapons program defected and exposed this lie, the regime admitted to producing tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents..."

Compassiongate: Bush's statement was misleading as usual compassionate in that his words suggest that a lie was exposed by the defector. But as the State Department says, the lie was already exposed by the U.N. inspectors and then verified by the defectors statement. 

"..."Saddam Hussein...has the wherewithal to develop smallpox"..."

AFTER THE INVASION

AP/MSNBC:
"...Top American scientists assigned to the weapons hunt in Iraq found no evidence Saddam Hussein’s regime was making or stockpiling smallpox, The Associated Press has learned from senior military officers involved in the search...SMALLPOX FEARS were part of the case the Bush administration used to build support for invading Iraq — and they were raised again as recently as last weekend by Vice President Dick Cheney.
       But a three-month search by “Team Pox” turned up only signs to the contrary: disabled equipment that had been rendered harmless by U.N. inspectors, Iraqi scientists deemed credible who gave no indication they had worked with smallpox and a laboratory thought to be back in use that was covered in cobwebs...
Two of the six members of Team Pox — whose existence and work hasn’t been previously disclosed — have left Iraq while the rest remain involved in other aspects of the weapons hunt, said the officers who described the smallpox pursuit for the first time.
       Though Team Pox is no longer operational, having carried out their work between May and July, their findings don’t dismiss the possibility that smallpox could still be discovered, according to the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
       However, there remains little to pursue in this area now.
       “We found no physical or new anecdotal evidence to suggest Iraq was producing smallpox or had stocks of it in its possession,” one of the military officers said...
Bush administration officials often cited smallpox when describing Saddam’s intentions — and continue to do so despite the lack of evidence.
       On Sunday, Cheney said two trailers discovered in Iraq could have been used to make smallpox...
Despite those suspicions, Pentagon planners didn’t organize a specific search for smallpox when they put together a post-Saddam weapons hunt comprising hundreds of military personnel with expertise in missiles as well as chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
       “There was some discussion about creating specialized teams but we didn’t have enough people,” said Lt. Col. Michael Slifka, who planned the weapons hunt for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
       The original search teams, which disbanded when a Pentagon-led effort known as the Iraq Survey Group took over in August, comprised military officers trained in detecting chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Those teams didn’t have an investigative capability and didn’t include experts in specific areas such as smallpox.
       Surprised by the configuration, a handful of American biologists and virologists sent to Kuwait and then Baghdad with little instruction except to help, set up Team Pox on their own..."