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UNIVERSITY OF COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM (what is this?) 

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COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM 203B*
*President Bush's lies and deception moral clarity, honesty and integrity 
on
Iraq and (non-nuclear) "WMDs" and other weapons

In this course you will learn about the abundant lies, deception or intent to deceive moral clarity, honesty and integrity displayed by compassionate conservative2 President George W. Bush (and his administration speaking on his behalf) on the issues of Iraq and non-nuclear "WMDs" and other weapons. This part covers his (Government's) statements on Iraq/Saddam's biological, chemical and conventional weapons/capability - made before and after the invasion of Iraq and some statements made before but evaluated after the invasion. Make sure you drop by again when the Election 04 (2004) campaign starts picking up steam, so that you can refresh your memory on his compassion. 

Please note that the statements made by Bush or his spokespersons/administration3 - as cited in column 3 of the tables below - are by default extracted from one or more of the links shown in column 4. If the source of the statements is different from the link(s) in column 4, then a URL is explicitly provided in column 3. For feedback and corrections, please go here.

A detailed acknowledgement of the sites from which the information below was obtained is listed at this location. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the following sites where I got the vast majority of links from: Atrios/Eschaton, Politics, Law and Autism, Calpundit, Buzzflash, Talking Points Memo, Daily Howler, Thinking it Through, BushwatchSpinsanity

Total Compassion Con credits 2 available from this course to date = 100

Last Update: 11/18/2003

 

BEFORE THE INVASION
"To questions about whether the attacks on Sept. 11 turned Bush into a better leader, Rove answered that Bush was a great leader all along," the Washington Post reported on December 12: " 'I for one don't buy this theory that September 11th somehow changed George Bush,' " Rove said. " 'You're just paying better attention. He is who he is.' "
"In a lot of ways he is exactly how he's always been, and I think people sort of see him now for how he's always been - very steady, and very disciplined, and a lot of resolve, but also a whole lot of compassion and a way to really connect with people," Laura [Bush] told Tim Russert on December 23.
(from Mark Crispin Miller, The Bush Dyslexicon)

Touché. 

Quotes below via Billmon/Whiskey Bar
"...Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction..." - Dick Cheney
"...Iraq has stockpiled biological and chemical weapons, and is rebuilding the facilities used to make more of those weapons. We have sources that tell us that Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons -- the very weapons the dictator tells us he does not have..." - George W. Bush


AFTER THE INVASION
Nancy Gibbs (Time.com) via Independent-Media
"...Over the past three months, TIME has interviewed Iraqi weapons scientists, middlemen and former government officials. Saddam's henchmen all make essentially the same claim: that Iraq's once massive unconventional-weapons program was destroyed or dismantled in the 1990s and never rebuilt; that officials destroyed or never kept the documents that would prove it; that the shell games Saddam played with U.N. inspectors were designed to conceal his progress on conventional weapons systems—missiles, air defenses, radar—not biological or chemical programs; and that even Saddam, a sucker for a new gadget or invention or toxin, may not have known what he actually had or, more to the point, didn't have. It would be an irony almost too much to bear to consider that he doomed his country to war because he was intent on protecting weapons systems that didn't exist in the first place..."

&c. (The New Republic):
"...
I appreciate people's opinions, but I'm more interested in news.... And the best way to get the news is from objective sources, and the most objective sources I have are people on my staff who tell me what's happening in the world..."--George W. Bush, in an interview with Fox News, September 22, 2003

 

Once you are done with the above sections, you may choose another course by picking one of the options below

 

STATEMENTS ON IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS BEFORE THE INVASION 
<go back to the top>

Compassion Con credits total = 11

# Topic President Bush or his representative's Compassionate statement Some Uncompassionate Facts Compassion Con Credits
CB1-01 Previous U.S. support for Iraq and Saddam's chemical weapon use Rumsfeld for Bush

"...said he "cautioned" Hussein about the use of chemical weapons [back in 1983]...Rumsfeld has also said he had "nothing to do" with helping Iraq in its war against Iran..."

Michael Dobbs (Washington Post) via Democrats.com:
"...What U.S. officials rarely acknowledge is that these offenses date back to a period when Hussein was seen in Washington as a valued ally. Among the people instrumental in tilting U.S. policy toward Baghdad during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war was Donald H. Rumsfeld, now defense secretary, whose December 1983 meeting with Hussein as a special presidential envoy paved the way for normalization of U.S.-Iraqi relations. Declassified documents show that Rumsfeld traveled to Baghdad at a time when Iraq was using chemical weapons on an "almost daily" basis in defiance of international conventions. The story of U.S. involvement with Saddam Hussein in the years before his 1990 attack on Kuwait -- which included large-scale intelligence sharing, supply of cluster bombs through a Chilean front company, and facilitating Iraq's acquisition of chemical and biological precursors -- is a topical example of the underside of U.S. foreign policy. It is a world in which deals can be struck with dictators, human rights violations sometimes overlooked, and accommodations made with arms proliferators, all on the principle that the "enemy of my enemy is my friend."...The administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush authorized the sale to Iraq of numerous items that had both military and civilian applications, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague...
In a September interview with CNN, Rumsfeld said he "cautioned" Hussein about the use of chemical weapons, a claim at odds with declassified State Department notes of his 90-minute meeting with the Iraqi leader. A Pentagon spokesman, Brian Whitman, now says that Rumsfeld raised the issue not with Hussein, but with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz. The State Department notes show that he mentioned it largely in passing as one of several matters that "inhibited" U.S. efforts to assist Iraq.
Rumsfeld has also said he had "nothing to do" with helping Iraq in its war against Iran. Although former U.S. officials agree that Rumsfeld was not one of the architects of the Reagan administration's tilt toward Iraq -- he was a private citizen when he was appointed Middle East envoy -- the documents show that his visits to Baghdad led to closer U.S.-Iraqi cooperation on a wide variety of fronts. Washington was willing to resume diplomatic relations immediately, but Hussein insisted on delaying such a step until the following year. As part of its opening to Baghdad, the Reagan administration removed Iraq from the State Department terrorism list in February 1982, despite heated objections from Congress. Without such a move, Teicher says, it would have been "impossible to take even the modest steps we were contemplating" to channel assistance to Baghdad. Iraq -- along with Syria, Libya and South Yemen -- was one of four original countries on the list, which was first drawn up in 1979....On the other hand, Iraq continued to play host to alleged terrorists throughout the '80s. The most notable was Abu Abbas, leader of the Palestine Liberation Front..."
2
CB1-02 Previous U.S. support for Iraq and Saddam's chemical weapon use Powell for Bush

"...Saddam Hussein has used such weapons. And Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them again -- against his neighbors and against his own people..."

Cheney for Bush

"...The whole range of weapons of mass destruction then would rest in the hands of a dictator who has already shown his willingness to use such weapons, and has done so, both in his war with Iran and against his own people..."

Peter W. Galbraith (Boston Globe):
"...In 1987, Hussein turned his chemical weapons on the Kurds, who the year before had embarked on one of their periodic rebellions against rule from Baghdad. The effects were devastating. In a single attack on March 16, 1988, on the eastern city of Halabja, more than 5,000 Kurdish men, women, and children died horrific deaths as nerve gas seeped into cellars where hundreds huddled or caught up with those trying to outrun the gas on the city's dusty streets.
A few months later, I encountered the survivors of what proved to be the final gas attacks on the Kurds. On August 25, 1988 - five days after the Iran-Iraq war ended - Iraq launched a massive attack on Kurdish villages along its border with Turkey. Within days, 65,000 refugees had crossed into Turkey...
By the time we arrived in early September, some refugees were sheltered in Turkish-run tent cities while others remained in the open in desolate high mountain valleys fringed with patches of snow. They seemed numb as they described how helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft flew over their homes, dropping "quiet" bombs. Smoke smelling of "burnt almonds" or "rotten onions" wafted across the landscape. People dropped dead. Those brave enough to venture close to the corpses noticed "blue lips" and sometimes small amounts of blood. Because these were not the first such attacks, the survivors knew better than to touch the corpses; nerve agents can kill on contact. Men fled, leaving the bodies of their wives and young children to scavenging animals.
Before we left for Turkey, Senators Pell, Al Gore, and Jesse Helms had introduced legislation to impose comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq for its use of chemical weapons. The Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988 unanimously passed the US Senate just one day after being introduced. Van Hollen's and my report on the gassings was intended to boost the bill's prospects in the House of Representatives.
Kurdish leaders knew all about the legislation. For the first time, it seemed the United States was poised to take action on their behalf. Indeed, at one refugee camp, Van Hollen and I were feted with an enthusiastic pro-American demonstration.
The Kurds were to be disappointed. The Reagan administration, which had been providing Iraq with $700 million a year in credit guarantees, saw Hussein's Iraq both as a potential security partner in the volatile Persian Gulf and as a promising market for American products and investment.
Secretary of State George Shultz denounced Iraq's use of chemical weapons, but others in the administration seemed more concerned about the Iraqi reaction should the sanctions become law. (Senate passage of the Pell legislation produced the biggest anti-American demonstration in Baghdad in 20 years.) Working with the Republican House leadership and some House Democrats, the administration was able to water down and ultimately defeat the Prevention of Genocide Act.
While past error is no indication of future action, the Kurds have not forgotten that Secretary of State Colin Powell was then the national security adviser who orchestrated Ronald Reagan's decision to give Hussein a pass for gassing the Kurds. Dick Cheney, then a prominent Republican congressman and now vice president and the Bush administration's leading Iraq hawk, could have helped push the sanctions legislation but did not..." [CG emphasis]

(being very very compassionate here)

CB2-01 Iraq and VX Powell for Bush

"...It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced four tons of the deadly nerve agent, VX. [...] UNSCOM also gained forensic evidence that Iraq had produced VX and put it into weapons for delivery. Yet, to this day, Iraq denies it had ever weaponized VX. And on January 27, UNMOVIC told this council that it has information that conflicts with the Iraqi account of its VX program..."

State Dept. for Bush

"...The UN concluded that Iraq had not accounted for 1.5 tons of the VX agent. Just one drop is enough to kill a person..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...Most chemical and biological agents are subject to processes of deterioration. A working paper by UNSCOM from January 1998 noted that: "Taking into consideration the conditions and the quality of CW-agents and munitions produced by Iraq at that time, there is no possibility of weapons remaining from the mid-1980's" (quoted in Arms Control Today, June 2000)...If the allegations that Iraq possessed a stockpile of illicit weapons were to be true, then the UK and US would need to present credible evidence that Iraq had managed to stabilise its chemical and biological agents to a greater extent than it is previously thought to have done...For example, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) strategic dossier of September 2002 records the status of VX produced before the Gulf War: "Any VX produced by Iraq before 1991 is likely to have decomposed over the past decade [...]. Any G-agent or V-agent stocks that Iraq concealed from UNSCOM inspections are likely to have deteriorated by now."...United States laboratory, which reported in June 1998 that they had found VX degradation products on the missile warheads. This was seen as indicating at the time that Iraq had stabilised VX sufficiently and had managed to weaponise it (in contrast to the Government of Iraq's own claims). However, further tests on fragments from the same missile warheads at two other laboratories (in Switzerland and France), and at the same United States laboratory with further samples, "found no nerve agent degradation products" (ibid., p.82). The chemical in question "could also originate from other compounds such as precursors or, according to some experts, a detergent" (ibid., p.81)..."

Also see Glen Rangwala for more details on the VX case.

1
CB3-01 Iraq and mustard gas  State Department for Bush

"...UNMOVIC has reported that Iraq failed to provide evidence to account for 1,000 tons of mustard gas, 550 mustard gas-filled munitions..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...With regard to the "1,000 tons of mustard gas", referred to by the State Department on 27 February 2003, this seems to be an exaggeration. The only mustard that is unaccounted for except for the artillery shells is the discrepancy revealed in the Air Force document between the aerial bombs that Iraq claims it used in the Iran-Iraq war and the lower figure for those used in that document (see above). As Hans Blix said (quoted above), the total amount of chemical agents in these bombs could be around 1,000 tonnes. However, a considerable proportion of this would be made up of Sarin and Tabun bombs, agents that would not have lasted for more than a few months, and not mustard..."
1
CB4-01 Iraq and G-agents Defense Dept. for Bush

[claimed that] 200 metric tons of G-agents (sarin) are unaccounted for.

State Dept. for Bush

"...Gaps identified by UNSCOM in Iraqi accounting and current production capabilities strongly suggest that Iraq maintains stockpiles of chemical agents, probably VX, sarin, cyclosarin and mustard..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...The main G-agents produced by Iraq were Tabun, Sarin and Cyclosarin...These agents deteriorate rapidly, especially if impurities are present in their manufacture. This seems to have been the case with Iraq's nerve agents...
Tabun: "documentary evidence suggests that Tabun was produced using process technology and quality control methodologies that would result in the agent being degraded to a very low quality through the action of a resulting by-product." ("Unresolved Disarmament Issues", 6 March 2003, p.68).
Sarin / Cyclosarin: "According to documents discovered by UNSCOM in Iraq, the purity of Sarin-type agents produced by Iraq were on average below 60%, and dropped below Iraq’s established quality control acceptance level of 40% by purity some 3 to 12 months after production. [...] There is no evidence that any bulk Sarin-type agents remain in Iraq - gaps in accounting of these agents are related to Sarin-type agents weaponized in rocket warheads and aerial bombs. Based on the documentation found by UNSCOM during inspections in Iraq, Sarin-type agents produced by Iraq were largely of low quality and as such, degraded shortly after production. Therefore, with respect to the unaccounted for weaponized Sarin-type agents, it is unlikely that they would still be viable today." ("Unresolved Disarmament Issues", 6 March 2003, pp.72-73)...."
1
CB5-01 Iraq chemical weapons plants State Department for Bush

 "...Iraq continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could quickly divert to chemical weapons production, such as chlorine and phenol plants..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...
Many of the most detailed claims made about Iraq since 1998 have been related to the rebuilding of facilities that were formerly associated with chemical and biological weapons. It is noticeable that few of these claims are that a specific facility is currently being used for the production of chemical or biological warfare agents. Instead, the facilities are identified as being capable of producing such agents as well as civilian products, or that the material that is being produced could be used in the development of illicit weapons.
Unless there is a reliable assessment that the production undertaken at these facilities is part of a chemical and biological warfare programme, the information presented in these claims cannot be taken as demonstrating that Iraq has recently produced illicit chemical and biological agents. Indeed, UNMOVIC inspections have not discovered any facilities in Iraq currently engaged in the production of chemical or biological weapons. A significant example is the description provided by UNMOVIC for the facilities required to produce mustard agents:
"Iraq does not appear to have a dedicated facility capable of producing Mustard and its key precursors. Significant modifications would be required to convert existing chemical production facilities for this purpose. Iraq would have to utilize “corrosion resistant” equipment (for the processing of the chlorinating agent), which it possesses in limited quantities. However, Iraq had some items of dual-use equipment distributed all over the country at legitimate facilities that could be removed and assembled for the construction of a dedicated Mustard production plant".
("Unresolved Disarmament Issues", 6 March 2003, p.77).
The example of mustard is significant because, according to UNMOVIC, "Mustard would be the easiest agent for Iraq to produce indigenously." (ibid.)
..."
None assigned since the claim is couched in "safe" words that cannot be argued against. However, the statement is compassionate because it does not demonstrate that actual weapons production is occurring.

I will cover this claim further in the "after invasion" section.

CB5-02 Iraq chemical weapons plants Powell for Bush

"..."Iraq has rebuilt key portions of the Tareq State Establishment. Tareq includes facilities designed specifically for Iraq’s chemical weapons program and employs key figures from past programs"..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...This site, which used to produce chemical weapons precursors, was bombed in the Gulf War, and its remaining stocks were removed and destroyed by UNSCOM. It was inactive in 1998. The claims that it now produces chlorine and phenol (ie carbolic acid), which could serve as precursors for the production of weapons, were not substantiated in UK and US reports. These chemicals could also be used as disinfectants and in water treatment, and so the production of these chemicals in themselves would not necessarily be evidence for a weapons programme. 
Results of UN inspections
. Fallujah II was inspected by UNMOVIC inspectors on 9 December 2002. In contrast to the extensive claims of the CIA and the State Department, UNMOVIC found that the chlorine plant was not even in use:
"Two separate chemical plants are in the factory area and their major activity is the production of phenol and chlorine. The chlorine plant is currently inoperative. The site contains a number of tagged dual-use items of equipment, which were all accounted for. All key buildings were inspected in addition to the chlorine and phenol plants. The objectives of the visit were successfully achieved."..."
1
CB5-03 Iraq chemical weapons plants Powell for Bush

"...Here you see 15 munitions bunkers...the four that are in red squares represent active chemical munitions bunkers. How do I know that?...a facility that is a signature item for this kind of bunker. Inside that facility are special guards and special equipment to monitor any leakage...The truck you also see is a signature item. It’s a decontamination vehicle..."

Greg Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) via Dennis Hans:
"...(a) This seems ostensibly to be a wholly implausible claim: a picture of a truck and a shed by themselves reveal nothing about the contents of the adjacent bunker. It also begs the question why the US did not provide this information to the inspectors as soon as they entered Iraq on 27 November, 25 days before Powell claims al-Taji was evacuated. If they were genuine in their beliefs, why did they not allow the independent inspectorate to check verify their claims? 
(b) Dr Blix reminds the Security Council of Powell’s false inference on 14 February 2003:
"The presentation of intelligence information by the US Secretary of State suggested that Iraq had prepared for inspections by cleaning up sites and removing evidence of proscribed weapons programmes. I would like to comment only on one case, which we are familiar with, namely, the trucks identified by analysts as being for chemical decontamination at a munitions depot. This was a declared site, and it was certainly one of the sites Iraq would have expected us to inspect. We have noted that the two satellite images of the site were taken several weeks apart. The reported movement of munitions at the site could just as easily have been a routine activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent inspection."..."

Charles Hanley (AP) via Common Dreams:
"...Powell presented satellite photos of industrial buildings, bunkers and trucks, and suggested they showed Iraqis surreptitiously moving prohibited missiles and chemical and biological weapons to hide them. At two sites, he said trucks were "decontamination vehicles" associated with chemical weapons. 
These and other sites have now undergone 500 inspections in recent months. Chief U.N. inspector Hans Blix, a day earlier, had said his well-equipped experts had found no contraband in their inspections and no sign that items had been moved. Nothing has been reported found since.
Addressing the Security Council a week after Powell, Blix used one photo scenario as an example and said it could be showing routine as easily as illicit activity. Journalists visiting photographed sites hours after the Powell speech found similar activity to be routine.
Norwegian inspector Jorn Siljeholm told AP on March 19 that "decontamination vehicles" U.N. teams were led to by U.S. information invariably turned out to be simple water or fire trucks. On June 24, Blix said of the entire Powell photo package, "We were not impressed with that particular evidence."
Amid Powell's warnings, a critical fact was lost: Iraq's military industries were to have remained under strict, on-site U.N. monitoring for years to come, guarding against the rebuilding of weapons programs..."

2
CB6-01 Iraq chemical weapons Powell for Bush

"...Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons..."

Powell for Bush

"...On Sept. 8, 2002, Powell said in a Fox News interview that ''there is no doubt'' that Saddam Hussein ''has chemical weapons stocks.''..."

Colin Powell (U.N. Speech):
"...We have evidence these weapons existed. What we don't have is evidence from Iraq that they have been destroyed or where they are. That is what we are still waiting for...With Iraq's well-documented history on biological and chemical weapons, why should any of us give Iraq the benefit of the doubt? I don't..."

Glen Rangwala:
"...a false inference that lack of corroborative evidence for destruction is equal to continued existence of weapons, as Blix pointedly mentioned in his briefing to the Security Council of 14 February 2003: "To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided, suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were ‘unaccounted for’. One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist."..."

Bryan Bender (Boston Globe):
"...The Defense Intelligence Agency, in a classified report that same month, had a different view: ''There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing or stockpiling chemical weapons.''..."
2

 

STATEMENTS ON IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS EVALUATED AFTER THE INVASION <go back to the top>

Compassion Con credits total = 9

# Topic President Bush or his representative's Compassionate statement Some Uncompassionate Facts Compassion Con Credits
CA1-01 Iraqi chemical/ biological weapons  Bush/WH

"...[Iraq] could launch a biological or chemical attack 45 minutes after the order is given..."

Dana Milbank (Washington Post):
"...The White House, in the run-up to war in Iraq, did not seek CIA approval before charging that Saddam Hussein could launch a biological or chemical attack within 45 minutes, administration officials now say.
The claim, which has since been discredited, was made twice by President Bush, in a September Rose Garden appearance after meeting with lawmakers and in a Saturday radio address the same week. Bush attributed the claim to the British government, but in a "Global Message" issued Sept. 26 and still on the White House Web site, the White House claimed, without attribution, that Iraq "could launch a biological or chemical attack 45 minutes after the order is given."
The 45-minute claim is at the center of a scandal in Britain that led to the apparent suicide on Friday of a British weapons scientist who had questioned the government's use of the allegation. The scientist, David Kelly, was being investigated by the British parliament as the suspected source of a BBC report that the 45-minute claim was added to Britain's public "dossier" on Iraq in September at the insistence of an aide to Prime Minister Tony Blair -- and against the wishes of British intelligence, which said the charge was from a single source and was considered unreliable.
The White House embraced the claim, from a British dossier on Iraq, at the same time it began to promote the dossier's disputed claim that Iraq sought uranium in Africa.
Bush administration officials last week said the CIA was not consulted about the claim. A senior White House official did not dispute that account, saying presidential remarks such as radio addresses are typically "circulated at the staff level" within the White House only.
Virtually all of the focus on whether Bush exaggerated intelligence about Iraq's weapons ambitions has been on the credibility of a claim he made in the Jan. 28 State of the Union address about efforts to buy uranium in Africa. But an examination of other presidential remarks, which received little if any scrutiny by intelligence agencies, indicates Bush made more broad accusations on other intelligence matters related to Iraq...
As it turns out, the 45-minute charge was not true; though forbidden weapons may yet be found in Iraq, an adviser to the Bush administration on arms issues said last week that such weapons were not ready to be used on short notice..."
1
CA1-02 Iraqi chemical weapons Bush

"...We have seen intelligence over many months that they have chemical and biological weapons, and that they have dispersed them and that they're weaponized and that, in one case at least, the command and control arrangements have been established..."

Christopher Scheer (AlterNet):
"...FACT: Despite a massive nationwide search by U.S. and British forces, there are no signs, traces or examples of chemical weapons being deployed in the field, or anywhere else during the war..."

Washington Post:
"...The administration maintained that Iraq was still producing deadly chemical agents such as mustard, sarin and VX. Mr. Kay reported that "multiple sources" have told his 1,200-member team "that Iraq did not have a large, centrally-controlled chemical weapons program after 1991." In the dozen summary pages of his report made public, Mr. Kay emphasized that after three months of work his conclusions are preliminary and that he may yet find chemical or biological munitions. Yet already enough is known to conclude that both the president and the nation's intelligence community must be accountable for misstating, or being mistaken about, the extent of the Iraqi threat. .."

1
CA1-03 Iraqi chemical weapons Powell for Bush

"...Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent..."

Bush NIE

"...Although we have little specific information on Iraq’s CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents—much of it added in the last year..."

Charles Hanley (AP) via Common Dreams:
"...Powell gave no basis for the assertion, and no such agents have been reported found. An unclassified CIA report last October made a similar assertion without citing concrete evidence, saying only that Iraq "probably" concealed precursor chemicals to make such weapons. The DIA reported confidentially last September there "is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons."..."

Bob Drogin (The New Republic):
"...Kay's interim report all but dismisses those claims as groundless. "Multiple sources," he wrote, indicate that Iraq "did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled C.W. program after 1991." Information found so far, he added, suggests Baghdad's large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new chemical munitions "was reduced--if not entirely destroyed" by the combined effects of the 1991 Gulf war, the 1998 Desert Fox air strikes, 13 years of U.N. sanctions, and nine years of U.N. inspections. Since large-scale facilities are needed to develop, produce, and fill chemical weapons for military use, the program was effectively dead..."

1
CA1-04 Iraqi chemical weapons Powell for Bush

"...Let me remind you that -- of the 122 mm chemical warheads that the UN inspectors found recently. This discovery could very well be, as has been noted, the tip of a submerged iceberg.
The question before us all, my friends, is when will we see the rest of the submerged iceberg?..."

Charles Hanley (AP) via Common Dreams:
"...The warheads were empty, a fact Powell didn't note. Blix said on June 16 the dozen stray rocket warheads, never uncrated, were apparently "debris from the past," the 1980s. No others have been reported found since the invasion..."
1
CA1-05 Iraqi chemical weapons Kay for Bush

"...Iraqi practice was not to mark much of their chemical ordnance and [was] to store it at the same [sites] that held conventional rounds, the size of the required search is enormous..."

Bob Drogin (The New Republic):
"...That's not quite true. For one thing, U.N. weapons inspectors checked scores of suspect Iraqi military bases, ammo dumps, and armories before the war. After it ended, special U.S. weapons-hunting teams scrutinized scores more that had been identified by the Defense Intelligence Agency. On May 30, the top Marine commander in Iraq, Lieutenant General James Conway, told reporters that his troops had scoured ammo storage sites across southern Iraq for banned weapons. We've been to virtually every ammunition supply point between the Kuwaiti border and Baghdad, but they are simply not there," Conway said.
There is another problem. If no chemical weapons were produced in bulk after 1991, as Kay now concedes, then he presumably is searching for chemical warfare agents or precursors left over from the '80s in drums or in filled munitions. It's possible that some will be found. But, except for Iraq's mustard gas, which had a long shelf life, all of Iraq's known nerve agents were of poor quality and would have deteriorated years ago. U.N. inspectors who recovered and destroyed large quantities of those weapons in the early '90s found they had lost most of their lethality and were not suitable for warfare. 
Moreover, despite Kay's claim, several U.N. inspectors say Saddam's regime always marked its "special munitions," as chemical-filled shells, bombs, and warheads were known. The markings were neither consistent nor standard--some munitions had numbers, others a black stripe, others a stenciled white circle, others just the painted letter "A" or "B." Nevertheless, they were marked. In fact, the markings were so well-known that, before the war, the Pentagon produced hand cards showing the various markings so that military ordnance and demolition experts could identify chemical weapons. There was good reason. On March 4, 1991, just after the Gulf war ended, up to 5,000 American troops were exposed when American military engineers mistakenly destroyed bunkers containing sarin and mustard gas at the Kamisiyah ammo-storage site in southern Iraq. No one wanted the accidental release of another toxic cloud. "Kay's comment gives the impression [chemical weapons] were kept with conventional munitions, and he'll have to check every shell," said an American weapons expert who spent seven years as a U.N. inspector and who strongly supported the war. "That's baloney. They kept them separated from regular munitions, they had separate security, and they had separate chain of command. They were never co-located with conventional munitions."..."

Also see: Bob Drogin (Los Angeles Times)

2
CA2-01 Iraqi VX Powell for Bush

"...It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced four tons of the deadly nerve agent VX. A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes. Four tons. The admission only came out after inspectors collected documentation as a result of the defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's late son-in-law.
UNSCOM also gained forensic evidence that Iraq had produced VX and put it into weapons for delivery, yet to this day Iraq denies it had ever weaponized VX. And on January 27, UNMOVIC told this Council that it has information that conflicts with the Iraqi account of its VX program..."

Charles Hanley (AP) via Common Dreams:
"...[In this speech] Powell didn't note that most of that four tons was destroyed in the 1990s under U.N. supervision. Before the invasion, the Iraqis made a "considerable effort" to prove they had destroyed the rest, doing chemical analysis of the ground where inspectors confirmed VX had been dumped, the U.N. inspection agency reported May 30.
Experts at Britain's International Institute of Strategic Studies said any pre-1991 VX most likely would have degraded anyway. No VX has been reported found since the invasion
..."
1
CA3-01 Iraqi chemical weapons
plan(t)s
Powell for Bush

"...We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry. To all outward appearances, even to experts, the infrastructure looks like an ordinary civilian operation. Illicit and legitimate production can go on simultaneously or on a dime..."

State Department for Bush

 "...Iraq continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could quickly divert to chemical weapons production, such as chlorine and phenol plants..."

Charles Hanley (AP) via Common Dreams:
"...
No "chemical weapons infrastructure" has been reported found. The newly disclosed DIA report of last September said there was "no reliable information" on "where Iraq has - or will - establish its chemical warfare agent-production facilities." 
Many countries' civilian chemical industries are capable of making weapons agents, and Iraq's was under close U.N. oversight. The DIA report suggested international inspections, swept aside by the U.S. invasion six months later, would be able to keep Iraq from rebuilding a chemical weapons program
..."

Dana Milbank and Walter Pincus (Washington Post):
"...David Kay, the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq, presented a different view in his congressional testimony last week. For example, he said: "Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW [chemical weapons] munitions was reduced -- if not entirely destroyed -- during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of U.N. sanctions and U.N. inspections." ..."

1
CA3-02 Iraqi chemical weapons
plan(t)s
Powell for Bush

"...Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons...we have sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them. He wouldn't be passing out the orders if he didn't have the weapons or the intent to use them..."

Bush

"...We have sources that tell us that Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons -- the very weapons the dictator tell us he does not have..."

Charles Hanley (AP) via Common Dreams:
"...No such weapons were used and none was reported found after the U.S. and allied military units overran Iraqi field commands and ammunition dumps. Even before Powell spoke, U.N. inspectors had found no such weapons at Iraqi military bases..."

Dana Milbank and Walter Pincus (Washington Post):
"...David Kay, the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq, presented a different view in his congressional testimony last week. For example, he said: "Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW [chemical weapons] munitions was reduced -- if not entirely destroyed -- during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of U.N. sanctions and U.N. inspections." ..."

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STATEMENTS ON IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS BEFORE THE INVASION 
<go back to the top>

Compassion Con credits total = 14

# Topic President Bush or his representative's Compassionate statement Some Uncompassionate Facts Compassion Con Credits
BB1-01 Previous U.S. shipment of biological toxins to Iraq Rumsfeld for Bush

"...At last week's Armed Services Committee hearing, Secretary [Donald] Rumsfeld said he had no knowledge of any such shipments and doubted that they ever occurred..."

Paul Nyden (West Virginia Gazette) via TruthOut:
"..."We have a paper trail," Byrd said. "We not only know that Iraq has biological weapons, we know the type, the strain, and the batch number of the germs that may have been used to fashion those weapons. We know the dates they were shipped and the addresses to which they were shipped. "We have in our hands the equivalent of a Betty Crocker cookbook of ingredients that the U.S. allowed Iraq to obtain and that may well have been used to concoct biological weapons." Those shipments included: Between 1985 and 1988, the nonprofit American Type Culture Collection made 11 shipments to Iraq that included a "witches' brew of pathogens," including anthrax, botulinum toxin and gangrene. All shipments were government-approved.
Between January 1980 and October 1993, the federal Centers for Disease Control shipped a variety of toxic specimens to Iraq, including West Nile virus and Dengue fever. The U.S. Commerce Department and CDC provided lists of these shipments..."
1
BB2-01 Iraq biological weapons Bush

"...From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs... Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them..."

"...In 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq's military industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents..."

Alan Gilbert (Priority Peace):
"..."Hussein Kamel, the highest-ranking Iraqi official ever to defect from Saddam Hussein's inner circle, told CIA and British intelligence officers and U.N. inspectors in the summer of 1995 that after the gulf war, Iraq destroyed all its chemical and biological weapons stocks and the missiles to deliver them." 
Newsweek
"The Defector’s Secrets" 03-03-03

"All chemical weapons were destroyed. I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons - biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed" Hussein Kamel 
UNSCOM/IAEA interview transcript, "UNSCOM/IAEA Sensitive," p. 13 08-22-95 http://www.casi.org.uk/info/unscom950822.pdf..."

Outlook India:
"..."Several inspections have taken place ... in relation to mobile production facilities," he [Blix] said. "No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found." Blix said his inspectors had looked into several mobile facilities as well as "large containers with seed processing equipment...."

Also see: The Guardian and see Glen Rangwala for a more detailed rebuttal of the claims regarding the "mobile" facilities.

1
BB2-02 Iraq (biological weapons) Bush admin

"...All key aspects - R&D, production, and weaponization - of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war..."

A lot of quotes are here.

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...It is unclear how seriously the CIA's claim that Iraq's BW programme is more advanced now than it was in 1991 should be taken, especially as al-Hakam, Iraq's main biological weapons facility, had been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in May-June 1996. The Security Council's Panel on Disarmament recorded in March 1999 that "the declared facilities of Iraq's BW programme have been destroyed and rendered harmless" (para.23). In any event, the CIA's claim is contradicted by other US official assessments. The US General Accounting Office (GAO), and investigative arm of the Congress, concluded in September 2002 that: "In the context of the conventional battlefield, the nature and magnitude of the military BW threat has not changed materially since 1990 in terms of the number of countries suspected of developing BW capability, the types of BW agents they possess, or their ability to weaponize and deliver BW agents. This is particularly true regarding the ability to accumulate and deliver sufficient quantities of processed agent to cause mass casualties." 
GAO Report GAO-02-445 (September 2002), p.3, at:
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02445.pdf..."

AFTER THE INVASION

Bob Drogin (The New Republic):
"...The Kay report doesn't support that assertion at all..."
1
BB2-03 Iraq biological weapons Bush

"...the regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. The inspectors, however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for, and capable of killing millions..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...The quotes above from the State Department and CIA in September and October 2002, misrepresent the findings of UNSCOM most clearly: UNSCOM did not conclude with the State Department "that Iraq actually produced two to four times the amount of most agents, including anthrax and botulinim toxin, than it had declared", but that if the assumptions above were to hold, the "[q]uantities produced could be at least 3 times greater than stated" by Iraq (in its January 1999 report, Appendix III). To infer from this to what Iraq "actually produced" (State Department) is to make a leap of logic for which there is insufficient evidence. Similarly, President Bush and Press Secretary Fleischer both impute views to UNSCOM that never constituted the position of the inspectorate: in no UNSCOM report is it stated that Iraq is "likely" to have produced more than it claimed, but merely that it could have done so.
Furthermore, the claims about Iraq possessing a stockpile of biological weapons created before 1991 may suffer from the same problems as discussed for the notion of a stockpile of chemical weapons, above. The assessment by Professor Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is as follows:
"The shelf-life and lethality of Iraq's weapons is unknown, but it seems likely that the shelf-life was limited. In balance, it seems probable that any agents Iraq retained after the Gulf War now have very limited lethality, if any"
"Iraq's Past and Future Biological Weapons Capabilities" (1998), p.13, at: http://www.csis.org/stratassessment/reports/iraq_bios.pdf..."

Joseph Cirincione and Dipali Mukhopadyay (Foreign Policy) via Corrente::
"...The U.N. inspectors did not reach this conclusion. Their final report in 1999 indicated that 520 kilograms (1,144 pounds) of yeast extract (bacterial growth media) remained unaccounted for and was "sufficient to produce 26,000 litres of Bacillus anthracis spores or over 3 times the amount declared by Iraq." Inspectors did not know if Iraq had actually used this growth media to produce more anthrax, nor did they draw any conclusions about what weapons Iraq might possess. Iraq's biological weapons, if they existed, could "kill millions" only if the regime had a large arsenal of highly-effective long-range missile, rocket, and airborne delivery systems, such as those that the United States and the Soviet Union perfected during the Cold War. There was no evidence that Iraq possessed such delivery systems..."

2
BB2-04 Iraq biological weapons Bush admin

"...The UN Special Commission concluded that Iraq did not verifiably account for, at a minimum, 2160kg of growth media. (repeated by White House, January 2003, p.5)..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...It is particularly curious that Dr Blix, in his update to the Security Council on 27 January 2003, provides a wholly different set of figures from the US in accounting for growth media. He claims that 650kg of bacterial growth media is unaccounted for (unlike the US claims that 2160kg or, alternatively, 3 tonnes of this media is unaccounted for)..."
1
BB2-05 Iraq biological weapons Powell for Bush

"...By 1998, U.N. experts agreed that the Iraqis had perfected drying techniques for their biological weapons programs..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...This seems to be untrue. UNSCOM never stated in its official reports that Iraq had "perfected drying techniques". UNSCOM recognised that Iraq had experimented with drying techniques, but seem to have been unsure about Iraq's success in this regard...
UNMOVIC reached the following conclusions:
"It is most likely that, as it had declared, Iraq was unsuccessful in 1989/90 in acquiring a special dust-free spray dryer to safely dry large quantities of anthrax. [...] In any event, it seems likely that no bulk drying of agent took place in either 1989 or 1990...
"UNMOVIC has no evidence that drying of anthrax or any other agent in bulk was conducted." (ibid., p.120)..."
1
BB2-06 Iraq (biological weapons) Bush

"...The United Nations concluded that Saddam Hussein had materials sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin -- enough to subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...Secretary Powell and President Bush both make a claim about growth material for botulinum toxin that is unaccounted for, and attribute this claim to the United Nations. Both are inaccurate.
According to the UNSCOM January 1999 report, the growth media unaccounted for that could be used for making botulinum toxin consisted of 460kg of casein and 80kg of thioglycollate broth. It records that this amount was "Sufficient for the production of 1200 litres of concentrated botulinum toxin (depending on availability of other components including yeast extract). This would represent an additional 6% of that which has already been declared by Iraq." Although far from being a small volume, the 1200 litres at issue for UNSCOM is quite different in scale from the 38,000 litres described by Secretary Powell and President Bush...
Clostridium botulinum (botulinum toxin) consists of anaerobic bacilli, which have a short shelf life."

Glen Rangwala and Raymond Whitaker (Traprockpeace.org):
"...In March, UN inspectors reported: "it seems unlikely that significant undeclared quantities of botulinum toxin could have been produced, based on the quantity of media unaccounted for."..."

2
BB2-07 Iraq biological weapons Powell for Bush

"...We know from Iraq's past admissions that it has successfully weaponized [...] ricin..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...This seems to be untrue. UNSCOM stated in its January 1999 report, Appendix III, that Iraq only admitted to attempting field trials using 155mm artillery shells in November 1990. UNMOVIC record:
"Iraq states that a single static field test was conducted in November 1990, that it was considered to be a failure and that the project was abandoned. While UNMOVIC finds it probable that this test occurred, the project was probably abandoned due to the onset of war rather than the failure of the test. Apart from this static field test using 155mm artillery shells, there is no evidence to suggest that Iraq weaponized ricin for military purposes."
("Unresolved Disarmament Issues", 6 March 2003, p.116)...
"
1
BB2-08 Iraq biological weapons Bush admin

"...The al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility is one of two known biocontainment level-three facilities in Iraq that have an extensive air handling and filtering system. Iraq has admitted that this was a biological weapons facility. In 2001, Iraq announced that it would begin renovating the plant without UN approval, ostensibly to produce vaccines that it could more easily and more quickly import through the UN..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...Prior to 1991, al-Dawrah was engaged in research on viral warfare agents. In March 2001, the Government of Iraq wrote to the UN Secretary-General to notify him of the reactivation of this facility for the production of foot and mouth vaccine. This was in the aftermath of a severe outbreak of the disease, during which "at least 400,000 animals have died for lack of the vaccine", and the Executive Director of the UN Iraq Programme himself recommended the reconstitution of Iraq's own facilities for producing the vaccine (AP, 3 July 1999). The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) warned in February 1999 that "Iraq would need to import the vaccines required to fight foot-and-mouth disease [...] Procurement of the vaccines and their timely delivery is vital to safeguarding animal health, which is an essential component of food security in the region. [...] The government has been unable to adequately monitor and control the spread of these diseases, partly because of the difficulties it has in obtaining equipment and supplies, particularly vaccines. As a result the Iraqi government has repeatedly sought the assistance of FAO to deal with the outbreaks" (emphasis added). Permission from the UN Sanctions Committee to import foot and mouth vaccine was inconsistent...According to a Reuters report of 13 April 1999, the US had again held up Iraq's purchase of the vaccine in the UN Sanctions Committee for a short period of time. Although Iraq has in general been able to import the vaccine under the oil-for-food programme since that date, especially as the vaccine is not on the May 2002 list of items that need to be reviewed by the Sanctions Committee prior to import, there may in 2001 have been suspicions that an indigenous facility would be necessary in the event of a renewed obstructionist US role on the Sanctions Committee....
Results of UN inspection: "By the time the inspectors left the plant today, after four hours, they had concluded that the plant was no longer operational -- not for the production of toxins, and not for animal vaccines either. Reporters who were allowed to wander through the plant after the inspectors left found the place largely in ruins. Apparently, it had been abandoned by the Iraqis after 1996, when the weapons inspectors took heavy cutting equipment to the fermenters, containers and pressurized tubing and valves used in the toxin production." ("Inspectors Find Only Ruins at an Old Iraqi Weapons Site", New York Times, 29 November 2002)..."
2
BB2-09 Iraq (biological weapons) Bush

"...From 1991 to 1995, the Iraqi regime said it had no biological weapons. After a senior official in its weapons program defected and exposed this lie, the regime admitted to producing tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents..."

U.S. State Department:
"...For years, Iraq denied that it had an offensive biological weapons program of any kind. Despite such stonewalling, U.N. weapons inspectors uncovered evidence of an extensive and ongoing effort to develop biological weapons. [CG emphasis]
Then, in 1995, Hussein Kamal, Saddam's son-in-law and director of Iraq's military industries, defected and provided verification [CG emphasis] of Iraq's bioweapons program. The regime was forced to admit the truth: production of thousands of liters of such deadly agents as anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin..."

Compassiongate: Bush's statement was misleading as usual compassionate in that his words suggest that a lie was exposed by the defector. But as the State Department says, the lie was already exposed by the U.N. inspectors and then verified by the defectors statement. 

1
BB2-10 Iraq biological weapons Powell for Bush

"..."Saddam Hussein...has the wherewithal to develop smallpox"..."

Glen Rangwala and Raymond Whitaker (Traprockpeace.org):
"...The UN recorded in March 2003 that "there is no evidence that Iraq had possessed seed stocks for smallpox or had been actively engaged in smallpox research"..."

AFTER THE INVASION

AP/MSNBC:
"...Top American scientists assigned to the weapons hunt in Iraq found no evidence Saddam Hussein’s regime was making or stockpiling smallpox, The Associated Press has learned from senior military officers involved in the search...SMALLPOX FEARS were part of the case the Bush administration used to build support for invading Iraq — and they were raised again as recently as last weekend by Vice President Dick Cheney.
       But a three-month search by “Team Pox” turned up only signs to the contrary: disabled equipment that had been rendered harmless by U.N. inspectors, Iraqi scientists deemed credible who gave no indication they had worked with smallpox and a laboratory thought to be back in use that was covered in cobwebs...
Two of the six members of Team Pox — whose existence and work hasn’t been previously disclosed — have left Iraq while the rest remain involved in other aspects of the weapons hunt, said the officers who described the smallpox pursuit for the first time.
       Though Team Pox is no longer operational, having carried out their work between May and July, their findings don’t dismiss the possibility that smallpox could still be discovered, according to the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
       However, there remains little to pursue in this area now.
       “We found no physical or new anecdotal evidence to suggest Iraq was producing smallpox or had stocks of it in its possession,” one of the military officers said...
Bush administration officials often cited smallpox when describing Saddam’s intentions — and continue to do so despite the lack of evidence.
       On Sunday, Cheney said two trailers discovered in Iraq could have been used to make smallpox...
Despite those suspicions, Pentagon planners didn’t organize a specific search for smallpox when they put together a post-Saddam weapons hunt comprising hundreds of military personnel with expertise in missiles as well as chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
       “There was some discussion about creating specialized teams but we didn’t have enough people,” said Lt. Col. Michael Slifka, who planned the weapons hunt for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
       The original search teams, which disbanded when a Pentagon-led effort known as the Iraq Survey Group took over in August, comprised military officers trained in detecting chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Those teams didn’t have an investigative capability and didn’t include experts in specific areas such as smallpox.
       Surprised by the configuration, a handful of American biologists and virologists sent to Kuwait and then Baghdad with little instruction except to help, set up Team Pox on their own..."

1

 

STATEMENTS ON IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS EVALUATED AFTER THE INVASION <go back to the top>

Compassion Con credits total = 16

# Topic President Bush or his representative's Compassionate statement Some Uncompassionate Facts Compassion Con Credits
BA1-01 Iraqi biological weapons Bush administration/CIA

"...made public its assessment of two mysterious trailers found in Iraq, calling them mobile units to produce deadly germs and the strongest evidence yet that Saddam Hussein had been hiding a program to prepare for biological warfare. 
"We're highly confident" of that judgment, an American intelligence official told reporters. The official said the administration's strong conviction was based mainly on the similarity between the testimony of Iraqi sources and the evidence found on the ground..."

Bush

"...citing two trailers that U.S. intelligence agencies have said were probably used as mobile biological weapons labs, said U.S. forces in Iraq have "found the weapons of mass destruction" that were the United States' primary justification for going to war..."And we'll find more weapons as time goes on," Bush said. "But for those who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're wrong. We found them."..."

Cheney for Bush

"...We had intelligence reporting before the war that there were at least seven of these mobile labs that he had gone out and acquired. We’ve, since the war, found two of them. They’re in our possession today, mobile biological facilities that can be used to produce anthrax or smallpox or whatever else you wanted to use during the course of developing the capacity for an attack..."

William Broad (New York Times):
"...The report called the discovery of the trailers "the strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program." It also noted that Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, in his testimony before the United Nations on Feb. 5 to generate support for a war in Iraq, had detailed such charges.
 
Both the report and the briefing,