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UNIVERSITY OF COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM (what is this?) 

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COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM 203B*
*President Bush's lies and deception moral clarity, honesty and integrity 
on
Iraq and (non-nuclear) "WMDs" and other weapons

In this course you will learn about the abundant lies, deception or intent to deceive moral clarity, honesty and integrity displayed by compassionate conservative2 President George W. Bush (and his administration speaking on his behalf) on the issues of Iraq and non-nuclear "WMDs" and other weapons. This part covers his (Government's) statements on Iraq/Saddam's biological, chemical and conventional weapons/capability - made before and after the invasion of Iraq and some statements made before but evaluated after the invasion. Make sure you drop by again when the Election 04 (2004) campaign starts picking up steam, so that you can refresh your memory on his compassion. 

Please note that the statements made by Bush or his spokespersons/administration3 - as cited in column 3 of the tables below - are by default extracted from one or more of the links shown in column 4. If the source of the statements is different from the link(s) in column 4, then a URL is explicitly provided in column 3. For feedback and corrections, please go here.

A detailed acknowledgement of the sites from which the information below was obtained is listed at this location. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the following sites where I got the vast majority of links from: Atrios/Eschaton, Politics, Law and Autism, Calpundit, Buzzflash, Talking Points Memo, Daily Howler, Thinking it Through, BushwatchSpinsanity

Total Compassion Con credits 2 available from this course to date = 100

Last Update: 11/18/2003

 

BEFORE THE INVASION
"To questions about whether the attacks on Sept. 11 turned Bush into a better leader, Rove answered that Bush was a great leader all along," the Washington Post reported on December 12: " 'I for one don't buy this theory that September 11th somehow changed George Bush,' " Rove said. " 'You're just paying better attention. He is who he is.' "
"In a lot of ways he is exactly how he's always been, and I think people sort of see him now for how he's always been - very steady, and very disciplined, and a lot of resolve, but also a whole lot of compassion and a way to really connect with people," Laura [Bush] told Tim Russert on December 23.
(from Mark Crispin Miller, The Bush Dyslexicon)

Touché. 

Quotes below via Billmon/Whiskey Bar
"...Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction..." - Dick Cheney
"...Iraq has stockpiled biological and chemical weapons, and is rebuilding the facilities used to make more of those weapons. We have sources that tell us that Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons -- the very weapons the dictator tells us he does not have..." - George W. Bush


AFTER THE INVASION
Nancy Gibbs (Time.com) via Independent-Media
"...Over the past three months, TIME has interviewed Iraqi weapons scientists, middlemen and former government officials. Saddam's henchmen all make essentially the same claim: that Iraq's once massive unconventional-weapons program was destroyed or dismantled in the 1990s and never rebuilt; that officials destroyed or never kept the documents that would prove it; that the shell games Saddam played with U.N. inspectors were designed to conceal his progress on conventional weapons systems—missiles, air defenses, radar—not biological or chemical programs; and that even Saddam, a sucker for a new gadget or invention or toxin, may not have known what he actually had or, more to the point, didn't have. It would be an irony almost too much to bear to consider that he doomed his country to war because he was intent on protecting weapons systems that didn't exist in the first place..."

&c. (The New Republic):
"...
I appreciate people's opinions, but I'm more interested in news.... And the best way to get the news is from objective sources, and the most objective sources I have are people on my staff who tell me what's happening in the world..."--George W. Bush, in an interview with Fox News, September 22, 2003

 

Once you are done with the above sections, you may choose another course by picking one of the options below

 

STATEMENTS ON IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS BEFORE THE INVASION 
<go back to the top>

Compassion Con credits total = 11

# Topic President Bush or his representative's Compassionate statement Some Uncompassionate Facts Compassion Con Credits
CB1-01 Previous U.S. support for Iraq and Saddam's chemical weapon use Rumsfeld for Bush

"...said he "cautioned" Hussein about the use of chemical weapons [back in 1983]...Rumsfeld has also said he had "nothing to do" with helping Iraq in its war against Iran..."

Michael Dobbs (Washington Post) via Democrats.com:
"...What U.S. officials rarely acknowledge is that these offenses date back to a period when Hussein was seen in Washington as a valued ally. Among the people instrumental in tilting U.S. policy toward Baghdad during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war was Donald H. Rumsfeld, now defense secretary, whose December 1983 meeting with Hussein as a special presidential envoy paved the way for normalization of U.S.-Iraqi relations. Declassified documents show that Rumsfeld traveled to Baghdad at a time when Iraq was using chemical weapons on an "almost daily" basis in defiance of international conventions. The story of U.S. involvement with Saddam Hussein in the years before his 1990 attack on Kuwait -- which included large-scale intelligence sharing, supply of cluster bombs through a Chilean front company, and facilitating Iraq's acquisition of chemical and biological precursors -- is a topical example of the underside of U.S. foreign policy. It is a world in which deals can be struck with dictators, human rights violations sometimes overlooked, and accommodations made with arms proliferators, all on the principle that the "enemy of my enemy is my friend."...The administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush authorized the sale to Iraq of numerous items that had both military and civilian applications, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague...
In a September interview with CNN, Rumsfeld said he "cautioned" Hussein about the use of chemical weapons, a claim at odds with declassified State Department notes of his 90-minute meeting with the Iraqi leader. A Pentagon spokesman, Brian Whitman, now says that Rumsfeld raised the issue not with Hussein, but with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz. The State Department notes show that he mentioned it largely in passing as one of several matters that "inhibited" U.S. efforts to assist Iraq.
Rumsfeld has also said he had "nothing to do" with helping Iraq in its war against Iran. Although former U.S. officials agree that Rumsfeld was not one of the architects of the Reagan administration's tilt toward Iraq -- he was a private citizen when he was appointed Middle East envoy -- the documents show that his visits to Baghdad led to closer U.S.-Iraqi cooperation on a wide variety of fronts. Washington was willing to resume diplomatic relations immediately, but Hussein insisted on delaying such a step until the following year. As part of its opening to Baghdad, the Reagan administration removed Iraq from the State Department terrorism list in February 1982, despite heated objections from Congress. Without such a move, Teicher says, it would have been "impossible to take even the modest steps we were contemplating" to channel assistance to Baghdad. Iraq -- along with Syria, Libya and South Yemen -- was one of four original countries on the list, which was first drawn up in 1979....On the other hand, Iraq continued to play host to alleged terrorists throughout the '80s. The most notable was Abu Abbas, leader of the Palestine Liberation Front..."
2
CB1-02 Previous U.S. support for Iraq and Saddam's chemical weapon use Powell for Bush

"...Saddam Hussein has used such weapons. And Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them again -- against his neighbors and against his own people..."

Cheney for Bush

"...The whole range of weapons of mass destruction then would rest in the hands of a dictator who has already shown his willingness to use such weapons, and has done so, both in his war with Iran and against his own people..."

Peter W. Galbraith (Boston Globe):
"...In 1987, Hussein turned his chemical weapons on the Kurds, who the year before had embarked on one of their periodic rebellions against rule from Baghdad. The effects were devastating. In a single attack on March 16, 1988, on the eastern city of Halabja, more than 5,000 Kurdish men, women, and children died horrific deaths as nerve gas seeped into cellars where hundreds huddled or caught up with those trying to outrun the gas on the city's dusty streets.
A few months later, I encountered the survivors of what proved to be the final gas attacks on the Kurds. On August 25, 1988 - five days after the Iran-Iraq war ended - Iraq launched a massive attack on Kurdish villages along its border with Turkey. Within days, 65,000 refugees had crossed into Turkey...
By the time we arrived in early September, some refugees were sheltered in Turkish-run tent cities while others remained in the open in desolate high mountain valleys fringed with patches of snow. They seemed numb as they described how helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft flew over their homes, dropping "quiet" bombs. Smoke smelling of "burnt almonds" or "rotten onions" wafted across the landscape. People dropped dead. Those brave enough to venture close to the corpses noticed "blue lips" and sometimes small amounts of blood. Because these were not the first such attacks, the survivors knew better than to touch the corpses; nerve agents can kill on contact. Men fled, leaving the bodies of their wives and young children to scavenging animals.
Before we left for Turkey, Senators Pell, Al Gore, and Jesse Helms had introduced legislation to impose comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq for its use of chemical weapons. The Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988 unanimously passed the US Senate just one day after being introduced. Van Hollen's and my report on the gassings was intended to boost the bill's prospects in the House of Representatives.
Kurdish leaders knew all about the legislation. For the first time, it seemed the United States was poised to take action on their behalf. Indeed, at one refugee camp, Van Hollen and I were feted with an enthusiastic pro-American demonstration.
The Kurds were to be disappointed. The Reagan administration, which had been providing Iraq with $700 million a year in credit guarantees, saw Hussein's Iraq both as a potential security partner in the volatile Persian Gulf and as a promising market for American products and investment.
Secretary of State George Shultz denounced Iraq's use of chemical weapons, but others in the administration seemed more concerned about the Iraqi reaction should the sanctions become law. (Senate passage of the Pell legislation produced the biggest anti-American demonstration in Baghdad in 20 years.) Working with the Republican House leadership and some House Democrats, the administration was able to water down and ultimately defeat the Prevention of Genocide Act.
While past error is no indication of future action, the Kurds have not forgotten that Secretary of State Colin Powell was then the national security adviser who orchestrated Ronald Reagan's decision to give Hussein a pass for gassing the Kurds. Dick Cheney, then a prominent Republican congressman and now vice president and the Bush administration's leading Iraq hawk, could have helped push the sanctions legislation but did not..." [CG emphasis]

(being very very compassionate here)

CB2-01 Iraq and VX Powell for Bush

"...It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced four tons of the deadly nerve agent, VX. [...] UNSCOM also gained forensic evidence that Iraq had produced VX and put it into weapons for delivery. Yet, to this day, Iraq denies it had ever weaponized VX. And on January 27, UNMOVIC told this council that it has information that conflicts with the Iraqi account of its VX program..."

State Dept. for Bush

"...The UN concluded that Iraq had not accounted for 1.5 tons of the VX agent. Just one drop is enough to kill a person..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...Most chemical and biological agents are subject to processes of deterioration. A working paper by UNSCOM from January 1998 noted that: "Taking into consideration the conditions and the quality of CW-agents and munitions produced by Iraq at that time, there is no possibility of weapons remaining from the mid-1980's" (quoted in Arms Control Today, June 2000)...If the allegations that Iraq possessed a stockpile of illicit weapons were to be true, then the UK and US would need to present credible evidence that Iraq had managed to stabilise its chemical and biological agents to a greater extent than it is previously thought to have done...For example, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) strategic dossier of September 2002 records the status of VX produced before the Gulf War: "Any VX produced by Iraq before 1991 is likely to have decomposed over the past decade [...]. Any G-agent or V-agent stocks that Iraq concealed from UNSCOM inspections are likely to have deteriorated by now."...United States laboratory, which reported in June 1998 that they had found VX degradation products on the missile warheads. This was seen as indicating at the time that Iraq had stabilised VX sufficiently and had managed to weaponise it (in contrast to the Government of Iraq's own claims). However, further tests on fragments from the same missile warheads at two other laboratories (in Switzerland and France), and at the same United States laboratory with further samples, "found no nerve agent degradation products" (ibid., p.82). The chemical in question "could also originate from other compounds such as precursors or, according to some experts, a detergent" (ibid., p.81)..."

Also see Glen Rangwala for more details on the VX case.

1
CB3-01 Iraq and mustard gas  State Department for Bush

"...UNMOVIC has reported that Iraq failed to provide evidence to account for 1,000 tons of mustard gas, 550 mustard gas-filled munitions..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...With regard to the "1,000 tons of mustard gas", referred to by the State Department on 27 February 2003, this seems to be an exaggeration. The only mustard that is unaccounted for except for the artillery shells is the discrepancy revealed in the Air Force document between the aerial bombs that Iraq claims it used in the Iran-Iraq war and the lower figure for those used in that document (see above). As Hans Blix said (quoted above), the total amount of chemical agents in these bombs could be around 1,000 tonnes. However, a considerable proportion of this would be made up of Sarin and Tabun bombs, agents that would not have lasted for more than a few months, and not mustard..."
1
CB4-01 Iraq and G-agents Defense Dept. for Bush

[claimed that] 200 metric tons of G-agents (sarin) are unaccounted for.

State Dept. for Bush

"...Gaps identified by UNSCOM in Iraqi accounting and current production capabilities strongly suggest that Iraq maintains stockpiles of chemical agents, probably VX, sarin, cyclosarin and mustard..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...The main G-agents produced by Iraq were Tabun, Sarin and Cyclosarin...These agents deteriorate rapidly, especially if impurities are present in their manufacture. This seems to have been the case with Iraq's nerve agents...
Tabun: "documentary evidence suggests that Tabun was produced using process technology and quality control methodologies that would result in the agent being degraded to a very low quality through the action of a resulting by-product." ("Unresolved Disarmament Issues", 6 March 2003, p.68).
Sarin / Cyclosarin: "According to documents discovered by UNSCOM in Iraq, the purity of Sarin-type agents produced by Iraq were on average below 60%, and dropped below Iraq’s established quality control acceptance level of 40% by purity some 3 to 12 months after production. [...] There is no evidence that any bulk Sarin-type agents remain in Iraq - gaps in accounting of these agents are related to Sarin-type agents weaponized in rocket warheads and aerial bombs. Based on the documentation found by UNSCOM during inspections in Iraq, Sarin-type agents produced by Iraq were largely of low quality and as such, degraded shortly after production. Therefore, with respect to the unaccounted for weaponized Sarin-type agents, it is unlikely that they would still be viable today." ("Unresolved Disarmament Issues", 6 March 2003, pp.72-73)...."
1
CB5-01 Iraq chemical weapons plants State Department for Bush

 "...Iraq continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could quickly divert to chemical weapons production, such as chlorine and phenol plants..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...
Many of the most detailed claims made about Iraq since 1998 have been related to the rebuilding of facilities that were formerly associated with chemical and biological weapons. It is noticeable that few of these claims are that a specific facility is currently being used for the production of chemical or biological warfare agents. Instead, the facilities are identified as being capable of producing such agents as well as civilian products, or that the material that is being produced could be used in the development of illicit weapons.
Unless there is a reliable assessment that the production undertaken at these facilities is part of a chemical and biological warfare programme, the information presented in these claims cannot be taken as demonstrating that Iraq has recently produced illicit chemical and biological agents. Indeed, UNMOVIC inspections have not discovered any facilities in Iraq currently engaged in the production of chemical or biological weapons. A significant example is the description provided by UNMOVIC for the facilities required to produce mustard agents:
"Iraq does not appear to have a dedicated facility capable of producing Mustard and its key precursors. Significant modifications would be required to convert existing chemical production facilities for this purpose. Iraq would have to utilize “corrosion resistant” equipment (for the processing of the chlorinating agent), which it possesses in limited quantities. However, Iraq had some items of dual-use equipment distributed all over the country at legitimate facilities that could be removed and assembled for the construction of a dedicated Mustard production plant".
("Unresolved Disarmament Issues", 6 March 2003, p.77).
The example of mustard is significant because, according to UNMOVIC, "Mustard would be the easiest agent for Iraq to produce indigenously." (ibid.)
..."
None assigned since the claim is couched in "safe" words that cannot be argued against. However, the statement is compassionate because it does not demonstrate that actual weapons production is occurring.

I will cover this claim further in the "after invasion" section.

CB5-02 Iraq chemical weapons plants Powell for Bush

"..."Iraq has rebuilt key portions of the Tareq State Establishment. Tareq includes facilities designed specifically for Iraq’s chemical weapons program and employs key figures from past programs"..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...This site, which used to produce chemical weapons precursors, was bombed in the Gulf War, and its remaining stocks were removed and destroyed by UNSCOM. It was inactive in 1998. The claims that it now produces chlorine and phenol (ie carbolic acid), which could serve as precursors for the production of weapons, were not substantiated in UK and US reports. These chemicals could also be used as disinfectants and in water treatment, and so the production of these chemicals in themselves would not necessarily be evidence for a weapons programme. 
Results of UN inspections
. Fallujah II was inspected by UNMOVIC inspectors on 9 December 2002. In contrast to the extensive claims of the CIA and the State Department, UNMOVIC found that the chlorine plant was not even in use:
"Two separate chemical plants are in the factory area and their major activity is the production of phenol and chlorine. The chlorine plant is currently inoperative. The site contains a number of tagged dual-use items of equipment, which were all accounted for. All key buildings were inspected in addition to the chlorine and phenol plants. The objectives of the visit were successfully achieved."..."
1
CB5-03 Iraq chemical weapons plants Powell for Bush

"...Here you see 15 munitions bunkers...the four that are in red squares represent active chemical munitions bunkers. How do I know that?...a facility that is a signature item for this kind of bunker. Inside that facility are special guards and special equipment to monitor any leakage...The truck you also see is a signature item. It’s a decontamination vehicle..."

Greg Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) via Dennis Hans:
"...(a) This seems ostensibly to be a wholly implausible claim: a picture of a truck and a shed by themselves reveal nothing about the contents of the adjacent bunker. It also begs the question why the US did not provide this information to the inspectors as soon as they entered Iraq on 27 November, 25 days before Powell claims al-Taji was evacuated. If they were genuine in their beliefs, why did they not allow the independent inspectorate to check verify their claims? 
(b) Dr Blix reminds the Security Council of Powell’s false inference on 14 February 2003:
"The presentation of intelligence information by the US Secretary of State suggested that Iraq had prepared for inspections by cleaning up sites and removing evidence of proscribed weapons programmes. I would like to comment only on one case, which we are familiar with, namely, the trucks identified by analysts as being for chemical decontamination at a munitions depot. This was a declared site, and it was certainly one of the sites Iraq would have expected us to inspect. We have noted that the two satellite images of the site were taken several weeks apart. The reported movement of munitions at the site could just as easily have been a routine activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent inspection."..."

Charles Hanley (AP) via Common Dreams:
"...Powell presented satellite photos of industrial buildings, bunkers and trucks, and suggested they showed Iraqis surreptitiously moving prohibited missiles and chemical and biological weapons to hide them. At two sites, he said trucks were "decontamination vehicles" associated with chemical weapons. 
These and other sites have now undergone 500 inspections in recent months. Chief U.N. inspector Hans Blix, a day earlier, had said his well-equipped experts had found no contraband in their inspections and no sign that items had been moved. Nothing has been reported found since.
Addressing the Security Council a week after Powell, Blix used one photo scenario as an example and said it could be showing routine as easily as illicit activity. Journalists visiting photographed sites hours after the Powell speech found similar activity to be routine.
Norwegian inspector Jorn Siljeholm told AP on March 19 that "decontamination vehicles" U.N. teams were led to by U.S. information invariably turned out to be simple water or fire trucks. On June 24, Blix said of the entire Powell photo package, "We were not impressed with that particular evidence."
Amid Powell's warnings, a critical fact was lost: Iraq's military industries were to have remained under strict, on-site U.N. monitoring for years to come, guarding against the rebuilding of weapons programs..."

2
CB6-01 Iraq chemical weapons Powell for Bush

"...Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons..."

Powell for Bush

"...On Sept. 8, 2002, Powell said in a Fox News interview that ''there is no doubt'' that Saddam Hussein ''has chemical weapons stocks.''..."

Colin Powell (U.N. Speech):
"...We have evidence these weapons existed. What we don't have is evidence from Iraq that they have been destroyed or where they are. That is what we are still waiting for...With Iraq's well-documented history on biological and chemical weapons, why should any of us give Iraq the benefit of the doubt? I don't..."

Glen Rangwala:
"...a false inference that lack of corroborative evidence for destruction is equal to continued existence of weapons, as Blix pointedly mentioned in his briefing to the Security Council of 14 February 2003: "To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided, suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were ‘unaccounted for’. One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist."..."

Bryan Bender (Boston Globe):
"...The Defense Intelligence Agency, in a classified report that same month, had a different view: ''There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing or stockpiling chemical weapons.''..."
2

 

STATEMENTS ON IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS EVALUATED AFTER THE INVASION <go back to the top>

Compassion Con credits total = 9

# Topic President Bush or his representative's Compassionate statement Some Uncompassionate Facts Compassion Con Credits
CA1-01 Iraqi chemical/ biological weapons  Bush/WH

"...[Iraq] could launch a biological or chemical attack 45 minutes after the order is given..."

Dana Milbank (Washington Post):
"...The White House, in the run-up to war in Iraq, did not seek CIA approval before charging that Saddam Hussein could launch a biological or chemical attack within 45 minutes, administration officials now say.
The claim, which has since been discredited, was made twice by President Bush, in a September Rose Garden appearance after meeting with lawmakers and in a Saturday radio address the same week. Bush attributed the claim to the British government, but in a "Global Message" issued Sept. 26 and still on the White House Web site, the White House claimed, without attribution, that Iraq "could launch a biological or chemical attack 45 minutes after the order is given."
The 45-minute claim is at the center of a scandal in Britain that led to the apparent suicide on Friday of a British weapons scientist who had questioned the government's use of the allegation. The scientist, David Kelly, was being investigated by the British parliament as the suspected source of a BBC report that the 45-minute claim was added to Britain's public "dossier" on Iraq in September at the insistence of an aide to Prime Minister Tony Blair -- and against the wishes of British intelligence, which said the charge was from a single source and was considered unreliable.
The White House embraced the claim, from a British dossier on Iraq, at the same time it began to promote the dossier's disputed claim that Iraq sought uranium in Africa.
Bush administration officials last week said the CIA was not consulted about the claim. A senior White House official did not dispute that account, saying presidential remarks such as radio addresses are typically "circulated at the staff level" within the White House only.
Virtually all of the focus on whether Bush exaggerated intelligence about Iraq's weapons ambitions has been on the credibility of a claim he made in the Jan. 28 State of the Union address about efforts to buy uranium in Africa. But an examination of other presidential remarks, which received little if any scrutiny by intelligence agencies, indicates Bush made more broad accusations on other intelligence matters related to Iraq...
As it turns out, the 45-minute charge was not true; though forbidden weapons may yet be found in Iraq, an adviser to the Bush administration on arms issues said last week that such weapons were not ready to be used on short notice..."
1
CA1-02 Iraqi chemical weapons Bush

"...We have seen intelligence over many months that they have chemical and biological weapons, and that they have dispersed them and that they're weaponized and that, in one case at least, the command and control arrangements have been established..."

Christopher Scheer (AlterNet):
"...FACT: Despite a massive nationwide search by U.S. and British forces, there are no signs, traces or examples of chemical weapons being deployed in the field, or anywhere else during the war..."

Washington Post:
"...The administration maintained that Iraq was still producing deadly chemical agents such as mustard, sarin and VX. Mr. Kay reported that "multiple sources" have told his 1,200-member team "that Iraq did not have a large, centrally-controlled chemical weapons program after 1991." In the dozen summary pages of his report made public, Mr. Kay emphasized that after three months of work his conclusions are preliminary and that he may yet find chemical or biological munitions. Yet already enough is known to conclude that both the president and the nation's intelligence community must be accountable for misstating, or being mistaken about, the extent of the Iraqi threat. .."

1
CA1-03 Iraqi chemical weapons Powell for Bush

"...Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent..."

Bush NIE

"...Although we have little specific information on Iraq’s CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents—much of it added in the last year..."

Charles Hanley (AP) via Common Dreams:
"...Powell gave no basis for the assertion, and no such agents have been reported found. An unclassified CIA report last October made a similar assertion without citing concrete evidence, saying only that Iraq "probably" concealed precursor chemicals to make such weapons. The DIA reported confidentially last September there "is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons."..."

Bob Drogin (The New Republic):
"...Kay's interim report all but dismisses those claims as groundless. "Multiple sources," he wrote, indicate that Iraq "did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled C.W. program after 1991." Information found so far, he added, suggests Baghdad's large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new chemical munitions "was reduced--if not entirely destroyed" by the combined effects of the 1991 Gulf war, the 1998 Desert Fox air strikes, 13 years of U.N. sanctions, and nine years of U.N. inspections. Since large-scale facilities are needed to develop, produce, and fill chemical weapons for military use, the program was effectively dead..."

1
CA1-04 Iraqi chemical weapons Powell for Bush

"...Let me remind you that -- of the 122 mm chemical warheads that the UN inspectors found recently. This discovery could very well be, as has been noted, the tip of a submerged iceberg.
The question before us all, my friends, is when will we see the rest of the submerged iceberg?..."

Charles Hanley (AP) via Common Dreams:
"...The warheads were empty, a fact Powell didn't note. Blix said on June 16 the dozen stray rocket warheads, never uncrated, were apparently "debris from the past," the 1980s. No others have been reported found since the invasion..."
1
CA1-05 Iraqi chemical weapons Kay for Bush

"...Iraqi practice was not to mark much of their chemical ordnance and [was] to store it at the same [sites] that held conventional rounds, the size of the required search is enormous..."

Bob Drogin (The New Republic):
"...That's not quite true. For one thing, U.N. weapons inspectors checked scores of suspect Iraqi military bases, ammo dumps, and armories before the war. After it ended, special U.S. weapons-hunting teams scrutinized scores more that had been identified by the Defense Intelligence Agency. On May 30, the top Marine commander in Iraq, Lieutenant General James Conway, told reporters that his troops had scoured ammo storage sites across southern Iraq for banned weapons. We've been to virtually every ammunition supply point between the Kuwaiti border and Baghdad, but they are simply not there," Conway said.
There is another problem. If no chemical weapons were produced in bulk after 1991, as Kay now concedes, then he presumably is searching for chemical warfare agents or precursors left over from the '80s in drums or in filled munitions. It's possible that some will be found. But, except for Iraq's mustard gas, which had a long shelf life, all of Iraq's known nerve agents were of poor quality and would have deteriorated years ago. U.N. inspectors who recovered and destroyed large quantities of those weapons in the early '90s found they had lost most of their lethality and were not suitable for warfare. 
Moreover, despite Kay's claim, several U.N. inspectors say Saddam's regime always marked its "special munitions," as chemical-filled shells, bombs, and warheads were known. The markings were neither consistent nor standard--some munitions had numbers, others a black stripe, others a stenciled white circle, others just the painted letter "A" or "B." Nevertheless, they were marked. In fact, the markings were so well-known that, before the war, the Pentagon produced hand cards showing the various markings so that military ordnance and demolition experts could identify chemical weapons. There was good reason. On March 4, 1991, just after the Gulf war ended, up to 5,000 American troops were exposed when American military engineers mistakenly destroyed bunkers containing sarin and mustard gas at the Kamisiyah ammo-storage site in southern Iraq. No one wanted the accidental release of another toxic cloud. "Kay's comment gives the impression [chemical weapons] were kept with conventional munitions, and he'll have to check every shell," said an American weapons expert who spent seven years as a U.N. inspector and who strongly supported the war. "That's baloney. They kept them separated from regular munitions, they had separate security, and they had separate chain of command. They were never co-located with conventional munitions."..."

Also see: Bob Drogin (Los Angeles Times)

2
CA2-01 Iraqi VX Powell for Bush

"...It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced four tons of the deadly nerve agent VX. A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes. Four tons. The admission only came out after inspectors collected documentation as a result of the defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's late son-in-law.
UNSCOM also gained forensic evidence that Iraq had produced VX and put it into weapons for delivery, yet to this day Iraq denies it had ever weaponized VX. And on January 27, UNMOVIC told this Council that it has information that conflicts with the Iraqi account of its VX program..."

Charles Hanley (AP) via Common Dreams:
"...[In this speech] Powell didn't note that most of that four tons was destroyed in the 1990s under U.N. supervision. Before the invasion, the Iraqis made a "considerable effort" to prove they had destroyed the rest, doing chemical analysis of the ground where inspectors confirmed VX had been dumped, the U.N. inspection agency reported May 30.
Experts at Britain's International Institute of Strategic Studies said any pre-1991 VX most likely would have degraded anyway. No VX has been reported found since the invasion
..."
1
CA3-01 Iraqi chemical weapons
plan(t)s
Powell for Bush

"...We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry. To all outward appearances, even to experts, the infrastructure looks like an ordinary civilian operation. Illicit and legitimate production can go on simultaneously or on a dime..."

State Department for Bush

 "...Iraq continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could quickly divert to chemical weapons production, such as chlorine and phenol plants..."

Charles Hanley (AP) via Common Dreams:
"...
No "chemical weapons infrastructure" has been reported found. The newly disclosed DIA report of last September said there was "no reliable information" on "where Iraq has - or will - establish its chemical warfare agent-production facilities." 
Many countries' civilian chemical industries are capable of making weapons agents, and Iraq's was under close U.N. oversight. The DIA report suggested international inspections, swept aside by the U.S. invasion six months later, would be able to keep Iraq from rebuilding a chemical weapons program
..."

Dana Milbank and Walter Pincus (Washington Post):
"...David Kay, the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq, presented a different view in his congressional testimony last week. For example, he said: "Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW [chemical weapons] munitions was reduced -- if not entirely destroyed -- during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of U.N. sanctions and U.N. inspections." ..."

1
CA3-02 Iraqi chemical weapons
plan(t)s
Powell for Bush

"...Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons...we have sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them. He wouldn't be passing out the orders if he didn't have the weapons or the intent to use them..."

Bush

"...We have sources that tell us that Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons -- the very weapons the dictator tell us he does not have..."

Charles Hanley (AP) via Common Dreams:
"...No such weapons were used and none was reported found after the U.S. and allied military units overran Iraqi field commands and ammunition dumps. Even before Powell spoke, U.N. inspectors had found no such weapons at Iraqi military bases..."

Dana Milbank and Walter Pincus (Washington Post):
"...David Kay, the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq, presented a different view in his congressional testimony last week. For example, he said: "Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW [chemical weapons] munitions was reduced -- if not entirely destroyed -- during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of U.N. sanctions and U.N. inspections." ..."

1

 

STATEMENTS ON IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS BEFORE THE INVASION 
<go back to the top>

Compassion Con credits total = 14

# Topic President Bush or his representative's Compassionate statement Some Uncompassionate Facts Compassion Con Credits
BB1-01 Previous U.S. shipment of biological toxins to Iraq Rumsfeld for Bush

"...At last week's Armed Services Committee hearing, Secretary [Donald] Rumsfeld said he had no knowledge of any such shipments and doubted that they ever occurred..."

Paul Nyden (West Virginia Gazette) via TruthOut:
"..."We have a paper trail," Byrd said. "We not only know that Iraq has biological weapons, we know the type, the strain, and the batch number of the germs that may have been used to fashion those weapons. We know the dates they were shipped and the addresses to which they were shipped. "We have in our hands the equivalent of a Betty Crocker cookbook of ingredients that the U.S. allowed Iraq to obtain and that may well have been used to concoct biological weapons." Those shipments included: Between 1985 and 1988, the nonprofit American Type Culture Collection made 11 shipments to Iraq that included a "witches' brew of pathogens," including anthrax, botulinum toxin and gangrene. All shipments were government-approved.
Between January 1980 and October 1993, the federal Centers for Disease Control shipped a variety of toxic specimens to Iraq, including West Nile virus and Dengue fever. The U.S. Commerce Department and CDC provided lists of these shipments..."
1
BB2-01 Iraq biological weapons Bush

"...From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs... Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them..."

"...In 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq's military industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents..."

Alan Gilbert (Priority Peace):
"..."Hussein Kamel, the highest-ranking Iraqi official ever to defect from Saddam Hussein's inner circle, told CIA and British intelligence officers and U.N. inspectors in the summer of 1995 that after the gulf war, Iraq destroyed all its chemical and biological weapons stocks and the missiles to deliver them." 
Newsweek
"The Defector’s Secrets" 03-03-03

"All chemical weapons were destroyed. I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons - biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed" Hussein Kamel 
UNSCOM/IAEA interview transcript, "UNSCOM/IAEA Sensitive," p. 13 08-22-95 http://www.casi.org.uk/info/unscom950822.pdf..."

Outlook India:
"..."Several inspections have taken place ... in relation to mobile production facilities," he [Blix] said. "No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found." Blix said his inspectors had looked into several mobile facilities as well as "large containers with seed processing equipment...."

Also see: The Guardian and see Glen Rangwala for a more detailed rebuttal of the claims regarding the "mobile" facilities.

1
BB2-02 Iraq (biological weapons) Bush admin

"...All key aspects - R&D, production, and weaponization - of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war..."

A lot of quotes are here.

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...It is unclear how seriously the CIA's claim that Iraq's BW programme is more advanced now than it was in 1991 should be taken, especially as al-Hakam, Iraq's main biological weapons facility, had been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in May-June 1996. The Security Council's Panel on Disarmament recorded in March 1999 that "the declared facilities of Iraq's BW programme have been destroyed and rendered harmless" (para.23). In any event, the CIA's claim is contradicted by other US official assessments. The US General Accounting Office (GAO), and investigative arm of the Congress, concluded in September 2002 that: "In the context of the conventional battlefield, the nature and magnitude of the military BW threat has not changed materially since 1990 in terms of the number of countries suspected of developing BW capability, the types of BW agents they possess, or their ability to weaponize and deliver BW agents. This is particularly true regarding the ability to accumulate and deliver sufficient quantities of processed agent to cause mass casualties." 
GAO Report GAO-02-445 (September 2002), p.3, at:
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02445.pdf..."

AFTER THE INVASION

Bob Drogin (The New Republic):
"...The Kay report doesn't support that assertion at all..."
1
BB2-03 Iraq biological weapons Bush

"...the regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. The inspectors, however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for, and capable of killing millions..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...The quotes above from the State Department and CIA in September and October 2002, misrepresent the findings of UNSCOM most clearly: UNSCOM did not conclude with the State Department "that Iraq actually produced two to four times the amount of most agents, including anthrax and botulinim toxin, than it had declared", but that if the assumptions above were to hold, the "[q]uantities produced could be at least 3 times greater than stated" by Iraq (in its January 1999 report, Appendix III). To infer from this to what Iraq "actually produced" (State Department) is to make a leap of logic for which there is insufficient evidence. Similarly, President Bush and Press Secretary Fleischer both impute views to UNSCOM that never constituted the position of the inspectorate: in no UNSCOM report is it stated that Iraq is "likely" to have produced more than it claimed, but merely that it could have done so.
Furthermore, the claims about Iraq possessing a stockpile of biological weapons created before 1991 may suffer from the same problems as discussed for the notion of a stockpile of chemical weapons, above. The assessment by Professor Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is as follows:
"The shelf-life and lethality of Iraq's weapons is unknown, but it seems likely that the shelf-life was limited. In balance, it seems probable that any agents Iraq retained after the Gulf War now have very limited lethality, if any"
"Iraq's Past and Future Biological Weapons Capabilities" (1998), p.13, at: http://www.csis.org/stratassessment/reports/iraq_bios.pdf..."

Joseph Cirincione and Dipali Mukhopadyay (Foreign Policy) via Corrente::
"...The U.N. inspectors did not reach this conclusion. Their final report in 1999 indicated that 520 kilograms (1,144 pounds) of yeast extract (bacterial growth media) remained unaccounted for and was "sufficient to produce 26,000 litres of Bacillus anthracis spores or over 3 times the amount declared by Iraq." Inspectors did not know if Iraq had actually used this growth media to produce more anthrax, nor did they draw any conclusions about what weapons Iraq might possess. Iraq's biological weapons, if they existed, could "kill millions" only if the regime had a large arsenal of highly-effective long-range missile, rocket, and airborne delivery systems, such as those that the United States and the Soviet Union perfected during the Cold War. There was no evidence that Iraq possessed such delivery systems..."

2
BB2-04 Iraq biological weapons Bush admin

"...The UN Special Commission concluded that Iraq did not verifiably account for, at a minimum, 2160kg of growth media. (repeated by White House, January 2003, p.5)..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...It is particularly curious that Dr Blix, in his update to the Security Council on 27 January 2003, provides a wholly different set of figures from the US in accounting for growth media. He claims that 650kg of bacterial growth media is unaccounted for (unlike the US claims that 2160kg or, alternatively, 3 tonnes of this media is unaccounted for)..."
1
BB2-05 Iraq biological weapons Powell for Bush

"...By 1998, U.N. experts agreed that the Iraqis had perfected drying techniques for their biological weapons programs..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...This seems to be untrue. UNSCOM never stated in its official reports that Iraq had "perfected drying techniques". UNSCOM recognised that Iraq had experimented with drying techniques, but seem to have been unsure about Iraq's success in this regard...
UNMOVIC reached the following conclusions:
"It is most likely that, as it had declared, Iraq was unsuccessful in 1989/90 in acquiring a special dust-free spray dryer to safely dry large quantities of anthrax. [...] In any event, it seems likely that no bulk drying of agent took place in either 1989 or 1990...
"UNMOVIC has no evidence that drying of anthrax or any other agent in bulk was conducted." (ibid., p.120)..."
1
BB2-06 Iraq (biological weapons) Bush

"...The United Nations concluded that Saddam Hussein had materials sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin -- enough to subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...Secretary Powell and President Bush both make a claim about growth material for botulinum toxin that is unaccounted for, and attribute this claim to the United Nations. Both are inaccurate.
According to the UNSCOM January 1999 report, the growth media unaccounted for that could be used for making botulinum toxin consisted of 460kg of casein and 80kg of thioglycollate broth. It records that this amount was "Sufficient for the production of 1200 litres of concentrated botulinum toxin (depending on availability of other components including yeast extract). This would represent an additional 6% of that which has already been declared by Iraq." Although far from being a small volume, the 1200 litres at issue for UNSCOM is quite different in scale from the 38,000 litres described by Secretary Powell and President Bush...
Clostridium botulinum (botulinum toxin) consists of anaerobic bacilli, which have a short shelf life."

Glen Rangwala and Raymond Whitaker (Traprockpeace.org):
"...In March, UN inspectors reported: "it seems unlikely that significant undeclared quantities of botulinum toxin could have been produced, based on the quantity of media unaccounted for."..."

2
BB2-07 Iraq biological weapons Powell for Bush

"...We know from Iraq's past admissions that it has successfully weaponized [...] ricin..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...This seems to be untrue. UNSCOM stated in its January 1999 report, Appendix III, that Iraq only admitted to attempting field trials using 155mm artillery shells in November 1990. UNMOVIC record:
"Iraq states that a single static field test was conducted in November 1990, that it was considered to be a failure and that the project was abandoned. While UNMOVIC finds it probable that this test occurred, the project was probably abandoned due to the onset of war rather than the failure of the test. Apart from this static field test using 155mm artillery shells, there is no evidence to suggest that Iraq weaponized ricin for military purposes."
("Unresolved Disarmament Issues", 6 March 2003, p.116)...
"
1
BB2-08 Iraq biological weapons Bush admin

"...The al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility is one of two known biocontainment level-three facilities in Iraq that have an extensive air handling and filtering system. Iraq has admitted that this was a biological weapons facility. In 2001, Iraq announced that it would begin renovating the plant without UN approval, ostensibly to produce vaccines that it could more easily and more quickly import through the UN..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...Prior to 1991, al-Dawrah was engaged in research on viral warfare agents. In March 2001, the Government of Iraq wrote to the UN Secretary-General to notify him of the reactivation of this facility for the production of foot and mouth vaccine. This was in the aftermath of a severe outbreak of the disease, during which "at least 400,000 animals have died for lack of the vaccine", and the Executive Director of the UN Iraq Programme himself recommended the reconstitution of Iraq's own facilities for producing the vaccine (AP, 3 July 1999). The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) warned in February 1999 that "Iraq would need to import the vaccines required to fight foot-and-mouth disease [...] Procurement of the vaccines and their timely delivery is vital to safeguarding animal health, which is an essential component of food security in the region. [...] The government has been unable to adequately monitor and control the spread of these diseases, partly because of the difficulties it has in obtaining equipment and supplies, particularly vaccines. As a result the Iraqi government has repeatedly sought the assistance of FAO to deal with the outbreaks" (emphasis added). Permission from the UN Sanctions Committee to import foot and mouth vaccine was inconsistent...According to a Reuters report of 13 April 1999, the US had again held up Iraq's purchase of the vaccine in the UN Sanctions Committee for a short period of time. Although Iraq has in general been able to import the vaccine under the oil-for-food programme since that date, especially as the vaccine is not on the May 2002 list of items that need to be reviewed by the Sanctions Committee prior to import, there may in 2001 have been suspicions that an indigenous facility would be necessary in the event of a renewed obstructionist US role on the Sanctions Committee....
Results of UN inspection: "By the time the inspectors left the plant today, after four hours, they had concluded that the plant was no longer operational -- not for the production of toxins, and not for animal vaccines either. Reporters who were allowed to wander through the plant after the inspectors left found the place largely in ruins. Apparently, it had been abandoned by the Iraqis after 1996, when the weapons inspectors took heavy cutting equipment to the fermenters, containers and pressurized tubing and valves used in the toxin production." ("Inspectors Find Only Ruins at an Old Iraqi Weapons Site", New York Times, 29 November 2002)..."
2
BB2-09 Iraq (biological weapons) Bush

"...From 1991 to 1995, the Iraqi regime said it had no biological weapons. After a senior official in its weapons program defected and exposed this lie, the regime admitted to producing tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents..."

U.S. State Department:
"...For years, Iraq denied that it had an offensive biological weapons program of any kind. Despite such stonewalling, U.N. weapons inspectors uncovered evidence of an extensive and ongoing effort to develop biological weapons. [CG emphasis]
Then, in 1995, Hussein Kamal, Saddam's son-in-law and director of Iraq's military industries, defected and provided verification [CG emphasis] of Iraq's bioweapons program. The regime was forced to admit the truth: production of thousands of liters of such deadly agents as anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin..."

Compassiongate: Bush's statement was misleading as usual compassionate in that his words suggest that a lie was exposed by the defector. But as the State Department says, the lie was already exposed by the U.N. inspectors and then verified by the defectors statement. 

1
BB2-10 Iraq biological weapons Powell for Bush

"..."Saddam Hussein...has the wherewithal to develop smallpox"..."

Glen Rangwala and Raymond Whitaker (Traprockpeace.org):
"...The UN recorded in March 2003 that "there is no evidence that Iraq had possessed seed stocks for smallpox or had been actively engaged in smallpox research"..."

AFTER THE INVASION

AP/MSNBC:
"...Top American scientists assigned to the weapons hunt in Iraq found no evidence Saddam Hussein’s regime was making or stockpiling smallpox, The Associated Press has learned from senior military officers involved in the search...SMALLPOX FEARS were part of the case the Bush administration used to build support for invading Iraq — and they were raised again as recently as last weekend by Vice President Dick Cheney.
       But a three-month search by “Team Pox” turned up only signs to the contrary: disabled equipment that had been rendered harmless by U.N. inspectors, Iraqi scientists deemed credible who gave no indication they had worked with smallpox and a laboratory thought to be back in use that was covered in cobwebs...
Two of the six members of Team Pox — whose existence and work hasn’t been previously disclosed — have left Iraq while the rest remain involved in other aspects of the weapons hunt, said the officers who described the smallpox pursuit for the first time.
       Though Team Pox is no longer operational, having carried out their work between May and July, their findings don’t dismiss the possibility that smallpox could still be discovered, according to the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
       However, there remains little to pursue in this area now.
       “We found no physical or new anecdotal evidence to suggest Iraq was producing smallpox or had stocks of it in its possession,” one of the military officers said...
Bush administration officials often cited smallpox when describing Saddam’s intentions — and continue to do so despite the lack of evidence.
       On Sunday, Cheney said two trailers discovered in Iraq could have been used to make smallpox...
Despite those suspicions, Pentagon planners didn’t organize a specific search for smallpox when they put together a post-Saddam weapons hunt comprising hundreds of military personnel with expertise in missiles as well as chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
       “There was some discussion about creating specialized teams but we didn’t have enough people,” said Lt. Col. Michael Slifka, who planned the weapons hunt for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
       The original search teams, which disbanded when a Pentagon-led effort known as the Iraq Survey Group took over in August, comprised military officers trained in detecting chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Those teams didn’t have an investigative capability and didn’t include experts in specific areas such as smallpox.
       Surprised by the configuration, a handful of American biologists and virologists sent to Kuwait and then Baghdad with little instruction except to help, set up Team Pox on their own..."

1

 

STATEMENTS ON IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS EVALUATED AFTER THE INVASION <go back to the top>

Compassion Con credits total = 16

# Topic President Bush or his representative's Compassionate statement Some Uncompassionate Facts Compassion Con Credits
BA1-01 Iraqi biological weapons Bush administration/CIA

"...made public its assessment of two mysterious trailers found in Iraq, calling them mobile units to produce deadly germs and the strongest evidence yet that Saddam Hussein had been hiding a program to prepare for biological warfare. 
"We're highly confident" of that judgment, an American intelligence official told reporters. The official said the administration's strong conviction was based mainly on the similarity between the testimony of Iraqi sources and the evidence found on the ground..."

Bush

"...citing two trailers that U.S. intelligence agencies have said were probably used as mobile biological weapons labs, said U.S. forces in Iraq have "found the weapons of mass destruction" that were the United States' primary justification for going to war..."And we'll find more weapons as time goes on," Bush said. "But for those who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're wrong. We found them."..."

Cheney for Bush

"...We had intelligence reporting before the war that there were at least seven of these mobile labs that he had gone out and acquired. We’ve, since the war, found two of them. They’re in our possession today, mobile biological facilities that can be used to produce anthrax or smallpox or whatever else you wanted to use during the course of developing the capacity for an attack..."

William Broad (New York Times):
"...The report called the discovery of the trailers "the strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program." It also noted that Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, in his testimony before the United Nations on Feb. 5 to generate support for a war in Iraq, had detailed such charges.
 
Both the report and the briefing, a telephone conference call in which reporters asked questions, were careful and candid. Both had notable caveats, including the use of the words "probable" and "unlikely." Both conceded that there were inconsistencies in the evidence and a lack of hard proof, like the presence of pathogens in trailer gear. The officials acknowledged that they had discovered neither biological agents nor evidence that the equipment had ever been used to make germ weapons. 
Moreover, they said the trailer's hardware presented no direct evidence of weapons use. The best evidence of that, they said, was the trailers' close resemblance to prewar descriptions of mobile germ plants given by Iraqi sources.
A technical assessment alone "would not lead you intuitively and logically to biological warfare," an official said of the trailers.
Their gear was rusty, officials said, perhaps from sitting in the rain. And the mobile factories were poorly designed. For instance, one official noted, Iraqi biologists running the plants would have had a hard time getting raw materials into the production gear and removing multiplied colonies of deadly germs...
"It's possible," one official added, that the two trailers, made in 2002 and 2003, were part of a new, more advanced generation of mobile gear "never used to manufacture agent."
The report also made brief mention of a mobile laboratory found by American forces that intelligence officials said could have had both civilian and military uses. The report took issue with experts cited in a New York Times editorial of May 13, who had suggested that the trailers might have been meant to produce biopesticides or to refurbish missile fuel. Those explanations, it said, made no sense. American-led forces in Iraq are still hunting for other plants and their support vehicles, especially older models that might better match the descriptions of Iraqi sources. 
A skeptical view of the evidence presented yesterday came from Matthew S. Meselson, a Harvard expert on biological weapons who has advised the Central Intelligence Agency. He said the C.I.A. had made technical errors in the past and called on the government to turn over its Iraqi evidence to an independent panel. "The C.I.A. is under great political pressure," he said in an interview. "The evidence has to be given to an unimpeachable outside group of scientists and they should be allowed any tests or measurements they want. They shouldn't be spoon-fed the data." Dr. Meselson suggested that an appropriate group might be the National Academy of Sciences, a prestigious organization in Washington that often advises the government..."

Ben Fritz (Spinsanity):
"...President Bush's is now claiming that "we found the weapons of mass destruction. "This statement is flat out false according to the evidence presented by his own administration, however. So far, the U.S. has only found evidence of weapons labs that likely could have been used to create biological weapons, but has found no actual weapons banned by the United Nations...In remarks to Polish television released on Friday, though, President Bush stated that the U.S. has found much more than these labs. "We found the weapons of mass destruction. We found biological laboratories," he said, according to an Associated Press article. "''They're illegal. They're against the United Nations resolutions, and we've so far discovered two. And we'll find more weapons as time goes on. But for those who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, we found them." 
However, as the Washington Post piece states, "U.S. authorities have to date made no claim of a confirmed finding of an actual nuclear, biological or chemical weapon." The existence of the labs is an important but separate issue. In the midst of a debate about whether the U.S. government misled the public and other governments over its reasons for invading Iraq, the President is now making a patently false claim about evidence of the existence of weapons of mass destruction..."

Peter Beaumont, Antony Barnett and Gaby Hinsliff (The Observer):
"...An official British investigation into two trailers found in northern Iraq has concluded they are not mobile germ warfare labs, as was claimed by Tony Blair and President George Bush, but were for the production of hydrogen to fill artillery balloons, as the Iraqis have continued to insist...

a British scientist and biological weapons expert, who has examined the trailers in Iraq, told The Observer last week: 'They are not mobile germ warfare laboratories. You could not use them for making biological weapons. They do not even look like them. They are exactly what the Iraqis said they were - facilities for the production of hydrogen gas to fill balloons.'
The conclusion of the investigation ordered by the British Government - and revealed by The Observer last week - is hugely embarrassing for Blair..."

Douglas Jehl (New York Times):
"...The State Department's intelligence division is disputing the Central Intelligence Agency's conclusion that mysterious trailers found in Iraq were for making biological weapons, United States government officials said today.
In a classified June 2 memorandum, the officials said, the department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research said it was premature to conclude that the trailers were evidence of an Iraqi biological weapons program, as President Bush has done...The reasons cited in the State Department memorandum to justify its dissent could not be learned. But in interviews earlier this month in Washington and the Middle East, American and British analysts with direct access to the evidence also disputed the C.I.A.'s claims, saying that the mobile units were more likely intended for other purposes and that the evaluation process had been damaged by a rush to judgment..."

Dana Milbank (Washington Post):
"..."The president had repeatedly said that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and that includes everything knowable up to the opening shots of the war," he said. "We still have confidence in that information. You could say Iraq continues to have weapons of mass destruction. We have confidence we're going to find them. They're still there." 
Bush's remarks were significantly more circumscribed than his statement two weeks ago that "we found the weapons of mass destruction," based on the discovery of two trailers that the CIA has said could have been used to produce biological warfare agents. Although no actual pathogens had been recovered, Bush asserted then that "we'll find more weapons as time goes on."
A week later, Bush dropped the assertion that weapons had been found, saying instead that "we're on the look" for the weapons and that Hussein had "a big country in which to hide them."..."

Glen Rangwala (The Independent):
"...The ISG [Iraq Survey Group headed by David Kay] even casts serious doubt on President Bush's much-trumpeted claim that US forces had found three mobile biological laboratories after the war: "technical limitations" would prevent the trailers from being ideally suited to biological weapons production, it records. In other words, they were for something else..."

Joe Conason (New York Observer via Working for Change):
"...Wrong again, as Mr. Kay reluctantly noted. After scouring the two trailers for the past several months, his teams have been unable to "corroborate the existence of a mobile [biological-weapons] production effort." Indeed, what his scientists have learned is that technical limitations would almost certainly have made such difficult, dangerous processes impossible in those peculiar, canvas-sided vehicles..."

AP/MSNBC:
"...Top American scientists assigned to the weapons hunt in Iraq found no evidence Saddam Hussein’s regime was making or stockpiling smallpox, The Associated Press has learned from senior military officers involved in the search...
...a three-month search by “Team Pox” turned up only signs to the contrary: disabled equipment that had been rendered harmless by U.N. inspectors, Iraqi scientists deemed credible who gave no indication they had worked with smallpox and a laboratory thought to be back in use that was covered in cobwebs...
Bush administration officials often cited smallpox when describing Saddam’s intentions — and continue to do so despite the lack of evidence.
       On Sunday, Cheney said two trailers discovered in Iraq could have been used to make smallpox...
Despite those suspicions, Pentagon planners didn’t organize a specific search for smallpox when they put together a post-Saddam weapons hunt comprising hundreds of military personnel with expertise in missiles as well as chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
       “There was some discussion about creating specialized teams but we didn’t have enough people,” said Lt. Col. Michael Slifka, who planned the weapons hunt for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
       The original search teams, which disbanded when a Pentagon-led effort known as the Iraq Survey Group took over in August, comprised military officers trained in detecting chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Those teams didn’t have an investigative capability and didn’t include experts in specific areas such as smallpox.
       Surprised by the configuration, a handful of American biologists and virologists sent to Kuwait and then Baghdad with little instruction except to help, set up Team Pox on their own..."

Also see: Fred Kaplan (MSN/Slate)

2

(1 for lying compassion about the trailers and 1 for saying that others who point out the truth are liars compassionate.)

BA1-02 Iraqi biological weapons Bush

"...Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints..."

Joseph Cirincione and Dipali Mukhopadyay (Foreign Policy) via Corrente::
"...To date, no nation that has produced chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons has ever given such weapons to terrorist groups. In March 2002, CIA Director George Tenet told the U.S. Senate that if Saddam did cooperate with al Qaeda or another terrorist network against the United States, he would be “well aware that such activity would carry serious consequences.”..."

Walter Pincus (Washington Post):
"...
But declassified portions of a still-secret National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released Friday by the White House show that at the time of the president's speech the U.S. intelligence community judged that possibility to be unlikely. In fact, the NIE, which began circulating Oct. 2, shows the intelligence services were much more worried that Hussein might give weapons to al Qaeda terrorists if he were facing death or capture and his government was collapsing after a military attack by the United States.
"Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might decide that only an organization such as al Qaeda, . . . already engaged in a life-or-death struggle against the United States, could perpetrate the type of terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct," one key judgment of the estimate said.

It went on to say that Hussein might decide to take the "extreme step" of assisting al Qaeda in a terrorist attack against the United States if it "would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him."...
Friday's declassified material from the NIE gave a much more complete picture of the intelligence in the form of all the key judgments of the intelligence community.
One of the judgments was that Hussein "appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or [chemical or biological weapons] against the United States fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger case for making war."
Another judgment was that Iraq would "probably" attempt a clandestine attack against the United States, as mentioned by Bush -- not on "any given day" as the president said Oct. 7, but only "if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable."
..."

2
BA1-03 Iraqi biological weapons Iraq Survey Group (ISG) report for Bush

"...there is the allegation that a biologist had a "collection of reference strains" at his home, including "a vial of live C botulinum Okra B from which a biological agent can be produced"..."

Bush

"...The [Kay] report states that Saddam Hussein's regime had a clandestine network of biological laboratories, a live strain of deadly agent botulinum..."

Bush

"...said [that] the Iraq war was justified and cited the vial of bacteria as proof Kay found ample signs Saddam "was a danger to the world."..."

Powell for Bush

"Do you think vials of botulism should constitute a weapon of mass destruction?" Powell asked reporters. " ... They never lost that capability. They never lost that intent."

Boucher for Bush

"...US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher added: "You kill people with botuli. They have no other use."..."

Kay for Bush

"...Well, that's one of the most fascinating stories. An Iraqi scientist in 1993 hid in his own refrigerator reference strains for — active strains, actually would've — were still active when we found them — Botulinum toxin, one of the most toxic elements known..."

Kay for Bush

"...KAY: We're actively searching for at least one more cache of weapons — of strains that we know exists.
SNOW: This is a cache that had been referred to by a scientist. The first bit of information paid off; you're still looking for the second one?
KAY: Exactly..."

Walter Pincus (Washington Post):
"...Appearing on "Fox News Sunday," U.S. chief weapons inspector David Kay said he is searching for a cache of reference strains of biological agents that is supposed to include anthrax bacteria. Reference strains are not weapons agents but in effect sample amounts to be used to determine whether that agent exists. 
Kay's discovery of one vial of a reference strain of botulinum toxin that an Iraqi scientist had stored in his refrigerator in 1993 at his government's request was described by Bush on Friday as a piece of evidence that Iraq was prepared to have prohibited biological weapons.
Before the war, the administration, using 1998 data from U.N. inspectors, said that Iraq had not accounted for 25,000 liters of anthrax bacteria and 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin..."

Julian Borger (The Guardian):
"...the scientist involved said he was asked to hide the botulinum in his refrigerator at home in 1993. Iraq admitted pursuing a biological weapons programme to UN inspectors two years later. It is unclear whether the Iraqi scientist had received any orders from the regime after that date...
More evidence of such programmes was included in a 200-page classified version of the 13-page report made public, but experts in the ISG, including former UN inspectors, have so far not been allowed to read the classified version, according to one of their former colleagues.
The refusal to allow ISG experts to read a report on their own work adds weight to suspicions that the report has been manipulated. "They're under huge pressure to come up with whatever," the ex-colleague said..."

John J. Lumpkin (AP):
"...The Iraqi scientist who had the vial had been given it for safekeeping at his home by another, more senior scientist, in 1993, Kay said...
Although tests showed that the one vial of bacteria that the scientist kept was still viable, Kay offered no evidence it had been used in a weapons program during the last decade.
The vial contained a live bacteria that make botulinum toxin - a toxin that can be used as a biological weapon. But experts say there are many, complicated steps between possessing a vial of bacteria and producing enough of the toxin to create a weapon. That would require relatively sophisticated equipment and processing.
The bacteria itself is a common cause of food poisoning."

John J. Lumpkin (AP) via Salon:
"..."We have not found at this point actual weapons," [CG emphasis] Kay said after briefing lawmakers behind closed doors. "It does not mean we've concluded there are no actual weapons."..."

Bob Drogin (Los Angeles Times):
"...A suspicious sample of biological material recently found by U.S. weapons hunters in Iraq probably was purchased legally from a U.S. organization in the 1980s and is a substance that has never been successfully used to produce a weapon, experts said.
The discovery of the hidden vial of C. botulinum Okra B, which was revealed in an Oct. 2 interim report by chief U.S. weapons hunter David Kay, was highlighted in speeches by President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and other senior administration officials as proof that President Saddam Hussein's government maintained an illicit bio-weapons program before the war.
The significance of the vial is one of several elements of Kay's report that are being called into question by U.S. biowarfare experts and former United Nations weapons inspectors. Although most praised Kay for uncovering numerous cases in which Iraq hid suspicious equipment and activities from U.N. inspectors, they said the report appeared misleading in several areas...
The single vial of botulinum B had been stored in an Iraqi scientist's kitchen refrigerator since 1993. It appears to have been produced by a nonprofit Virginia biological resource center, the American Type Culture Collection, which legally exported botulinum and other biological material to Iraq under a Commerce Department license in the late 1980s.
The vial of botulinum B — about 2 inches high and half an inch wide — was the only suspicious biological material Kay reported finding. It was sealed and stored in the scientist's home with 96 other apparently benign vials of single-cell proteins and biopesticides...
But Dr. David Franz, a former chief U.N. biological weapons inspector who is considered among America's foremost experts on biowarfare agents, said there was no evidence that Iraq or anyone else has ever succeeded in using botulinum B for biowarfare.
"The Soviets dropped it [as a goal] and so did we, because we couldn't get it working as a weapon," said Franz, who is the former commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Ft. Detrick, Md., the Pentagon's lead laboratory for bioweapons defense research.
"From the weapons side, it's not something to be concerned about," agreed Dr. Raymond Zilinskas, another former U.N. inspector who is now director of the chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation program at the Monterey Institute in California..."

Glen Rangwala (The Independent):
"...type B - the form found at the biologist's home - is less lethal.
Even then, it would require an extensive process of fermentation, the growing of the bug, the extraction of the toxin and the weaponisation of the toxin before it could cause harm. That process would take weeks, if not longer, but the ISG reported no sign of any of these activities.
Botulinum type B could also be used for making an antidote to common botulinum poisoning. That is one of the reasons why many military laboratories around the world keep reference strains of C botulinum Okra B. The UK keeps such substances, for example, and calls them "seed banks"..."

Also see: Bob Drogin (The New Republic); Billmon/Whiskey Bar

3
BA1-04 Iraqi biological weapons Kay for Bush

"...[Iraq had] New research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN..."

Bob Drogin (Los Angeles Times):
"...In addition to the doubts about the botulinum B, several outside experts are also questioning the significance of Kay's claim that he uncovered covert "new research" in Iraq on such potential biowarfare agents as Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever as well as "continuing work" on ricin and aflatoxin that were not declared to U.N. inspectors.
CCHF, as the hemorrhagic fever virus is known, is common in Iraq. The World Health Organization reports that the disease, which can cause intense bleeding and death, is "endemic in many countries in Africa, Europe and Asia." There is no evidence that Iraq or anyone else has weaponized it.
"There are public health reasons to work with it in that part of the world," said Franz, the former bioweapons lab chief. "I wouldn't find it alarming that they're working on that."
Brucella, which chiefly affects livestock, is also endemic to Iraq. U.S. military scientists weaponized the bacterium during the Cold War but did not consider it effective because it is slow acting and can be treated with antibiotics. U.N. inspectors have not found evidence that Iraq worked on Brucella as a weapon.
Aflatoxin causes vomiting and other incapacitating symptoms but is rarely lethal in humans. The fungal toxin is chiefly known for causing liver cancer. Iraq produced aflatoxin as a weapon in the 1980s, but nonproliferation program director Zilinskas said it has never been clear why.
"It's not particularly toxic, and its primary effects are long term," he said. "My feeling to this day is that it was a scam that the scientists put over on the decision-makers because it's easy to produce and the decision-makers wouldn't know it is useless as a biological weapon."
Hussein's regime also had sought to weaponize ricin, which can be highly lethal if inhaled, but ended the program in 1990 after field tests failed to kill animals, according to U.N. reports.
"They gave up using ricin as a weapon," Franz said. "That was the right decision, in my opinion." Because it is so difficult to produce the proper powdered form for aerosol distribution, he added, "you almost need to be hit by a brick of it to kill you."..."
3
BA1-05 Iraqi biological weapons Kay for Bush

"...[Iraq had] A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research..."

Glen Rangwala (The Independent):
"...Note what that sentence does not say: these facilities were suitable for chemical and biological weapons research (as almost any modern lab would be), not that they had engaged in such research. The reference to UN monitoring is also spurious: under the terms of UN resolutions, all of Iraq's chemical and biological facilities are subject to monitoring. So all this tells us is that Iraq had modern laboratories..."
1
BA1-06 Iraqi biological weapons Powell for Bush

"...Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving not just documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction, to keep them from being found by inspectors. While we were here in this Council chamber debating Resolution 1441 last fall, we know, we know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was dispersing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agent to various locations, distributing them to various locations in western Iraq. Most of the launchers and warheads had been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved every one to four weeks to escape detection..."

Charles Hanley (AP) via Common Dreams:
"...According to Powell, unidentified sources said the Iraqis dispersed rocket launchers and warheads holding biological weapons to the western desert, hiding them in palm groves and moving them every one to four weeks.
Nothing has been reported found, after months of searching by U.S. and Australian troops in the near-empty desert. Al-Saadi suggested the story of palm groves and weekly-to-monthly movement was lifted whole from an Iraqi general's written account of hiding missiles in the 1991 war..."
1
BA1-07 Iraqi biological weapons Kay for Bush

"...Debriefings of IIS officials and site visits have begun to unravel a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities within the security service apparatus. This network was never declared to the U.N. and was previously unknown. We are still working on determining the extent to which this network was tied to large-scale military efforts or BW terror weapons, but this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW capable facilities and continuing R&D – all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production..."

Bob Drogin (The New Republic):
"...Bush officials maintain that much may yet be hidden in Iraq, and, as evidence, they have emphasized Kay's discovery of a clandestine network of two dozen small laboratories in safehouses run by the Mukhabarat, Saddam's ruthless secret police and intelligence service. In his report, Kay said the "previously unknown" labs contained dual-use equipment that should have been declared to U.N. inspectors and that was "suitable for continuing [chemical and biological weapons] research." He did not say if such research was actually conducted and so presumably had no evidence that it was. Still, he called the discovery a "major surprise."
It is not clear why. U.N. inspectors uncovered documents and other evidence about the secret Mukhabarat labs in 1996 and sent search teams out several times to find them during the next two years. They never did, but internal U.N. reports were filled with references to them, said the same former U.N. inspector, who asked not to be identified because he has applied to join Kay's group. "There were Post-it notes everywhere about the labs saying, `Who is this? What about this? Where is this?'" he said. "It was on our investigative menu for a long time."..."
1
BA1-08 Iraqi biological weapons Powell for Bush

"...The Iraqi regime has also developed ways to disperse lethal biological agents widely, indiscriminately into the water supply, into the air. For example, Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets. This video of an Iraqi test flight obtained by UNSCOM some years ago shows an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet aircraft. Note the spray coming from beneath the Mirage. That is 2,000 liters of simulated anthrax that a jet is spraying...
Iraq admitted to producing four spray tanks, but to this day, it has provided no credible evidence that they were destroyed, evidence that was required by the international community..."

Charles Hanley (AP) via Common Dreams:
"...Powell showed video of an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet spraying "simulated anthrax." He said four such spray tanks were unaccounted for, and Iraq was building small unmanned aircraft "well suited for dispensing chemical and biological weapons."
According to U.N. inspectors' reports, the video predated the 1991 Persian Gulf war, when the Mirage was said to have been destroyed, and three of the four spray tanks were destroyed in the 1990s.
No small drones or other planes with chemical-biological capability have been reported found in Iraq since the invasion. Iraq also gave inspectors details on its drone program, but the U.S. bombing intervened before U.N. teams could follow up..."
1
BA1-09 Iraqi biological / chemical weapons Rumsfeld for Bush

"...A reporter at a Pentagon news conference asked: "In retrospect, were you a little too far-leaning in your statement that Iraq categorically had caches of weapons, of chemical and biological weapons, given what's been found to date? You painted a picture of extensive stocks" of Iraqi mass-killing weapons.

"Wait," Rumsfeld interjected. "You go back and give me something that talks about extensive stocks. The U.N. reported extensive stocks. That is where that came from. I said what I believed to be the case, and I don't - I'd be surprised if you found the word 'extensive."'..."

Eric Rosenberg (Online Star Banner):
"...When testifying about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction before the House Armed Services Committee Sept. 18, 2002, Rumsfeld said Saddam "has amassed large clandestine stocks of biological weapons." including anthrax and botulism toxin and possibly smallpox. His regime has amassed large clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons, including VX and sarin and mustard gas."
Saddam
Saddam "has at this moment stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons," he later added, repeating the charges the next day before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
He repeated that theme in the weeks preceding the war..."

Compassiongate:
The U.N. did not report extensive stocks. As documented in the sections above, the U.N. said it could not account for some stocks but that it is a far cry to use that information to assert that such stocks were actually in Iraq.

2

 

STATEMENTS ON OTHER WEAPONS/MISCELLANEOUS WMD CLAIMS BEFORE THE INVASION <go back to the top>

Compassion Con credits total = 19

# Topic President Bush or his representative's Compassionate statement Some Uncompassionate Facts Compassion Con Credits
OB1-01 Past support of Saddam's weapons program Bush and others

have waxed eloquent about the threat of Saddam's WMDs and how his having WMDs is unacceptable 

Baltimore Chronicle:
"...The plot? The missing 8,000 pages the United States edited out of Iraq’s 11,800-page dossier on weapons before it passed on a “sanitized” version to the 10 non-permanent members of the United Nations security council, according to a December 22 story in the Glasgow, Scotland Sunday Herald. The five permanent members of the security council—the US, the UK, France, China and Russia—were given access to the complete “top secret” version of the dossier. Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan called it was ‘unfortunate’ that the UN had allowed the US to take the only complete dossier and edit it. Norway, a fellow (non-permanent) member of the Security Council, was miffed; its UN spokesperson said Norway felt like it was being treated like a “second-class country” because it wasn’t made privy to the complete dossier...Hans von Sponeck, former assistant general secretary of the UN and the UN’s humanitarian co-ordinator in Iraq until 2000, told the Scottish authors, “This is an outrageous attempt by the US to mislead.”...the missing pages provided the names of US corporations, government agencies and even nuclear labs that over the years have helped arm Iraq, and train Iraqi personnel in the use of these arms—illegally..."We have 24 major U.S. companies listed in the report who gave very substantial support especially to the biological weapons program but also to the missile and nuclear weapons program," Zumach said. "Pretty much everything was illegal in the case of nuclear and biological weapons. Every form of cooperation and supplies was outlawed in the 1970s."...US corporations listed in the missing pages of the report include Hewlett Packard, DuPont, Honeywell, Rockwell, Tectronics, Bechtel, International Computer Systems, Unisys, Sperry and TI Coating. Further, the missing information shows that US governmental agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and Agriculture, as well as the U.S. government nuclear weapons laboratories Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos and Sandia, all illegally helped Iraq to build its biological, chemical and nuclear weapons programs by providing supplies and/or training..."

Also see: The Memory Hole, Tony Paterson (The Independent)

1
OB2-01 Iraqi missiles Bush

"...In his March 6 news conference, Bush dismissed Iraq's destruction of its Al Samoud-2 missiles, saying they were being dismantled "even as [Hussein] has ordered the continued production of the very same type of missiles."..."

Walter Pincus and Dana Milbank 
(Washington Post, MSNBC)
:
"...But the only intelligence was electronic intercepts that had individuals talking about being able to build missiles in the future, according to a senior intelligence analyst..."
1
OB2-02 Iraqi missiles Fleischer for Bush

"..He [Saddam] denied he had these weapons, and then he destroys things he says he never had."...referring to Saddam Hussein's destruction of Al Samoud missiles..."

Dana Milbank (Washington Post):
"...
"In the missile area, Iraq has declared the development of a missile known as the Al Samoud, which uses components from an imported surface-to-air missile."-- Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix, Dec. 19."
1
OB2-03 Iraq missiles State Department for Bush

"...Iraq claims that flight-testing of a larger diameter missile falls within the 150km limit. This claim is not credible..."

White House

"...Iraq claims that its designs for a larger diameter missile fall within the UN-mandated 150km limit. But Dr. Blix has cited 13 recent Iraqi missile tests which exceed the 150km limit..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...
it seems that the claim of the State Department (19 Dec 02) and White House in response to Iraq's dossier is incorrect: Iraq has admitted that the range of both al-Samoud II and al-Fatah in test flights has exceeded the 150km limit. 
al-Samoud II
"In the missile area, Iraq has declared the development of a missile known as the Al Samoud, which uses components from an imported surface-to-air missile. A variant of the Al Samoud, with a larger diameter (760 mm) than the standard version (500 mm) has been declared. [...] In the latest update of the semi-annual monitoring declarations, Iraq has declared that in 13 flight tests of the Al Samoud the missile has exceeded the permitted range. The greatest range achieved was 183 kilometres."
Hans Blix, notes for briefing the Security Council of 19 December 2002

On 27 January 2003, Blix reported:
"During my recent meeting in Baghdad, we were briefed on these two programmes. We were told that the final range for both systems would be less than the permitted maximum range of 150 km. These missiles might well represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems. The test ranges in excess of 150 km are significant, but some further technical considerations need to be made, before we reach a conclusion on this issue. In the mean time, we have asked Iraq to cease flight tests of both missiles."..."

1
OB2-04 Iraqi missiles Bush

"...Iraq possesses ballistic missiles with a likely range of hundreds of miles -- far enough to strike Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and other nations -- in a region where more than 135,000 American civilians and service members live and work...."

Walter Pincus and Dana Milbank 
(Washington Post, MSNBC)
:
"...Inspectors have found that the Al Samoud-2 missiles can travel less than 200 miles -- not far enough to hit the targets Bush named. Iraq has not accounted for 14 medium-range Scud missiles from the 1991 Persian Gulf War, but the administration has not presented any evidence that they still exist..."

Joseph Cirincione and Dipali Mukhopadyay (Foreign Policy) via Corrente::
"...In the 1980s Iraq had hundreds of Scud missiles with ranges from 300 to 600 kilometers (186 to 373 miles), firing over 500 in its war with Iran, and almost 100 in the 1991 Gulf War. The U.N. inspectors were able to confirm that all but two of the Scuds remaining after the war were destroyed. Under U.N. sanctions, Iraq was able to build short-range missiles with ranges of up to 150 kilometres (93 miles). In May [or March ?? - CG note] 2003, U.N. inspectors reported that they had found 97 missiles that had exceeded that range by some 30 kilometres (19 miles). These missiles could have struck neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey but could not have hit more distant nations such as Israel or Egypt. Inspectors had destroyed 72 of these missiles when the U.S. attacked Iraq. As yet, there is no evidence that Iraq had any missile capable of flying "hundreds of miles"...."

2
OB2-05 Iraqi missiles Powell for Bush

"...Iraq has programs that are intended to produce ballistic missiles that fly over 1,000 kilometers. One program is pursuing a liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200 kilometers. [...] Iraq has built an engine test stand that is larger than anything it has ever had...Since then, the test stand has been finished and a roof has been put over it so it will be harder for satellites to see what's going on underneath the test stand."..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...This appears to be untrue. This site (the al-Rafah/Shahiyat Test Facility) has been repeatedly inspected, beginning on 27 November 2002. No incriminating usage has been found.
Recent inspections include those of 4 February 2003. The relevant excerpt of the UNMOVIC / IAEA report of 21 January 2003 read: "Another missile team traveled to the Shahiyat Test Facility, about 100 km north of Baghdad, to verify that this site was still abandoned."
Dr Blix made this point explicit in his briefing to the Security Council on 14 February 2003: "The experts also studied the data on the missile engine test stand that is nearing completion [...]. So far, the test stand has not been associated with a proscribed activity."..."

Alan Gilbert (Priority Peace):
"..."The experts also studied the data on the missile engine test stand that is nearing completion [...]. So far, the test stand has not been associated with a proscribed activity." 
Chief U.N. weapons inspector, Dr. Hans Blix Report to the U.N. Security Council 02-14-03

"But the U.N. missile experts have reported inspecting al-Rafah at least five times since inspections resumed Nov. 27, have studied the specifications of the new test stand, regularly monitor tests at the installation, and thus far have reported no concerns." Associated Press "Iraq: Sites Powell Noted Are Monitored" 02-07-03

"Al-Rafah and the Rasheed site were just two of numerous Iraqi installations said by Powell to pose threats, without his noting that U.N. teams have them under close watch." Associated Press 
"Iraq: Sites Powell Noted Are Monitored"
02-07-03..."

1
OB2-06 Iraqi missiles Tenet for Bush

"...In February 2003, Tenet told Congress that ''Iraq retains . . . a small number of Scud missiles.''..."

Powell for Bush

"...numerous intelligence reports over the past decade from sources inside Iraq indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a range of 650 to 900 kilometers..."

Glen Rangwala (Traprockpeace.org) (via Dennis Hans):
"...
The claims about a retained stock of ballistic missiles seem unlikely. According to UNSCOM, by 1997, 817 out of Iraq's imported 819 Scud-B ballistic missiles had been certifiably destroyed. This finding was endorsed by UNSCOM commissioners in their report of November 1997 (para.7). On the worst-case assumption that Iraq has salvaged some of the parts for these missiles and has reconstructed them since 1998, even Charles Duelfer - former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, deputy head of UNSCOM and strong proponent of an invasion of Iraq - has provided an estimate of only 12 to 14 missiles held by Iraq. 
There remain questions about Iraq's retained missile engines and warheads. Iraq produced 121 Scud-type warheads, and UNSCOM did not manage to find remnants of approximately 25 of them. Iraq also developed 7 engines, it claims, for training purposes, and states that these engines were destroyed in July 1991. UNSCOM was unable to verify this claim, but inspectors have yet to analyse the fragments Iraq claims were found from the destruction of these engines on 4 August 1997..."

Bryan Bender (Boston Globe):
"...Thielmann said that even the CIA director, George Tenet, exaggerated the facts. In February 2003, Tenet told Congress that ''Iraq retains . . . a small number of Scud missiles.'' But Thielmann said the supporting classified analysis said: ''We cannot confirm that all of those over 800 missiles that Iraq obtained have all been destroyed.''
''I would argue that's an important difference,'' he said..."

Also see: CBS News

1
OB3-01 Iraq's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) Bush

"...Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] for missions targeting the United States..."

Peter Beinart (The New Republic):
"...American officials later admitted that the UAVs had a maximum range of several hundred miles. It's hard to believe such a whopping error made it into President Bush's speech by accident...the Bush administration may well have lost its bid for U.N. authorization for the war. If so, American officials and commentators will no doubt chalk up the defeat to anti-American suspicion among countries motivated by timidity, resentment, and pique. And they'll be partly correct. But it's worth noting that the suspicion isn't entirely irrational, given what Security Council members have witnessed over the past several months. If the Bush administration wanted to win the world's trust, it should have started by telling the truth..."

CBS News:
"...the U.S. claim that Iraq is developing missiles that could hit its neighbors – or U.S. troops in the region, or even Israel – is just one of the claims coming from Washington that inspectors here are finding increasingly unbelievable. The inspectors have become so frustrated trying to chase down unspecific or ambiguous U.S. leads that they've begun to express that anger privately in no uncertain terms...So frustrated have the inspectors become that one source has referred to the U.S. intelligence they've been getting as "garbage after garbage after garbage." In fact, Phillips says the source used another cruder word. The inspectors find themselves caught between the Iraqis, who are masters at the weapons-hiding shell game, and the United States, whose intelligence they've found to be circumstantial, outdated or just plain wrong..."

1
OB3-02 Iraq's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) Powell/Fleischer for Bush

Claimed that the drones could fly greater distances than the limit imposed by the U.N.; Claimed that "...the information that the aircraft exists ''should be of concern to everyone'' and that Baghdad's failure to declare the drone suggests that ''Iraq has really not changed'' when it comes to declaring its weapons systems..."; Claimed that "...there was no question ''the munitions are capable of dispensing chemical and biological weapons.''..."

Niko Price (Salon.com):
"...A remotely piloted aircraft that the United States has warned could spread chemical weapons appears to be made of balsa wood and duct tape, with two small propellors attached to what look like the engines of a weed whacker.
Iraqi officials took journalists to the Ibn Firnas State Company just north of Baghdad on Wednesday, where the drone's project director accused Secretary of State Colin Powell of misleading the U.N. Security Council and the public. "He's making a big mistake," said Brig. Imad Abdul Latif. "He knows very well that this aircraft is not used for what he said."...
Latif said the plane is controlled by the naked eye from the ground. Asked whether its range is above the 93-mile limit imposed by the United Nations, he said it couldn't be controlled from more than five miles. Latif said the exact range will be determined when the drone passes to the next testing stage...Iraq insisted it declared the drone in a report in January -- and Hussein held up its declaration to prove it. The confusion, he said, was the result of a typo: The declaration said the wingspan was 14.5 feet instead of 24.5 feet as stated by Powell. "When we discovered the mistake we addressed an official letter correcting the wingspan," he said. He showed that letter to reporters as well. He suggested inspectors had already seen the drone when the correction was made, but said: "No one of the inspectors noticed the difference."..."

David Filipov (Boston Globe):
"...Duct tape reinforced by aluminum foil held together the black and white drone's balsa wood wings....Perched on a sawhorse at a military research base 20 miles north of Baghdad, the drone looked more like a large school science project than a vehicle capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons..."

News.com.au:
"...Powell told the UN Security Council that the Iraqis possessed a drone that could fly 500km, violating UN rules that limit the range of Iraqi weapons to 150km. "There is no possibility that the design shown on 12 March has the capability to fly anywhere near 500 kilometres," drones expert Ken Munson said on Jane's website (http://jdw.janes.com). "The design looks very primitive, and the engines -- which have their pistons exposed -- appear to be low-powered," he said...Jane's, a British weekly specialising on defence, is one of the most respected publications on such matters and its experts are considered to be authorities on the subject...."

Also see: BuzzFlash

3
OB4-01 Iraq inspection areas Powell for Bush

"...Let me play another tape for you...Let me pause again and review the elements of this message...
"They are inspecting the ammunition you have, yes?"
"Yes. For the possibility there are forbidden ammo."
"For the possibility there is, by chance, forbidden ammo?"
"Yes."
"And we sent you a message yesterday to clean out all the areas, the scrap areas, the abandoned areas. Make sure there is nothing there. Remember the first message: evacuate it."
...
This is all part of a system of hiding things and moving things out of the way and making sure they have left nothing behind..."

Gilbert Cranberg (Herald Tribune):
"...The State Department's transcript of the actual conversation makes it evident that Powell had embellished the quote to make it appear much more incriminating. Instead of being a directive to "clean out all of the areas, the scrap areas and the abandoned areas," as Powell claimed, the transcript shows the message from headquarters was merely "to inspect (emphasis added) the scrap areas and the abandoned areas." The damaging admonition that Powell said he quoted, "Make sure there is nothing there" is not in the transcript and appears to be an invention. Asked to explain the discrepancy, the State Department's press and public affairs offices said I should study Powell's presentation posted on the department's Web site. Instead of clarifying or explaining the discrepancy, the posted material simply confirmed the disparity..."

Charles Hanley (AP) via Common Dreams:
"...Powell played three audiotapes of men speaking in Arabic of a mysterious "modified vehicle," "forbidden ammo" and "the expression 'nerve agents' " - tapes said to be intercepts of Iraqi army officers discussing concealment.
Two of the brief, anonymous tapes, otherwise not authenticated, provided little context for judging their meaning. It couldn't be known whether the mystery vehicle, however modified, was even banned. A listener could only speculate over the cryptic mention of "nerve agents." [CG note: Glen Rangwala has noted that the comment on nerve agents, which was provided without context could easily have been a report that was being written]
The third tape, meanwhile, seemed natural, an order to inspect scrap areas for "forbidden ammo." The Iraqis had just told U.N. inspectors they would search ammunition dumps for stray, empty chemical warheads left over from years earlier. They later turned four over to inspectors.
Powell's rendition of the third conversation made it more incriminating, by saying an officer ordered that the area be "cleared out." The voice on the tape didn't say that, but only that the area be "inspected," according to the official U.S. translation...."

Also see: Gilbert Cranberg (Washington Post)

1
OB5-01 General comments on Iraq's WMDs and/ or cooperation  Powell for Bush
2-5-03

"...I asked for this [special U.N.] session today for two purposes: First, to support the core assessments made by Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei...And as Dr. ElBaradei reported, Iraq’s declaration of December 7, ‘did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998..."

Glen Rangwala:
"...Powell misses out the next part of ElBaradei’s quote of 27 January 2003, where he explains that these ‘certain questions’ relate only to "Iraq’s progress prior to 1991 related to weapons design and centrifuge development...While these questions do not constitute unresolved disarmament issues, they nevertheless need further clarification". ElBaradei’s core assessment was that: 
"we have to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons programme since the elimination of the programme in the 1990s...With our verification system now in place, barring exceptional circumstances, and provided there is sustained proactive cooperation by Iraq, we should be able within the next few months to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme."..."
1
OB5-02 General comments on Iraq's WMDs and/ or cooperation Powell for Bush
2-5-03

"...Dr Blix pronounced the 12,000-page declaration rich in volume but poor in information and practically devoid of new evidence..."

Glen Rangwala:
"...
Blix made this statement to the Security Council on 9 January 2003. He seemed to revise, and in some ways reverse, this judgement in his statement to the Security Council on 27 January 2003: "In the field of missiles and biotechnology, the declaration contains a good deal of new material and information covering the period from 1998 and onward. This is welcome"..."
1
OB5-03 General comments on Iraq's WMDs and/ or cooperation

 

Powell for Bush
2-5-03

"...This is all part of a system of hiding things and moving things out of the way and making sure they have left nothing behind...this is part and parcel of a policy of evasion and deception that goes back 12 years, a policy set at the highest levels of the Iraqi regime...Saddam Hussein has what is called "a Higher Committee for Monitoring the Inspection Teams". Think about that. Iraq has a high-level committee to monitor the inspectors who were sent in to monitor Iraq’s disarmament not to cooperate with them, not to assist them, but to spy on them and keep them from doing their jobs."..."

Glen Rangwala:
"...
(a) Hans Blix in his briefing to the Security Council on 14 February 2003 gives a much more positive view of Iraqi ‘monitoring’, and gives details of two assisting commissions which have been set up:
"The Iraqi side also informed us that the commission, which had been appointed in the wake of our finding 12 empty chemical weapons warheads, had had its mandate expanded to look for any still existing proscribed items. This was welcomed. A second commission, we learnt, has now been appointed with the task of searching all over Iraq for more documents relevant to the elimination of proscribed items and programmes. It is headed by the former Minister of Oil, General Amer Rashid, and is to have very extensive powers of search in industry, administration and even private houses."
(b) Movement of proscribed weapons is questioned by Dr Blix on 14 February 2003:
"intelligence has led to sites where no proscribed items were found. Even in such cases, however, inspection of these sites were useful in proving the absence of such items and in some cases the presence of other items - conventional munitions. It showed that conventional arms are being moved around the country and that movements are not necessarily related to weapons of mass destruction."..."
1
OB5-04 General comments on Iraq's WMDs and/ or cooperation Bush

Making statements repeatedly to the effect that Saddam has WMDs because he hasn't provided sufficient evidence that he does not

Examples:

Fleischer for Bush

"...If he declares he has none, then we will know that Saddam Hussein is once again misleading the world..."

Dave Koehler (Philly Burbs) via Carla Binion:
"...Another arguing device is the argument from ignorance. This involves claiming that what hasn’t been disproven must be true. We hear Iraq hasn’t shown that they do not have WMD, therefore they do. The real burden of proof is on the party making the claim. The U.S. and/or U.N. must prove that Iraq has WMD. It is impossible for Iraq to prove that they don’t..."
1
OB6-01 Intelligence quality on Iraqi WMDs Powell for Bush

"...I would call my colleagues' attention to the fine paper that the United Kingdom distributed yesterday which describes in exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities..."

CNN:
"...Large chunks of the 19-page report -- highlighted by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell at the U.N. as a "fine paper ... which describes in exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities" -- contains large chunks lifted from other sources, according to several academics...Academics told Britain's Channel 4 news on Thursday that the "bulk" of the report was lifted from three sources, an article in the Middle East Review of International Affairs by Ibrahim al-Marashi, a research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California.
..Al-Marashi's article, published last September, was based on information obtained at the time of the 1991 Gulf War, Rangwala said. "The information he was using is 12 years old and he acknowledges this in his article. The British government, when it transplants that information into its own dossier, does not make that acknowledgement. "So it is presented as current information about Iraq, when really the information it is using is 12 years old."..."

Walter Pincus and Dana Milbank 
(Washington Post, MSNBC)
:
"...But it later emerged that the British report's evidence was based in part on academic papers and trade publications..."

Also see: BuzzFlash

1
OB6-02 Intelligence quality on Iraqi WMDs Powell for Bush 

"...The Secretary of State began his February 5 presentation to the UN Security Council — supposedly the best-scrubbed version of the indictment against Saddam — with the promise that "every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence."..."

Compassiongate:
All the stuff above speaks for itself.
1

 

STATEMENTS ON OTHER WEAPONS/MISCELLANEOUS WMD CLAIMS EVALUATED AFTER THE INVASION + STATEMENTS RELATING TO WMD SEARCH
<go back to the top>

Compassion Con credits total = 31

# Topic President Bush or his representative's Compassionate statement Some Uncompassionate Facts Compassion Con Credits
OA1-01  WMD search Bush

(when asked about Iraq's WMDs and not having found any so far) "..."Iraq had a weapons program," Bush said yesterday after a meeting of his Cabinet, the first time the body had met since the war started. "Intelligence throughout the decade showed they had a weapons program. I am absolutely convinced with time we'll find out that they did have a weapons program."..."

Dana Milbank (Washington Post):
"...Even in making that stout defense, though, Bush appeared to redefine the accusations being made about his administration's use of intelligence in rallying support for an attack on Iraq. Nobody disputes that Hussein had weapons programs at one point. At issue is whether Iraq pursued such programs after inspectors left in 1998 and whether Hussein continued to possess such weapons in quantities to threaten the United States. [CG emphasis. It is astonishing that one even needs to highlight this. There is no shame at all in this administration.]  
But Bush spoke of Iraq's weapons program, rather than its weaponry, and referred to it in the past tense. Asked to clarify Bush's remarks, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said Bush did not intend to make a distinction between weapons and weapons programs. "The president, in saying programs, also applies that to weapons," the spokesman said. Fleischer also said Bush believed Iraq had weapons when the war began..."

Bryan Keefer (Spinsanity):
"...Though White House Press Secretary Ari Flesicher has suggested that Bush uses "weapons" and "weapons programs" interchangeably, there is clearly a difference between evidence suggesting weapons were produced and actual weapons (link requires Salon Premium subscription or viewing of an advertisement). 
Just as importantly, however, is the way Bush is building the claim...[he] rhetorically implies that the discovery of the trailers is equivalent to finding weapons themselves, stating that we will find "more weapons" (emphasis mine) and repeating the word "weapons" three times after mentioning the labs. The final sentence, "But for those who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're wrong, we found them," is a classic example of a rhetorical fudge -- the "them" could refer to either the trailers or weapons themselves. By combining them in this way, Bush implies that weapons have actually been found, but he does so in such a way that he can claim he was only discussing manufacturing devices..."

Also see Jake Tapper (Salon.com)

1
OA1-02 WMD search Bush

"...''We won't be proven wrong,'' Bush told reporters last week. ''We will find the truth, and the truth is [Hussein] was developing a program for weapons of mass destruction.''..."

Bryan Bender (Boston Globe) - 7/20/03:
"...But weapons specialists note that ''developing a program'' -- intending or endeavoring to acquire weapons of mass destruction -- represents a far less imminent threat than would the possession of a stockpile of such arms, raising questions about the haste to go to war in Iraq without broad international support..."

Compassiongate:
Clearly, it also represents a far less threat than even a developed program for making WMDs, let alone possessing the WMDs themselves.

Josh Marshall (Talking Points Memo):
"...
This is the statement that jumped out at me from the president's press conference this morning. (And, for what it's worth, I was surprised and impressed that he held one just now.)
We gathered a lot of intelligence. That intelligence was good, sound intelligence on which I made a decision.
And in order to, you know, placate the critics and the cynics about intention of the United States we need to produce evidence. And I fully understand it, and I'm confident that our search will yield that which I strongly believe: that Saddam had a weapons program.
I want to remind you, he actually used his weapons program on his own people at one point in time, which was pretty tangible evidence.

You can see where this is going, can't you? This is really great-moments-in-goal-post-moving. 
Saddam had a weapons program
And how can you believe he didn't have a weapons program, when he actually used the weapons from his weapons programs, albeit fifteen years ago.
This isn't just a slip of the tongue or a Bushism. This is where we're going. As the White House now wants to define it, the question is whether Iraq ever had a weapons program. Or, to put it more precisely, whereas some people are foolish enough to believe that the standard is whether Saddam actually still had the weapons programs we know he once had, the real standard is whether Saddam actually once had the weapons programs we know he once had.
This is too silly to even talk about..."

1

(being very very compassionate here)

OA1-03 WMD search Bush

"...In order to placate the critics and cynics about intentions of the United States, we need to produce evidence..."

Letter to New York Times via Atrios:
"...If the Iraqi weapons exist, we need to find them not to placate critics but to prevent them from being used for devastating attacks on the United States! The weapons that the administration described before the war could be used by whoever now possesses them to kill us by the thousands or millions.
The fact that President Bush did not express concern about this prospect, but instead described the stakes as a matter of political credibility, indicates that he privately assumes that the weapons do not exist.
ALAN M. MACROBERT
Bedford, Mass., July 31, 2003..."
1
OA1-04 WMD search Rumsfeld for Bush

"..."We have to recognize that almost all first reports that we get turn out to be wrong," Rumsfeld said, adding that "literally dozens and dozens and dozens of instances where the first report comes in and -- perfectly good reporting -- but it's wrong. And therefore, we don't do that."..."

Jake Tapper (Salon.com):
"...But that policy became irrelevant when the Pentagon decided to embed reporters with troops. While the Pentagon might not have planned on issuing preliminary reports on possible WMD discoveries, that didn't stop soldiers in the field from sharing these almost always erroneous primary field reports with journalists. They may not be official Pentagon pronouncements, but reporters have taken to the airwaves with gripping stories, the phrase "smoking gun" being bandied about. Days later, the reports have generally been shot down. But did readers -- or TV viewers -- really notice?
On Monday, reports came in about the discovery of 11 alleged biological/chemical weapons mobile labs. No evidence of any weaponry has been reported to have been found within the labs, though the media has played up the possibility that these vans constituted evidence of WMD. "The 101st, Wolf, continues to inspect so-called sensitive sites," CNN's Ryan Chilcote reported from the field. "Sensitive sites are places where the U.S. believes the elements of an Iraqi chemical and biological weapons program may be hidden."
Chilcote interviewed Gen. Benjamin Freakly, who told CNN viewers that the "2nd Brigade found about 11 buried conexes" -- a military term for a large metal shipping container -- in the form of "20- by probably 20-foot vans buried in the ground." They "are dual-use chemical labs, biological and chemical," Freakly continued. "About 1,000 pounds of documentation were found in that, and they were close to an artillery ammunition plant." Freakly said that the Iraqi regime had denied "any wrongdoing and yet here's major chemical lab facilities, 11 different large-sized conexes buried in the ground clearly marked so they could be found again, dual-use chemical and biological close to an artillery factory that has empty shells." He noted that nothing had been confirmed -- "We're exploring that further, a little too early to tell," he said. Yet, he concluded, the labs were evidence of "new equipment, a lot of money in the 2000-to-2003 time period have been spent in that camp, probably over a $1 million worth of chemical capability found in these 11 conexes, and we continue to develop that with better expertise."
Centcom spokesman Maj. Brad Bartelt, reached in Qatar, said he would not confirm that report. "You gotta be careful about rushing to judgment," Bartelt cautioned. "We use a process that's methodical and precise, and it does take time." Time that neither Gen. Freakly nor Chilcote were willing to take before going on air.
That has been the pattern..." [see many more examples in the article]

Also see: Sam Gardiner (US News and World Report via Common Dreams) for a systematic study of the use of premature information that was misleading or false as propaganda by Rumsfeld, Bush, etc.

1

(being extraordinarily compassionate here)

OA1-05 WMD search

Bush:
"...[Saddam] spent decades hiding tools of mass murder. He knew the inspectors were looking for them. You know better than me he's got a big country in which to hide them. We're on the look. We'll reveal the truth...." 

Compassiongate
Er, how about the minor detail that he could have transferred weapons over to terrorists? (Something that was repeated ad nauseam before the war) Did the Al Qaeda that were supposedly "linked to Saddam" suddenly decide to go on a trip to Mars minus all those "weapons"? 

Dafna Linzer (Newsday):
"...no U.S. weapons hunters or intelligence officials have visited the heart of Iraq's missile programs -- the state-owned al-Fatah company in Baghdad, which designed all the rockets Saddam Hussein's troops fired in 1991 and again this year. Not only that, it's not even on their agenda. 
"We have the most sensitive documents here," said Marouf al-Chalabi, director-general of al-Fatah. "We were sure the Americans would target us but they haven't even dropped by." 
Looters, however, have ransacked the place. The three-building complex has been stripped of everything from drafting tables to light switches. 
Among the few things left behind, though, are what U.N. inspectors long believed existed but never obtained: design plans and test results for every missile system and warhead the Iraqis developed. 
Plans for rocket engines, guidance systems and even missile warheads are strewn across the dusty office floors and swirl in the parking lot outside. Some have been blown into nearby bushes. "They're scattered everywhere," al-Chalabi said, marveling at the mess. 
American missile experts who have accompanied U.S. weapons teams in Iraq expressed astonishment this week when told that the design plans and engineers behind the Iraqi Scuds and other missile projects were available..."

1
OA1-06 WMD search Bush administration

Condi Rice

"...U.S. officials never expected that "we were going to open garages and find" weapons of mass destruction..."

Donald Rumsfeld

"...We never believed that we'd just tumble over weapons of mass destruction in that country..."

"...They may have had time to destroy them, and I don't know the answer..."

Rumsfeld for Bush (5/27/03) 

"..."It is also possible that they decided they would destroy them [WMDs] prior to a conflict," Mr. Rumsfeld said in response to question after a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in Manhattan today..."

Rice for Bush (6/8/03)

"...No one ever said that we knew precisely where all of these agents were, where they were stored..."

Whiskey Bar/Billmon:
"...
Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. Dick Cheney
Speech to VFW National Convention
August 26, 2002...

Well, there is no question that we have evidence and information that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical particularly . . . all this will be made clear in the course of the operation, for whatever duration it takes. Ari Fleisher
Press Briefing
March 21, 2003

There is no doubt that the regime of Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction. And . . . as this operation continues, those weapons will be identified, found, along with the people who have produced them and who guard them. Gen. Tommy Franks
Press Conference
March 22, 2003

I have no doubt we're going to find big stores of weapons of mass destruction. Defense Policy Board member Kenneth Adelman
Washington Post, p. A27
March 23, 2003

One of our top objectives is to find and destroy the WMD. There are a number of sites. Pentagon Spokeswoman Victoria Clark
Press Briefing
March 22, 2003

We know where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat. Donald Rumsfeld
ABC Interview
March 30, 2003

But make no mistake -- as I said earlier -- we have high confidence that they have weapons of mass destruction. That is what this war was about and it is about. And we have high confidence it will be found. Ari Fleischer
Press Briefing
April 10, 2003..."

Council for a Livable World:
"...On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell told the United Nations Security Council: "We know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was disbursing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agents to various locations, distributing them to various locations in western Iraq. Most of the launchers and warheads have been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved every one to four weeks to escape detection."..."

Alan Elsner (Reuters):
"...[Rice's] statement represents a dramatic change from rhetoric from Bush and other top officials before the war, backed up by a steady stream of documents, all of which are still accessible on the White House web site.
 
In his March 17 speech giving Iraqi President Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave the country, Bush said: "Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised." Earlier, in a speech last Oct. 7, Bush said: "The Iraqi regime ... possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons. "We know that the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas ... And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons." In his State of the Union address last January, Bush accused Iraq of having enough material "to produce over 25,000 liters of anthrax -- enough doses to kill several million people ... more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin -- enough to subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure ... as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent." 
In his dramatic presentation to the United Nations Security Council on Feb. 6, Secretary of State Colin Powell said the United States "knew" that Baghdad had dispersed rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agents to locations in western Iraq.
"We also have satellite photos that indicate that banned materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction facilities," Powell said. "There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more." In Congressional testimony last month, Powell insisted that banned weapons "will be found." He said of his U.N speech that, "everything we had there had backup and double sourcing and triple sourcing."..."

3

(being ultra-
compassionate)

OA1-07 WMD search

Wolfowitz for Bush (5/13/03)

"...We said all along that we will never get to the bottom of the Iraqi WMD program simply by going and searching specific sites, that you’d have to be able to get people who know about the programs to talk to you..."

Whiskey Bar/Billmon:

"...There is no doubt that the regime of Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction. And . . . as this operation continues, those weapons will be identified, found, along with the people who have produced them and who guard them. Gen. Tommy Franks
Press Conference
March 22, 2003

I have no doubt we're going to find big stores of weapons of mass destruction. Defense Policy Board member Kenneth Adelman
Washington Post, p. A27
March 23, 2003

One of our top objectives is to find and destroy the WMD. There are a number of sites. 
Pentagon Spokeswoman Victoria Clark
Press Briefing
March 22, 2003

We know where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat. Donald Rumsfeld
ABC Interview
March 30, 2003

But make no mistake -- as I said earlier -- we have high confidence that they have weapons of mass destruction. That is what this war was about and it is about. And we have high confidence it will be found. Ari Fleischer
Press Briefing
April 10, 2003..."

Billmon:
"...I'm absolutely sure that there are weapons of mass destruction there and the evidence will be forthcoming. We're just getting it just now.
Colin Powell 
Remarks to Reporters 5/4/03

"...There are people who in large measure have information that we need . . . so that we can track down the weapons of mass destruction in that country..." Donald Rumsfeld 
Press Briefing 4/25/2003..."

OA1-08 WMD search Rumsfeld for Bush

"...No. I mean, how can you secure…sites in a country the size of California, that has open borders, porous borders…It’s not possible to secure every single site. What one has to do is to go in and win the war. Throw out the regime. And then, as rapidly as possible, shift that fighting force into a presence force and try to provide security in the country..."

Liberal Oasis:
"...The logic here is simply bizarre, and should call into question the entire pre-emption argument.
If the whole point of the war is to remove the WMD, but the realities of war make it difficult to get the WMD, then why go to war in the first place?
Apparently, using Rummy logic, it would only make sense if the WMD were in a really tiny island nation. (Watch out Barbados.)..."
1
OA1-09 WMD search Rumsfeld for Bush

"...We know where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat..."

David Corn (The Nation):
"...Speaking at a National Press Club luncheon last week, Rumsfeld was asked, "On March 30th you said, referring to Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, quote, 'We know where they are.' Do you know where they are now? Will they be found?" He replied, "In that instance, we had been in the country for about 15 seconds; sometimes I overstate for emphasis...What we had...is a long list of suspect sites. And they were sites that the inspectors had been in the process of looking at when they concluded that the inspection process really wasn't working, because of lack of cooperation on the part of Saddam Hussein's regime. And I said, 'We know they're in that area.' I should have said, 'I believe they're in that area.'..And we were being pressed to find them while the war was still in its earliest, earliest days. And it seemed to me a somewhat unrealistic expectation."..."

Liberal Oasis:
"...What will probably be lost in the IntelliGate fallout was George Stephanopoulos’ notable exchange with Rumsfeld about the Phantom WMD.
First, Rummy belatedly walked back his earlier “we know where they are” statement from back in March:
I probably should have said “we know where they were,” instead of “we know where they are.”
Of course, this was done with the classic Rummy nonchalant, devilish grin, trying to make a blatant lie come across as an innocuous “oops!”..."

(for providing two different compassionate explanations)

OA1-10 WMD search Rumsfeld for Bush

"...What we had...is a long list of suspect sites. And they were sites that the inspectors had been in the process of looking at when they concluded that the inspection process really wasn't working, because of lack of cooperation on the part of Saddam Hussein's regime..."

David Corn (The Nation):
"...Rumsfeld was pegging the needle on the duplicity meter. The UN inspectors never concluded that the inspections process wasn't working. They had identified problems and complained about aspects of the process, presenting mixed reports to the Security Council on their progress and Iraq's cooperation. And their complaints mostly concerned Iraq's reluctance to account for past WMD materials, not the lack of access to suspected sites..."
1
OA1-11 WMD search Rice for Bush

"...You may find assembly lines, you may find pieces hidden here and there," she said. Ingredients or precursors, many non-lethal by themselves, could be embedded in dual-use facilities. She had a new explanation too for Iraq's ability to launch these weapons that were not assembled. "Just-in-time assembly" and "just-in-time" inventory, as she put it..."

Sydney Morning Herald:
"...President George Bush's National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, is now acknowledging that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program is less clear-cut, and probably more difficult to establish, than the White House portrayed before the war.
She has no doubt that the US-led coalition, assisted by experts from Britain and Australia, will find Iraq's WMD programs. But for the first time, Dr Rice is saying publicly that it is less likely many actual weapons will be found. Rather, she described the programs as being hidden in so-called "dual use" infrastructure. In other words, chemicals and biological agents could be in plants, factories and laboratories capable of being used for legal and prohibited purposes. Almost three weeks since the fall of Baghdad, with senior Iraqi scientists and officials in US custody, no chemical or biological weapons stockpiles have been found. Neither has any evidence been uncovered that Iraq had restarted a nuclear program. 
In explaining the gap between the prewar and postwar claims on Iraq's WMD, Dr Rice said the US was now seeing the programs in a different light. "The fact is that we are beginning to see a kind of pattern on how Iraq may have hidden its weapons of mass destruction from the outside world for all of these years," she said this week. According to Dr Rice, the weapons programs are "in bits and pieces" rather than assembled weapons. "You may find assembly lines, you may find pieces hidden here and there," she said. Ingredients or precursors, many non-lethal by themselves, could be embedded in dual-use facilities. She had a new explanation too for Iraq's ability to launch these weapons that were not assembled. "Just-in-time assembly" and "just-in-time" inventory, as she put it.
But in the months before the Iraq war, Mr Bush and his advisers, including the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, gave far more frightening descriptions of Iraq's stockpile of weapons of mass destruction..."We cannot wait for final proof," Mr Bush said. "The smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud."
When Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons inspector, suggested Iraq's WMD program could be more fragmented and degraded, he was pilloried as naive or incompetent. When his inspectors talked of a more complex search for WMD, where components or precursors could be in the form of legal, dual-use chemical or biological agents that had to be monitored, they were dismissed as flatfooted and overcautious. [CG emphasis] Yet Dr Rice's descriptions of Iraq's weapons program is far closer to Dr Blix's analysis than she would want to concede. Throughout Dr Blix's reports to the Security Council he spoke of the need to track down the components of Iraq's old biological and chemical programs, the bits and pieces, and to monitor all activity at dual-use facilities. 
Many international weapons experts believed that the threat from Iraq did not come from chemical-filled Scud missiles or aircraft, as sometimes cited in Washington. The threat was less direct. It was about whether Saddam was trying to maintain the core of a WMD program, both raw ingredients and scientific expertise, which he could reconstitute when the world got tired of containing him.
For arms control experts around the world that threat was a very real one. But it was far less dramatic and threatening than that presented by the US to justify a pre-emptive war..."
1
OA1-12 WMD search Bush

"...“I am absolutely convinced that with time, we’ll find out they did have a weapons program.”..."

Fleischer for Bush

"...''I think there's an interesting lesson here on patience,'' Fleischer said. ''The president has it. He will continue to have it.''..."

Bush

"..."We are determined to discover the true extent of Saddam Hussein's weapons programs, no matter how long it takes..."

Rumsfeld for Bush

"...the WMD search in Iraq "is going to take time," the secretary observed, adding searchers probably aren't "going to stumble over" a cache of WMDs in Iraq..."

Wolfowitz for Bush

"...Well, look, I mean, we've stressed since 1441 was passed that the key to finding out what this program is, what they have, what they've destroyed, what they were working on, is getting people to talk to us. And that remains the key. And it will take time. I mean, it took time in 1991, if you recall. I think it was three months after the war that the IAEA was prepared to declare there was no nuclear program, and it was about 3-6 months later that they discovered that, in fact, they were pursuing not one, but I think four different routes to nuclear weapons, a couple of which we had completely missed. So it takes time to do this stuff..."

George W. Bush (Speech transcript - CBS):
"...Inspection teams do not need more time or more personnel. All they need is what they have never received — the full cooperation of the Iraqi regime..."

The New Republic:
"...Before the war, critics maintained that United Nations inspectors would need months to years to search for evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Yet less than two months after the war, these same critics rush to judgment, unwilling to give coalition forces time to find weapons that Saddam Hussein had years to hide." So explained Pentagon spokesperson Victoria Clarke in a letter to The New York Times this week.
We hate to be unsympathetic, but it's not the critics who have changed their stripes. It was the Bush administration that demanded speedy evidence of Iraq's failure to disarm from the U.N. team even though inspectors reported progress and wanted a few more months to complete their work. "This is a matter of weeks, not months," President Bush declared on January 31. "Any attempt to drag the process on for months will be resisted by the United States." It hardly seems hypocritical for administration critics to argue that it should be held to its own standard. After all, the Pentagon has a few advantages the U.N. inspectors did not--military control of Iraq, more than 100,000 troops in the country, and no evil dictator to obstruct the process, to name but a few. Still, Clarke pleads for time: "We have an extensive effort under way. Let's allow our team to finish the job before drawing conclusions." Somewhere, Hans Blix is laughing..."

James Pinkerton (Newsday):
"...David Kay's report on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, or lack thereof, was obviously a disappointment to President George W. Bush. But some weapons of mass destruction have already been found, here at home, and they have killed Americans. Yet the Bush administration is much less interested in the search for those weapons and the unknown evildoer who used them - and for future weapons of the same lethal sort.
Two years ago this month, even as America was still reeling from 9/11, the nation was further shaken by the letter-based anthrax attacks aimed at six different political and media targets. Those attacks - envelopes filled with bacterial spores - left five people dead and 17 sick..."

1
OA1-13 WMD search Fleischer for Bush (6/10/03)

"..."The president had repeatedly said that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and that includes everything knowable up to the opening shots of the war," he said. "We still have confidence in that information. You could say Iraq continues to have weapons of mass destruction. We have confidence we're going to find them. They're still there."..."

Bennett Roth (Houston Chronicle) (4/25/03):
"..."He tried to fool the United Nations, and did for 12 years by hiding those weapons," Bush said. "And so it's going to take time to find them. But we know he had them. And whether he destroyed them, moved them or hid them, we're going to find out the truth."..."

Compassiongate: Either one believes there is a possibility that Saddam destroyed the WMDs, or one is confident that Iraq "continues to have" WMDs. Both can't simultaneously be true.

1
OA1-14 WMD search Cheney for Bush

"...How do you explain why Saddam Hussein, if he had no program, wouldn’t come clean and say, “I haven’t got a program. Come look”? Then he would have sanctions lifted. He’d earned $100 billion more in oil revenue over the last several years. He’d still be in power. The reason he didn’t was because obviously he couldn’t comply and wouldn’t comply with the U.N. resolutions demanding that he give up his WMD..."

Uggabugga:
"...False. The U.S. government position was not to lift sanctions unless Saddam was removed from power..."

George W. Bush (CNN):
"...Today, no nation can possibly claim that Iraq has disarmed. And it will not disarm so long as Saddam Hussein holds power..."

Nonviolence.org:
"...The Iraqi government, knowing that the United States favors Saddam Hussein’s ouster and will impose sanctions until a "regime change" occurs, has no incentive to cooperate with the United States or intrusive weapon’s inspections. Top US administration officials have said publicly for more than a decade that sanctions will remain intact until Saddam Hussein is out of office, even though this is not stipulated under the UN resolutions enforcing the sanctions..."

IPA:
"...May 20, 1991: President George Bush: "At this juncture, my view is we don't want to lift these sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein is in power." James Baker, Secretary of State: "We are not interested in seeing a relaxation of sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein is in power."...
[President] Clinton [1993]: "There is no difference between my policy and the policy of the present Administration.... I have no intention of normalizing relations with him."...
March 26, 1997: Albright, in her first major foreign policy address as Secretary of State: "We do not agree with the nations who argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted. Our view, which is unshakable, is that Iraq must prove its peaceful intentions. It can only do that by complying with all of the Security Council resolutions to which it is subjected. Is it possible to conceive of such a government under Saddam Hussein? When I was a professor, I taught that you have to consider all possibilities. As Secretary of State, I have to deal in the realm of reality and probability. And the evidence is overwhelming that Saddam Hussein's intentions will never be peaceful."...
November 14, 1997: President Clinton. [During a standoff on weapons inspectors] "What he [Hussein] says his objective is, is to relieve the people of Iraq, and presumably the government, of the burden of the sanctions. What he has just done is to ensure that the sanctions will be there until the end of time or as long as he lasts..."

1
OA2-01 Iraqi WMD evidence Fleischer for Bush

"...What the president has said [about Iraq's WMDs]... has been the long-standing view of numerous people, not only in this country, not only in this administration, but around the world, including at the United Nations..."

Peter Beinart (The New Republic):
"...But that's not exactly true. Yes, everyone agreed Saddam Hussein had not accounted for his chemical and biological stockpiles. But those stockpiles weren't, by themselves, the basis for war. The administration's case rested on linking them to the far more frightening prospect of an Iraqi nuclear weapon, which Vice President Dick Cheney claimed Saddam would acquire "fairly soon." And, on that score, there was heated debate. During the Clinton administration, as John Prados wrote in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, intelligence assessments of Iraq's nuclear program were far more cautious than they became in 2002. And, on March 7, the International Atomic Energy Agency's Mohamed ElBaradei reported that, "after three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq." To which Cheney responded, "I think Mr. ElBaradei frankly is wrong."
The other key element in the White House's case for war was Iraq's supposed links to Al Qaeda, which both explained how Saddam could deliver his unconventional weapons to the United States and connected Iraq in the public mind to September 11, 2001. And that was even more controversial. In October 2002, French President Jacques Chirac said, "To my knowledge, no proof has been found, or in any case officially made public, of a link between Iraq and Al Qaeda." John Edwards made the same point this January: "I've certainly not seen any compelling evidence of an Al Qaeda connection as a member of the Intelligence Committee."..."

Compassiongate: The issue is not whether everyone and their uncles and great grandmothers thought Saddam had biological and chemical weapons - it is whether:
(a) the Bush administration's "evidence" clearly showed evidence to support that picture, or not, and 
(b) the possession of the disputed weapons caused an immediate threat to the United States that justified a near-unilateral attack on Iraq. 

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OA2-02 Iraqi WMD evidence Powell for Bush

"...Our concern was that Iraq was keeping in place this capability, waiting for the day when they were free of sanctions and could go about putting all of their programs back in place. This particularly applies to the nuclear program. What I said in February when I spoke to the UN, was that they had the brainpower, they had the plans, and they were working on acquiring the capability, and whenever they were free of UN constraints or other constraints -- nobody was breathing down their neck -- there was no doubt in my mind Saddam Hussein still had the intention of developing such a capability..."

Josh Marshall (Talking Points Memo):
"...So now the argument is that Iraq hadn't reconstituted anything, but rather that they were holding on to the plans and waiting for the day when they were out of the sanctions box and could go back into the WMD business...
But this isn't the argument the administration made -- not even close. If this is what the White House thought, then there was no reason whatsoever to turn the world upside down in order to pull the trigger this spring. Dick Cheney knew that, of course. Thus the recourse to bogus Niger uranium documents..."
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OA2-03 Iraqi WMD evidence Bush

"..."After 11 years during which we have tried containment, sanctions, inspections, even selected military action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons and is increasing his capabilities to make more," President Bush declared in a speech in Cincinnati last October. "And he is moving ever closer to developing a nuclear weapon."
"Clearly, to actually work, any new inspections, sanctions, or enforcement mechanisms will have to be very different," he added...."

Wolfowitz for Bush

"...just days before President Bush's State of the Union address in January, Paul D. Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense, described the intelligence as not only convincing but up-to-date.
"It is a case grounded in current intelligence," he told the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, "current intelligence that comes not only from sophisticated overhead satellites and our ability to intercept communications, but from brave people who told us the truth at the risk of their lives. We have that; it is very convincing."..."

Tenet for Bush

"...[said] "...When inspectors were pushed out in 1998, we did not sit back... The fact is we made significant professional progress." 
In his written statement, [Tenet] cited new evidence on biological and missile programs, but did not mention Hussein's nuclear pursuits..."

Rice for Bush

"...told "Fox News Sunday" that "there was an enrichment of the intelligence from 1998 over the period leading up to the war" and that Saddam Hussein had "very good programs in weapons of mass destruction...It was a gathering danger." Rice said the intelligence included new information about Iraq's procurement efforts and attempts to "reconstitute groups of scientists that had worked" for Hussein.
"Yes, I think I would call it new information, and it was certainly enriching the case in the same direction that this is somebody who had had weapons of mass destruction, had used them, and was continuing to pursue them," she said. "There were many, many dots about what was going on in the Iraqi programs after 1998."..."

James Risen, David E. Sanger, and Thom Shanker (New York Times) - bold text is my emphasis:
"...Now, with the failure so far to find prohibited weapons in Iraq, American intelligence officials and senior members of the administration have acknowledged that there was little new evidence flowing into American intelligence agencies in the five years since United Nations inspectors left Iraq, creating an intelligence vacuum...
Condoleezza Rice, Mr. Bush's national security adviser, said today that the question of new evidence versus old was beside the point. "The question of what is new after 1998 is not an interesting question," she said. "There is a body of evidence since 1991. You have to look at that body of evidence and say what does this require the United States to do? Then you are compelled to act...
"The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass murder," [Secretary Rumsfeld] said. "We acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light, through the prism of our experience on Sept. 11."
Richard Kerr, who headed a four-member team of retired C.I.A. officials that reviewed prewar intelligence about Iraq, said analysts at the C.I.A. and other agencies were forced to rely heavily on evidence that was five years old at least.
Intelligence analysts drew heavily "on a base of hard evidence growing out of the lead-up to the first war, the first war itself and then the inspections process," Mr. Kerr said. "We had a rich base of information," he said, and, after the inspectors left, "we drew on that earlier base."...
When the inspectors returned in November, senior administration officials were dismissive of their abilities.
They insisted that American intelligence agencies had better information on Iraq's weapons programs than the United Nations, and would use that data to find Baghdad's weapons after Mr. Hussein's government was toppled. In hindsight, it is now clear just how dependent American intelligence agencies were on the United Nations weapons inspections process
.
The inspections aided intelligence agencies directly, by providing witnesses' accounts from ground level and, indirectly, by prodding the Iraqis and forcing them to try to move and hide people and equipment, activities that American spy satellites and listening stations could monitor.
Several current and former intelligence officials said the United States did not have any high-level spies in Mr. Hussein's inner circle who could provide current information about his weapons programs. That weakness could not be fixed quickly..."

Daily Howler:
"...Yesterday, President Bush took a question on WMD. We thought his reply was astounding:
QUESTION: On weapons of mass destruction; is it fair to say now after a few months of looking for them that there is a discrepancy between what the intelligence community and you and your top officials described as the threat from Saddam Hussein and what was actually there on the ground?
BUSH: Saddam Hussein had a weapons program. Remember he used them—he used chemical weapons on his own people. Saddam Hussein is no longer a threat to the United States because we removed him, but he was a threat. Such a threat that my predecessor, using the same intelligence in 1998, ordered a bombing of Iraq. I mean, so—he was a threat. He’s not a threat now. And the world is more peaceful by virtue of the fact that he is not in power
..."

Dana Milbank and Mike Allen (Washington Post):
"...Bush told those gathered in the lush gardens outside the government's Union Building here that President Bill Clinton in 1998 "raided Iraq based upon the very same intelligence." Bush was referring to four days of bombing by the United States and Britain in December 1998 of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons facilities as well as its missile-production plants. ..
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld sought to diminish the importance of the debate over the intelligence on Iraq's weapons programs. "The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit" of weapons of mass destruction, he told the Senate Armed Services Committee. "We acted because we saw the evidence in a dramatic new light -- through the prism of our experience on 9-11." ..."

Dana Priest (Washington Post):
"...The leading Democrat on the House intelligence committee yesterday strongly disputed the assertion by national security adviser Condoleezza Rice that there was new information to support the claim that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction before the war and was a looming threat to the United States.  
"We don't see the support for that," said Rep. Jane Harman (D-Calif.), ranking member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, whose staff has spent four months scrutinizing 19 volumes of intelligence underlying the intelligence community's prewar judgments about Iraq.
"As we moved to war, did the claims the policymakers made, were those claims supported by the intelligence?" Harman asked. "My conclusion is no."...
As we moved to war, did the claims the policymakers made, were those claims supported by the intelligence?" Harman asked. "My conclusion is no."
Last week, Harman and committee Chairman Porter Goss (R-Fla.) sent a letter to CIA Director George J. Tenet outlining their preliminary view of the material used to compile a classified National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq in October 2002. The 90-page NIE, parts of which were declassified at Congress's request, was the key document used by members of Congress and other policymakers to decide whether to go to war in Iraq.

In the letter, the two committee members criticized the intelligence community for using information that was outdated, circumstantial and fragmentary to come to the conclusion that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons and had links to al Qaeda.
Most of the information was collected before 1998, when U.N. weapons inspectors left Iraq because the United States had made it clear it was about to strike the country, the two members noted..."

Dana Priest (Washington Post):
"...Leaders of the House intelligence committee have criticized the U.S. intelligence community for using largely outdated, "circumstantial" and "fragmentary" information with "too many uncertainties" to conclude that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and ties to al Qaeda. 
Top members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, which spent four months combing through 19 volumes of classified material used by the Bush administration to make its case for the war on Iraq, found "significant deficiencies" in the community's ability to collect fresh intelligence on Iraq, and said it had to rely on "past assessments" dating to when U.N. inspectors left Iraq in 1998 and on "some new 'piecemeal' intelligence," both of which "were not challenged as a routine matter."
"The absence of proof that chemical and biological weapons and their related development programs had been destroyed was considered proof that they continued to exist," the two committee members said in a letter Thursday to CIA Director George J. Tenet. The Washington Post obtained a copy this weekend...The committee, like all congressional panels, is controlled by Republicans, and its chairman, Rep. Porter J. Goss (R-Fla.), is a former CIA agent and a longtime supporter of Tenet and the intelligence agencies. Goss and the committee's ranking Democrat, Rep. Jane Harman (Calif.), signed the letter..."

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OA2-04 Iraqi WMD evidence Kay for Bush

"...Our understanding of the status of Iraq's WMD program was always bounded by large uncertainties and had to be heavily caveated..."

David Corn (The Nation):
"...Wait a minute. That was not what Bush and his compadres had said prior to the war. Flash back to Bush's get-out-of-town speech on March 17, two days before he launched the war. He maintained, "Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal" weapons of mass destruction. Yet Kay was saying there had been "large uncertainties" in the intelligence. How does that square with Bush's no-doubt claim? It doesn't...
On December 5, 2002, for instance, Ari Fleischer, then the White House press secretary, said, "the president of the United States and the secretary of defense would not assert as plainly and bluntly as they have that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction if it was not true, and if they did not have a solid basis for saying it."..."

Dana Priest and Dana Milbank:
"...On Thursday, after briefing House and Senate intelligence committee members, Kay had said that the team had discovered no chemical or biological weapons and that the nuclear program was only rudimentary. "It had a long way to go," he said.
Yesterday, Kay estimated it would have taken Iraq five to seven years to reconstitute its nuclear program.
In his March 17 ultimatum to Hussein, Bush said: "Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised."

In May, after inspectors found two trailers that could have been used to produce biological weapons, Bush said: "We found the weapons of mass destruction."..."

Powell at the U.N. before the invasion:
"...There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. And he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive death and destruction..."
"...Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons..."

1
OA2-05 Iraqi WMD evidence Bush

"...Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised..."

Bush

"...[Iraq] possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons..."

Fleischer for Bush:
"...the president of the United States and the secretary of defense would not assert as plainly and bluntly as they have that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction if it was not true, and if they did not have a solid basis for saying it..."

AFTER THE IRAQ INVASION

Dana Milbank (Washington Post):
"...President Bush and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell defended yesterday a statement made by Powell early in 2001 that Iraq's Saddam Hussein did not have "any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction." [CG emphasis]
Bush and Powell were asked about the remark, made on Feb. 24, 2001, after it was discovered on the State Department's Web site. Bush, asked about how Hussein went from that status in February to becoming what he called a "great and gathering danger" a year and a half later, said his perspective was changed by the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
"Nine-eleven changed my calculation," the president said after a meeting with lawmakers at the White House. "It made it really clear we have to deal with threats before they come on our shore..."...
Powell offered a different explanation yesterday, saying that more information was obtained later. "What I said was, at that time, three weeks into the administration, when I was trying to get sanctions retained -- and we did succeed in getting sanctions retained -- I made that observation," he said. "You'll note that I did not say that he didn't have weapons of mass destruction. . . . He was a threat then. The extent of his holdings were yet to be determined. It was early in the administration and, fact of the matter, it was long before 9/11."
National security adviser Condoleezza Rice, interviewed yesterday on ABC's "Good Morning America," provided a similar explanation. She said "the story unfolded" after Powell's remark, noting that "we began to get important reporting, for instance, on the fact that, in 1998, Saddam Hussein was diverting maybe $500 million in illegal funds from oil revenue by the period of 2002, not -- $3 billion in illegal revenue."

Powell's 2001 remark was similar to one made by Vice President Cheney on Sept. 16, 2001. Cheney asserted that Hussein was contained. "Saddam Hussein's bottled up, at this point, but clearly, we continue to have a fairly tough policy where the Iraqis are concerned," he said..."

1
OA2-06 Iraqi WMD evidence Powell for Bush

"...A lot changed between February 2001 (and the invasion), but I don't find anything inconsistent between what I said then and what I've said all along..."

Billmon/Whiskey Bar:
"...Sanctions exist -- not for the purpose of hurting the Iraqi people, but for the purpose of keeping in check Saddam Hussein's ambitions toward developing weapons of mass destruction ... And frankly they have worked. He has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors.
Colin Powell Press Briefing in Cairo 
February 24, 2001

If Iraq had disarmed itself, gotten rid of its weapons of mass destruction over the past 12 years, or over the last several months since (UN Resolution) 1441 was enacted, we would not be facing the crisis that we now have before us. 
Colin Powell Interview with Radio France International February 28, 2003..."

MaxSpeak has more quotes, especially from Powell.

Sydney Morning Herald:
"...A television report by Pilger aired on British screens last night said US Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice confirmed in early 2001 that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had been disarmed and was no threat...
Pilger uncovered video footage of Powell in Cairo on February 24, 2001 saying, "He (Saddam Hussein) has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbours."
Two months later, Rice reportedly said, "We are able to keep his arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt." ..."

1
OA3-01 Iraq's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) Powell for Bush

"...In his U.N. address last February, Powell highlighted two other points about Iraq's UAV program to suggest the drones could be used to spread chemical or biological agents. One was an extensive Iraqi effort to develop "spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs." The other involved evidence that Iraq had tried flying UAVs substantial distances, including one test that went for 310 miles..."

Bush

"...We’ve also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas. We’re concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States..."

Bradley Graham (Washington Post):
"...Flipping through photographs of drone aircraft uncovered by U.S. search teams in Iraq, Robert S. Boyd, the Air Force's senior intelligence analyst, stopped at one showing the inside of a fuselage. 
Two glass viewing ports could be seen at the bottom of the metal frame. Fastened above was a bracket, which Boyd said was likely for mounting "a camera or recorder of some sort." Also squeezed into the cramped space were the flight controls, leaving little room, Boyd noted, for much else -- certainly not anything capable of dispensing biological or chemical warfare agents.
Discovery of such remnants of Iraq's drone program since U.S. forces seized Baghdad in April has left Air Force officials feeling vindicated. They argued before the Iraq war that the drones were never meant to spread toxins but to fly unarmed reconnaissance missions.

The CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency and other government intelligence groups disagreed with that assessment. They contended the drones, known in military jargon as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), were intended to carry biological or chemical agents and therefore posed a particular threat to Iraq's neighbors and to U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf region. They also warned that if Iraq managed to find a way to launch the UAVs from some place near the United States, the aircraft could threaten American communities.
President Bush and his senior national security aides seized on that assessment to bolster their argument for invading Iraq. In a speech in Cincinnati last October, Bush expressed concern that "Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States." Secretary of State Colin L. Powell spoke of the same possibility in his presentation to the U.N. Security Council in February.
What the Bush administration did not reveal until recently was that the government organization most knowledgeable about the United States' UAV program -- the Air Force's National Air and Space Intelligence Center -- had sharply disputed the notion that Iraq's UAVs were being designed as attack weapons. [CG emphasis] The Air Force dissent emerged publicly in July when the White House released excerpts from an October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq.
The disclosure has added to the debate over the administration's handling of intelligence on Iraq's weapons programs before the war, when the president and his senior advisers often cited intelligence assessments that supported their argument for invading Iraq without reference to opposing points of view...
According to Boyd, the dissent began in the summer of 2002, when Air Force specialists received a draft of the NIE, a comprehensive assessment of Iraq's weapons capabilities produced by the various intelligence agencies. It asserted that Iraq's drone aircraft were intended to spew deadly chemicals or germs.
"We thought this statement was a little odd," Boyd said, noting that Air Force assessments "all along" had cited reconnaissance -- not weapons delivery -- as the purpose of the Iraqi UAVs. .."

[CG: There's more...]

"...But with the debate now out in the open, Boyd, who is the director of intelligence analysis for the Air Force, has been quite willing to talk...
Boyd said the spray devices were weighty tanks that were intended for fighter jets and were too heavy for Iraq's UAV fleet. As for the longer-range test flights, he said they did not mean the drones could carry any bigger payload.
U.S. teams scouring Iraq in recent months for evidence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction have unearthed UAVs -- or pieces of them -- in several locations, including a "parking lot" in southwest Baghdad that Boyd described as part of Iraq's "main UAV development center." He said U.S. officials have determined that before the war, Iraq had an inventory of about 75 UAVs, roughly half of them Musayara-20s.

"Everything we discovered strengthened our conviction that the UAVs were to be used for reconnaissance," Boyd said. Interviews with a number of Iraqis who had been involved in the UAV program have supported this view, he added..."

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OA4-01 Iraqi missile "program"

Bush

"...The [Kay] report states that Saddam Hussein's regime had...advanced design work on prohibited longer-range missiles..."

Cheney for Bush

"...Plans and advanced design work for new long-range ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges capable of striking targets throughout the Middle East, which were prohibited by the U.N. and which Saddam sought to conceal from U.N. weapons inspectors..."

Glen Rangwala (The Independent):
"...However, it does not demonstrate that Iraq was violating the terms of any Security Council resolution. The prohibition on Iraq acquiring technology relating to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons was absolute: no agents, no sub-systems and no research or support facilities.
By contrast, Iraq was simply prohibited from actually having longer-range missiles, together with "major parts, and repair and production facilities". The ISG does not claim proof that Iraq had any such missiles or facilities, just the knowledge to produce them in future. Indeed, it would have been entirely lawful for Iraq to develop such systems if the restrictions implemented in 1991 were lifted, while it would never have been legitimate for it to re-develop WMD..."
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OA5-01 Iraqi U.N. Resolution violations

Cheney for Bush

"...each and every one of these findings [by Kay's team] confirms a material breach by the former Iraqi regime of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441..."

Dana Milbank and Walter Pincus (Washington Post):

"...But some of the items Cheney cited from Kay's report as violations remain unconfirmed. The prison laboratory story was first explored in 1998 by U.N. inspectors. Kay said U.S. inspectors still did not have enough evidence or witnesses "that would indicate that in fact that's what they [the prison facilities] were used for." 
Similarly, a former U.N. inspector said that in the past, investigators in Iraq were continually discovering technical equipment that had not been declared or tagged "because almost any lab equipment is dual purpose." And experts say the drones Cheney cited probably could not travel far enough to violate U.N. requirements and were not designed to carry weapons..."

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OA5-02 WMD inspection Cheney for Bush

"...We've got a very good man now in charge of the operation, David Kay, who used to run UNSCOM..."

Dana Milbank and Walter Pincus (Washington Post):
"...Kay, who is heading the 1,200-person search group, did not in fact run UNSCOM, the U.N. Special Commission that directed inspections in Iraq from 1991 through 1998; he was for one year the chief inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency, which handled the nuclear portion of those investigations for UNSCOM..."
1
OA6-01 Concern over Iraq's WMDs Adelman for Bush

"...we know that the main weapon of mass destruction was Saddam Hussein and his regime and that has been stopped..."

CNN via Atrios:
"...BROWN: Do you think it's fair to say at this point that whatever ends up being found in Iraq is going to be less than the administration seemed to suggest very strongly leading up to the war?
ADELMAN: I don't think that's fair. I think what we've seen is the destruction in Iraq far more than any of us ever predicted. We have seen the destruction of a people, the destruction of the family, the destruction of human beings and human life in that country is far, far greater than we ever expected. So, we know that the main weapon of mass destruction was Saddam Hussein and his regime and that has been stopped..." 

Julian Borger (The Guardian):
"...Mr Wolfowitz said there were several motives for the invasion, including weapons of mass destruction, Iraq's alleged links with al-Qaida and the oppression of the Iraqi people. "The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the US government bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on - which was weapons of mass destruction - as the core reason," he said. Mr Wolfowitz said that the "criminal treatment" of the "Iraqi people is a reason to help the Iraqis, but it's not a reason to put American kids' lives at risk, certainly not on the scale we did" [CG emphasis]..."

1
OA6-02 Concern over Iraq's WMDs

Bolton for Bush

"...Whether or not Hussein had weapons was not central to the U.S. decision to invade Iraq, Bolton said. "The issue I think has been the capability that Iraq sought to have . . . WMD programs," he told the Associated Press. "Whether he possessed them today or four years ago isn't really the issue. Until that regime was removed from power, that threat remained. That was the purpose of military action." ..."

Wolfowitz for Bush

"...I'm not concerned about weapons of mass destruction..."
July 21, 2003

Billmon/Whiskey Bar:
"...We still need to find and secure Iraq's weapons of mass destruction facilities and secure Iraq's borders so we can prevent the flow of weapons of mass destruction materials and senior regime officials out of the country.
Donald Rumsfeld Press Conference
April 9, 2003
Q: And are you concerned that those weapons might have been shipped out of the country?
Rumsfeld: You bet we're concerned about it. And one of the reasons it's important is because the nexus between terrorist states with weapons of mass destruction ... and terrorist groups -- networks -- is a critical link. And the thought that ... some of those materials could leave the country and [get] in the hands of terrorist networks would be a very unhappy prospect. So it is important to us to see that that doesn't happen.
Donald Rumsfeld Press Conference
April 9, 2003..."

Billmon/Whiskey Bar:
"...Disarming Iraq of its chemical and biological weapons and dismantling its nuclear weapons program is a crucial part of winning the War on Terror. 
Paul Wolfowitz
Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations January 23, 2003

Compassiongate: A whole slew of such quotes is available from Billmon here.

1

(being very very compassionate here)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


1. Now some of you might wonder where this University is located - so, it is appropriate to make it clear right here that this is not a real University - it is only a hypothetical institute of lower higher learning.

2. I sometimes prefer to truncate the words Compassionate Conservative to Compassion Con. There is no intent here to imply anything significant by this (at least anything more than is commonly understood). I reserve all moral clarity rights to the use of this term. One Compassion Con credit is assigned to every instance of compassion (i.e., misleading, deceptive or inaccurate statement or outright lie/mendacity).

3. Note that Compassionate statements made by Mr. Bush's spokespersons, advisers or appointees - speaking clearly on behalf of Mr. Bush - are considered as being supported by Mr. Bush, absent a public statement to the contrary.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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