Compassionate
Nominees
Moral Clarity
aka Honesty
A Promise Made is
A Promise Kept
Compassionate
Policy
Compassionate Media,
Uncompassionate Voices
Using Compassion
Con credits
About CG/
Acknowledgements
Search CG

UNIVERSITY OF COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM (what is this?) 

You have selected

COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM 203D*
*President Bush's lies and deception moral clarity, honesty and integrity 
on the
Iraq invasion - Part A

In this course you will learn about the abundant lies, deception or intent to deceive moral clarity, honesty and integrity displayed by compassionate conservative2 President George W. Bush (and his administration speaking on his behalf) on the Iraq invasion (Part A). This part covers his (Government's) miscellaneous statements relating to the assessed overall threat that Iraq posed, the reasons/justification for invading Iraq, the U.N. and "coalition" partners and the period of "major combat". Make sure you drop by again when the Election 04 (2004) campaign starts picking up steam, so that you can refresh your memory on his compassion. 

Please note that the statements made by Bush or his spokespersons/administration3 - as cited in column 3 of the tables below - are by default extracted from one or more of the links shown in column 4. If the source of the statements is different from the link(s) in column 4, then a URL is explicitly provided in column 3. For feedback and corrections, please go here.

A detailed acknowledgement of the sites from which the information below was obtained is listed at this location. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the following sites where I got the vast majority of links from: Atrios/Eschaton, Politics, Law and Autism, Calpundit, Buzzflash, Daily Howler, Talking Points Memo, Thinking it Through, BushwatchSpinsanity

Total Compassion Con credits 2 available from this course to date = 50

Last Update: 12/01/2003

 

"To questions about whether the attacks on Sept. 11 turned Bush into a better leader, Rove answered that Bush was a great leader all along," the Washington Post reported on December 12: " 'I for one don't buy this theory that September 11th somehow changed George Bush,' " Rove said. " 'You're just paying better attention. He is who he is.' "
"In a lot of ways he is exactly how he's always been, and I think people sort of see him now for how he's always been - very steady, and very disciplined, and a lot of resolve, but also a whole lot of compassion and a way to really connect with people," Laura [Bush] told Tim Russert on December 23.
(from Mark Crispin Miller, The Bush Dyslexicon)

Touché. 

MSNBC - 10/13/03 (bold text is my emphasis):
"...A key Republican lawmaker, Richard Lugar of Indiana, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said Sunday on NBC’s “Meet the Press” that “the president has to be president” as his top advisers appeared to quarrel. Monday, Bush responded by telling Tribune Broadcasting, “The person who is in charge is me.”
       “In all due respect to politicians here in Washington, D.C., who make comments, they’re just wrong about our strategy,” Bush said. Referring to Paul Bremer, the U.S. civilian administrator in Iraq, by his nickname, Bush added: “We’ve had a strategy from the beginning. Jerry Bremer is running the strategy, and we are making very good progress about the establishment of a free Iraq.”..."

 

Once you are done with the above sections, you may choose another course by picking one of the options below

 

PRE-INVASION THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND JUSTIFICATIONS <go back to the top>

Compassion Con credits total = 20

# Topic President Bush or his representative's Compassionate statement Some Uncompassionate Facts Compassion Con Credits
WR1-01 Motives: Oil?

Powell for Bush

"...The oil of Iraq belongs to the people of Iraq..." 

Wolfowitz for Bush

"...This is not a war about oil. This is going to—if we have to use force, it's going to be to liberate Iraq, not to occupy Iraq. The oil resources belong to the Iraqi people..." 

Rumsfeld for Bush

"...An Iraq war has absolutely nothing to do with oil..."

Perle for Bush

"...I find the accusation that this administration has embarked upon this policy for oil to be an outrageous, scurrilous charge for which, when you asked for the evidence, you will note there was none...It is a lie, congressman. It's an out-and-out lie."..."

Fleischer for Bush (Oct 2002)

"...The only interest the United States has in the region is furthering the cause of peace and stability. We are not interested in Saddam Hussein's country's ability to generate oil."..."

James Ridgeway (Village Voice) via Bushwatch:
"...Four years ago Perle was singing a different tune. On January 26, 1998, Perle, Wolfowitz, and Rumsfeld, along with several others, signed a letter to President Clinton that said, "It hardly needs to be added that if Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world's supply of oil will all be put at hazard."..."

H. Josef Hebert (AP/Yahoo):
"...Vice President Dick Cheney's energy task force appeared to have some interest in early 2001 in Iraq's oil industry, including which foreign companies were pursuing business there, according to documents released Friday by a private watchdog group. Judicial Watch, a conservative legal group, obtained a batch of task force-related Commerce Department (news - web sites) papers that included a detailed map of Iraq's oil fields, terminals and pipelines as well as a list entitled "Foreign Suitors of Iraqi Oilfield Contracts." 
The papers also included a detailed map of oil fields and pipelines in Saudi Arabia and in the United Arab Emirates and a list of oil and gas development projects in those two countries..."

World Industry News via Whodies (Oct 2002):
"...The US State Department has pushed back its planned meeting with Iraqi opposition leaders on exploiting Iraq's oil and gas reserves after a US military offensive removes Saddam Hussein from power to early December. According to a source at the State Department, all the desired participants are not yet available.
The Bush administration wants to have a working group of 12 to 20 people focused on Iraqi oil and gas to be able to recommend to an interim government ways of restoring the petroleum sector following a military attack in order to increase oil exports to partially pay for a possible US military occupation government - further fueling the view that controlling Iraqi oil is at the heart of the Bush campaign to replace Hussein with a more compliant regime..."

Donald Barlett and James Steele (Time):
"...
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has been firm and consistent on what the war in Iraq is not about. "It has nothing to do with oil, literally nothing to do with oil," he says. If it sounds as though he's protesting too much, it's because the Bush Administration is up against a prevailing world view that the burden of proof is on the U.S. to show that it won't exploit Iraq's underground riches. Hours after the invasion began, U.S. forces had seized two offshore terminals that can transfer 2 million bbl. daily to tankers. They secured the southern Rumaila oil field so swiftly that Saddam Hussein's retreating troops managed to set only nine wells ablaze, compared with 650 Kuwaiti wells during Gulf War I, and U.S. airborne troops took the northern oil fields at Kirkuk largely intact.
Three weeks later, when U.S. forces rolled into downtown Baghdad, they headed straight for the Oil Ministry building and threw up a protective shield around it. While other government buildings, ranging from the Ministry of Religious Affairs to the National Museum of Antiquities, were looted and pillaged, while hospitals were stripped of medicine and basic equipment, Iraq's oil records were safe and secure, guarded by the U.S. military. General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had an explanation: "I think it's, as much as anything else, a matter of priorities."
Rumsfeld's disclaimer aside, the fact is that oil—who has it, who produces it, who fixes its price—governs everything of significance in the Persian Gulf and affects economies everywhere. While the Bush Administration has repeatedly asserted that Iraq's oil belongs to its citizens—"We'll make sure that Iraq's natural resources are used for the benefit of their owners, the Iraqi people," the President said—the stakes go far beyond Iraq. The amount of oil that Iraq brings to market will not just determine the living standards of Iraqis but affect everything from the Russian economy to the price Americans pay for gasoline, from the stability of Saudi Arabia to Iran's future.
Why is Iraq such a prize? Not only does it have the potential to become the world's largest producer, but no other country can do it as cheaply. That's because, for geological reasons, Iraq boasts the world's most prolific wells..."

1
WR2-01 Motive: Other? Cheney for Bush

"...said it was "reprehensible" that people would think the administration had "saved" its ammunition on Iraq to bring it out now, 60 days before an election. "So the suggestion that somehow, you know, we husbanded this and we waited is just not true," Cheney said..."

Dana Milbank (Washington Post) via Bushwatch:
"...Now where would people get such a cockamamie idea? Well, maybe from White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. and Bush political adviser Karl Rove, who made the case to the New York Times's Elisabeth Bumiller last week that they pretty much did what Cheney said they didn't do -- waited patiently and deliberately to launch a long-planned rollout. "From a marketing point of view, you don't introduce new products in August," Card said. Added Rove: "The thought was that in August the president is sort of on vacation."..."

Misleader.org:
"...Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz has acknowledged that in the first weekend after September 11th "the disagreement was whether [invading Iraq] should be in the immediate response or whether you should concentrate simply on Afghanistan first."2
Privately, the President began making it known in March 2002 that the decision to invade Iraq was a foregone conclusion. In an unscheduled appearance with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Republican and Democratic Senators, Bush cursed Saddam and vowed, "We're taking him out." Weeks later, Vice President Dick Cheney said to a Senate Republican policy lunch that the question of attacking Iraq was not if, but when.3
The strategy of seeking United Nations approval for the invasion was hatched during an August dinner with Secretary of State Colin Powell at which "the agenda was not whether Iraq, but how."4 Publicly, though, the President continued to mislead the American public, saying the U. N. resolution "does not mean that military action is imminent or unavoidable."5..."

Dwight Meredith (P.L.A.):
"...if Saddam’s WMD program is on the verge of having such capability, what was President Bush doing taking a month’s vacation in August? We suspect that President Bush knows that Saddam has no such capability and knows that such capability is not eminent..."

1
WR2-02 Motive: Other? Bush

"...continued to say he has not yet decided whether to go to war..."

Bush

stated multiple times that war on Iraq will be a "last resort"

Bush

"...the American people can know that every measure has been taken to avoid war..."

Karen DeYoung (Washington Post) via Bushwatch:
"...
In meetings yesterday with senior officials in Moscow, Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton told the Russian government that "we're going ahead," whether the council agrees or not, a senior administration official said. "The council's unity is at stake here."
A senior diplomat from another council member said his government had heard a similar message and was told not to anguish over whether to vote for war.
"You are not going to decide whether there is war in Iraq or not," the diplomat said U.S. officials told him. "That decision is ours, and we have already made it. It is already final. The only question now is whether the council will go along with it or not." President Bush has continued to say he has not yet decided whether to go to war. But the message being conveyed in high-level contacts with other council governments is that a military attack on Iraq is inevitable, these officials and diplomats said..."

Seymour Hersh (The New Yorker):
"...By early March, 2002, a former White House official told me, it was understood by many in the White House that the President had decided, in his own mind, to go to war..."

Misleader.org:
"...Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz has acknowledged that in the first weekend after September 11th "the disagreement was whether [invading Iraq] should be in the immediate response or whether you should concentrate simply on Afghanistan first."2
Privately, the President began making it known in March 2002 that the decision to invade Iraq was a foregone conclusion. In an unscheduled appearance with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Republican and Democratic Senators, Bush cursed Saddam and vowed, "We're taking him out." Weeks later, Vice President Dick Cheney said to a Senate Republican policy lunch that the question of attacking Iraq was not if, but when.3
The strategy of seeking United Nations approval for the invasion was hatched during an August dinner with Secretary of State Colin Powell at which "the agenda was not whether Iraq, but how."4 Publicly, though, the President continued to mislead the American public, saying the U. N. resolution "does not mean that military action is imminent or unavoidable."5..."

Robert Parry (Consortium News):
"...Americans also don’t seem to mind that Bush appears to have deceived them for months when he claimed he hadn’t made up his mind about invading Iraq.
As he marched the nation to war, Bush presented himself as a Christian man of peace who saw war only as a last resort. But in a remarkable though little noted disclosure, Time magazine reported that in March 2002 – a full year before the invasion – Bush outlined his real thinking to three U.S. senators, “Fuck Saddam,” Bush said. “We’re taking him out.” Time actually didn’t report the quote exactly that way. Apparently not to offend readers who admire Bush’s moral clarity, Time printed the quote as “F--- Saddam. We’re taking him out.” Bush offered his pithy judgment after sticking his head in the door of a White House meeting between National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and three senators who had been discussing strategies for dealing with Iraq through the United Nations. The senators laughed uncomfortably at Bush’s remark, Time reported. [Time story posted March 23, 2003]. It now is clear that Bush never intended to avoid a war in Iraq, a conflict which has so far claimed the lives of at least 85 American soldiers and possibly thousands of Iraqis..."

2
WR3-01 Internal divisions on Iraq strategy  Fleischer for Bush

"...dismissed any suggestions of a split. He called suggestions of tension between Powell and Cheney, "much ado about no difference."..."

USA Today:
"...In an interview with the British Broadcasting Corp., Powell said that as a "first step" U.N. weapons inspectors must be allowed to return to Iraq. President Bush "has been clear that he believes weapons inspectors should return," Powell said.
Those comments appeared to contradict two speeches Cheney gave last week in which he said inspections should not be the primary goal of U.S. policy toward Iraq. Cheney said the key issue is Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's drive to acquire nuclear weapons, and the return of inspectors, who left Iraq in 1998, "would provide no assurance."..."

Paul Krugman (New York Times):
"...Ari Fleischer's insistence that Mr. Powell and Mr. Cheney have no differences over Iraq seems to have pushed some journalists into facing up, at least briefly, to the obvious. ABC's weblog The Note described it as a "chocolate-is-vanilla" claim, admitting that "The Bush team has always had a credibility problem with some reporters because of their insistence on saying 'up is down' and 'black is white.'" But the administration needn't worry; if history is any guide, many reporters will soon return to their usual cringe. The next time the administration insists that chocolate is vanilla, much of the media — fearing accusations of liberal bias, trying to create the appearance of "balance" — won't report that the stuff is actually brown; at best they'll report that some Democrats claim that it's brown..."

1
WR4-01 Iraqi threat Bush

"...Saddam Hussein regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble, and this is a risk we must not take..."

Powell for Bush

"...The gravity of this moment is matched by the gravity of the threat that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction pose to the world..."

Cheney for Bush

"...The ability to criticize is one of the great strengths of our democracy. But those who do so have an obligation to answer this question: How could any responsible leader have ignored the Iraqi threat?...Those charged with the security of this nation could not read such an assessment and pretend that it did not exist. Ignoring such information, or trying to wish it away, would be irresponsible in the extreme...When the decision fell to him, President Bush was not willing to place the future of our security, and the lives of our citizens, at the mercy of Saddam Hussein. And so the President acted [and invaded Iraq]..."

David Corn (The Nation):
"...at the press conference, Bush said--as he has repeatedly--"the risk of doing nothing, the risk of hoping that Saddam Hussein changes his mind and becomes a gentle soul, the risk that somehow that inaction will make the world safer is a risk I'm not willing to take for the American people." With this statement, Bush was presenting a false dichotomy: war or nothing. If that's the choice, war may seem less avoidable. Yet the nations opposing his push for war--France, Germany, Canada--have indeed proposed other courses of action involving more aggressive and intrusive inspections. Bush is free to argue that such means cannot succeed and are not worth even attempting. Instead, he dismisses his opposition by suggesting it is naively and foolishly counting on Saddam's transformation into a saint. This has been one of the critical distortions he has used to promote his war...."

David Corn (The Nation):
"...But the influential UN members that opposed a war at this juncture--including Washington's closest allies--were not assuming Hussein's "good faith." They advocated reviving intrusive inspections and pursuing other means before contemplating war. But Bush implied--disingenuously--that weapons inspections would not work..."

Dave Koehler (Philly Burbs) via Carla Binion:
"...When facts are not available or convenient, there are many tricks one can use to present an argument. Here are a few examples of tactics the current administration is using to convince you and the world that invading Iraq is necessary. 
One of the favorite methods of the current administration is a false dilemma. This is when only two choices are given when, in reality, there are more options. Right after 9/11 you heard, “You are either with us or against us,” in the fight against terrorism. Actually, countries can be both against terrorism and not an ally of the U.S. More recently, many countries are showing that they are both against a pre-emptive war and against the current Iraqi regime. 
We are also hearing we must attack Iraq or Saddam will develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and threaten the world if we do nothing. Other options of monitoring with inspectors and containment are just flatly discounted. Are we to believe that Saddam could develop nuclear weapons while the world has him under a microscope?..."

2
WR4-02 Iraqi threat Bush

"...Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof—the smoking gun—that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud. As President Kennedy said in October of 1962, "Neither the United States of America, nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world," he said, "where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nations security to constitute maximum peril."..."

Joseph Cirincione and Dipali Mukhopadyay (Foreign Policy):
"...Theodore Sorenson, the Kennedy advisor who wrote these words, complained that this quote was taken totally out of context. "It was not intended to justify a pre-emptive strike, because JFK had specifically ruled out a preemptive strike..."
1
WR4-03 Iraqi threat Bush admin

"...the only possible use he could have for those weapons, is to dominate, intimidate or attack..."

Dennis Hans (Take Back the Media):
"...'Deterrence' is also a generally understood reason to develop WMD. Just ask the leaders of North Korea, Israel, Pakistan, India, Russia and the U.S. Deterrence and regional 'balance of power' considerations were obvious factors in Saddam's efforts in the 1980s to develop nuclear weapons. Not the only factors, but factors nonetheless..."
1
WR4-04 Iraqi threat Bush

called Iraq a "..."direct and growing threat,"..."

and 

"...Bush also repeated his favorite passive phrase, "If war is forced upon us."..."

Cheney for Bush

"...What we must not do in the face of a mortal threat," Cheney instructed a Nashville gathering of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in August 2002, "is give in to wishful thinking or willful blindness."..."

Dwight Meredith (P.L.A.):
"...if Saddam’s WMD program is on the verge of having such capability, what was President Bush doing taking a month’s vacation in August? We suspect that President Bush knows that Saddam has no such capability and knows that such capability is not eminent..."

Matthew Rothschild (The Progressive) via Dennis Hans:
"...
no one in the region, not even Israel, seems to agree. A New York Times article on Feb. 27, just a few pages away from the transcript of Bush's speech, noted, "The Israeli government and military elite believe that Saddam Hussein seeks devastating weapons but has far less capacity of mayhem than he had during the Persian Gulf war." And the claim that the threat is "growing" appears less credible by the day, as Iraq has now announced a decision to start dismantling the missiles in question and is in the process of destroying some mustard gas. What's more, with weapons inspectors on the ground and spy planes in the air, Saddam has no room to be a "growing" threat. He's in a box, and the walls of that box are closing in on him...Bush also repeated his favorite passive phrase, "If war is forced upon us." No one's forcing you, George!..."

David Olive (Toronto Star):
"...
With an invasion force the U.S. itself now boasts was of relatively minimal strength, Saddam's regime was easily toppled. On that point, the neo-con war hawks were correct. Iraq was poised to fall like a house of cards. By the second week of the conflict, Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, was saying he felt embarrassed by the Iraqis' poor fighting skills — or unwillingness to fight at all. As the enormity of the rout was clear early last week, the Pentagon was dismissing the Iraqi forces as "a paper army." Pushed to the wall, the Iraqi regime did not try to blunt the enemy advance by dipping into its vaunted stockpile of "weapons of mass destruction" — or perhaps that, too, was a paper inventory. Of course, the outcome of this dubious contest between the world's lone superpower and a puny, impoverished adversary with no allies was never in doubt. The U.S. and its British ally were taking on an enemy that had not been able to obtain spare parts for its tanks for the past decade and proved unable to get its fighter jets airborne..."

CBS News:
"...Thielmann's last job at the State Department was director of the Office of Strategic Proliferation and Military Affairs, which was responsible for analyzing the Iraqi weapons threat for Secretary Powell. He and his staff had the highest security clearances, and everything – whether it came into the CIA or the Defense Department – came through his office...
At the time of Powell's speech, Thielmann says that Iraq didn't pose an imminent threat to anyone: “I think it didn't even constitute an imminent threat to its neighbors at the time we went to war.”
But Thielmann also says that he believes the decision to go to war was made first, and then the intelligence was interpreted to fit that conclusion..."

John B. Judis and Spencer Ackerman (The New Republic):
"...Cheney's admonition is resonant, but not for the reasons he intended. The Bush administration displayed an acute case of willful blindness in making its case for war. Much of its evidence for a reconstituted nuclear program, a thriving chemical-biological development program, and an active Iraqi link with Al Qaeda was based on what intelligence analysts call "rumint." Says one former official with the National Security Council, "It was a classic case of rumint, rumor-intelligence plugged into various speeches and accepted as gospel."
In some cases, the administration may have deliberately lied. If Bush didn't know the purported uranium deal between Iraq and Niger was a hoax, plenty of people in his administration did--including, possibly, Vice President Cheney, who would have seen the president's State of the Union address before it was delivered. Rice and Rumsfeld also must have known that the aluminum tubes that they presented as proof of Iraq's nuclear ambitions were discounted by prominent intelligence experts. And, while a few administration officials may have genuinely believed that there was a strong connection between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, most probably knew they were constructing castles out of sand.
The Bush administration took office pledging to restore "honor and dignity" to the White House. And it's true: Bush has not gotten caught having sex with an intern or lying about it under oath. But he has engaged in a pattern of deception concerning the most fundamental decisions a government must make. The United States may have been justified in going to war in Iraq--there were, after all, other rationales for doing so--but it was not justified in doing so on the national security grounds that President Bush put forth throughout last fall and winter. He deceived Americans about what was known of the threat from Iraq and deprived Congress of its ability to make an informed decision about whether or not to take the country to war..."

2
WR4-05 Iraqi threat Cheney for Bush

"...Last October, the Director of Central Intelligence issued a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Continuing Programs of Weapons of Mass Destruction. That document contained the consensus judgments of the intelligence community, based upon the best information available about the Iraqi threat. The NIE declared -- quote: "We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction program, in defiance of UN Resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons, as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions. If left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade." End quote. Those charged with the security of this nation could not read such an assessment and pretend that it did not exist [CG emphasis]..."

Walter Pincus (Washington Post):
"...At the center of the political debate over the intelligence preceding the war in Iraq is the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) -- the 100-page, top secret document that hurriedly pulled together judgments from across the U.S. intelligence community about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and the potential dangers involved in an invasion.
Such estimates are usually requested by the White House and take months to prepare, with the CIA and other elements of the U.S. intelligence community weighing their own information and working out disagreements after review and debate. But this one was rushed into production only after requests from Democratic senators who were being asked to give President Bush authorization to go to war. [CG emphasis]
"The NIE was hastily done in three weeks," one senior intelligence expert said. "It was a cut-and-paste job, with agencies and officials given only one day to review the draft final product when they usually take months. . . . Today they still disagree on the meaning of what came out."
As the Bush administration built its case for war against Iraq in the fall of 2002, a thorough NIE would seem to have been crucial: Hussein's reported chemical, biological or nuclear weapons were central to the pro-war argument. Equally important were questions about how likely Hussein was to use such weapons against U.S. troops or worse, the U.S. homeland.
Yet as late as September 2002, Sen. Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.), wrote to the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "I am deeply concerned that the intelligence community has not prepared a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities." [CG emphasis]
Durbin's letter also referred to what some senior analysts inside the intelligence community see as the reason no NIE had been sought by the White House: a reluctance to submit individual intelligence findings to challenge from competing analysts.
"Without an NIE," Durbin said, "agencies may never have an opportunity to examine each others' data, and any differences or similarities between the reports could provide important information to policymakers." [CG emphasis]
On Sept. 11, Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.), then the Senate committee chairman, sent a classified letter to CIA Director George J. Tenet requesting what one congressional source described as an "end-to-end NIE on Iraq." That meant, the source said, that it would include not only an assessment of Hussein's weapons but also judgments on "what the war would be like and how the postwar would play out."
Tenet quickly approved the request once the president was informed, according to a senior intelligence official. At the same time, a decision was made to produce a declassified version that senators could use during public debate.
Asked in an interview last summer why administration policymakers had not sought an NIE before making their decisions on Iraq, Tenet said, "We had covered parts of all those programs over 10 years through NIEs and other reports, and we had a ton of community product on all these issues."..."

Hullaballoo:
"...It's very interesting to see the administration quoting at length from the vaunted NIE as if it were a sacred rune. On September 12, 2002, the president went to the UN and proclaimed:
Today, Iraq continues to withhold important information about its nuclear program -- weapons design, procurement logs, experiment data, an accounting of nuclear materials and documentation of foreign assistance. Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians. It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. And Iraq's state-controlled media has reported numerous meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons
[...]
Delegates to the General Assembly, we have been more than patient. We've tried sanctions. We've tried the carrot of oil for food, and the stick of coalition military strikes. But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has a -- nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one. We owe it to all our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that day from coming.

Just 2 days before, however, on the Senate floor, Dick Durbin said:
As a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I am deeply concerned that the intelligence community has not completed the most basic document which is asked of them before the United States makes such a critical life-or-death decision...
I was stunned to learn last week that we have not produced a national intelligence estimate showing the current state of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. What is incredible, with all of the statements made by members of this administration about those weapons, is the fact that the intelligence community has not been brought together...
...When we are talking about a possible invasion of Iraq and a war against Iraq, why haven't we really created the most basic document that we have the power to create in this Government--the national intelligence estimate--so we know exactly what we may be up against in Iraq? It has not been done.

So one was prepared. Apparently, only because Dick Durbin explicitly asked for it:
This morning, I handed a letter to the deputy to Director Tenet asking that he give it to the Director personally, asking that they move as quickly as possible to establish and create this national intelligence estimate...

Two days later, Bush was proclaiming to the UN, quite without reservation, that (amongst other things) Saddam would be able to make a bomb within a year if he could obtain fissile material.
So, the NIE is not exactly the best evidence for why the administration believed that Iraq was a serious threat because the NIE didn't exist until a Democrat specifically requested it. The administration was quite "convinced" of Iraq's WMD threat long before it was produced. So convinced, apparently, that they didn't feel the need to produce one themselves before they launched their Iraq invasion marketing plan last September. [CG emphasis]..."
1

(being extremely compassionate here)

WR4-06 Iraqi threat Cheney for Bush

"...Some claim we should not have acted because the threat from Saddam Hussein was not imminent. Yet, as the president has said, "Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intention, politely putting us on notice before they strike?'' ..."

Compassiongate:
How compassionate of our VP to forget the reams of intelligence about the 9/11 hijackers and the threat of airline/suicide hijackings before 9/11! Obviously those who strike may not specify the exact time and location they want to strike at. But the incompetence compassion of the administration does not miraculously mean that all the information the CIA and FBI had on bin Laden's or other fanatics' intentions or plans did not exist. The administration is now waxing poetically about the threat due to Saddam Hussein's intentions. How come this moral clarity was not evident before 9/11 in assessing and responding to Al Qaeda's known intentions?
1
WR4-07 Iraqi threat Cheney for Bush

"...In the days of the Cold War, we were able to manage the threat with strategies of deterrence and containment. But it’s a lot tougher to deter enemies who have no country to defend. And containment is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of mass destruction, and are prepared to share them with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United States..."

James K. Galbraith (Texas Observer):
"...
Now, some of what Mr. Cheney says is plainly true. Al Qaeda cannot be deterred, nor can it be safely contained. But then, the rejection of these doctrines in favor of pre-emptive self-defense is unnecessary to justify action against Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has already attacked us, numerous times. We are clearly justified in pursuing them to the ends of the earth. 
The more difficult question is whether the new doctrine is needed for the case of Iraq. And again the answer is no. Saddam Hussein does have a country and a regime to defend. He was deterred effectively from the use of chemical weapons against Israel in 1991. He is contained–by all evidence–within (a fraction of) his own country today. And he is subject to the enforcement power of the Security Council, with respect to his disarmament commitments, as Mr. Bush correctly argued to the U.N. two weeks ago. However, proceeding on that ground requires that we also accept the judgment of the Security Council as to what specific enforcement actions are justified at this moment. 
And so it would appear that the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense has been resurrected now for one reason only–to defy the authority of the Security Council and the U.N. Charter, to justify a war on Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq on terms, conditions, and timetables dictated by ourselves alone..."

Gene Healy (Cato Institute):
"...The administration argues that Saddam Hussein may not be deterrable. But it has provided no reason to believe that deterrence—which sufficed to contain nuclear-armed Mao and Stalin, the gold and silver medallists in the 20th Century's genocidal Olympics—will not work And it ignores the fact that Hussein has demonstrably and repeatedly been deterred from using weapons of mass destruction against enemies capable, like the U.S., of massive retaliation...
...again, Hussein had chemical weapons during the Gulf War. However, in response to a thinly veiled American threat of nuclear retaliation, he chose not to use them. None of the 42 scuds launched at Israel was tipped with chemical weapons. He didn't even use them against American forces driving him out of Kuwait, and possibly marching onto Baghdad: none of the 40-some scuds shot at allied forces during the war had chemical payloads...
A scud delivery comes with a return address, they argue; delivery by terrorist intermediaries may not. But if Hussein ever considered this strategy, the evidence suggests that deterrence worked here as well. Hussein first got nerve gas over 20 years ago. His hatred of Israel predates his hatred of the U.S. (Israel launched a preventive airstrike on the Osirik nuclear reactor in 1981, after all). Hussein's had longstanding links with anti-Israel terror groups like the Palestine Liberation Front and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Thus, he's long had the means, the motive, and the requisite links with people who would carry out a sneak chemical attack on Israel. If using terrorists as a WMD delivery system is such a foolproof scheme and if it would be so hard to discern who the culprit was, then why hasn't Hussein tried at least once over the years to use them against (militarily dominant and nuclear armed) Israel? Hint: the answer's in the parentheses..."

2
WR5-01 Iraq
 and democracy
Bush

"...spoke about a liberated Iraq showing "the power of freedom to transform that vital region" and said "a new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region."..."

Walter Pincus and Dana Milbank 
(Washington Post, MSNBC)
:
"...But a classified State Department report put together by the department's intelligence and research staff and delivered to Powell the same day as Bush's speech questioned that theory, arguing that history runs counter to it...."
1
WR6-01 Iraq disarmament Bush

"...called for a congressional resolution that "sends a clear signal that the country is determined to disarm Iraq and thereby bring peace to the world."..."

Dwight Meredith (P.L.A.):
"...
MR. RUSSERT: But what’s your goal? Disarmament or regime change?
VICE PRES. CHENEY: The president’s made it clear that the goal of the United States is regime change. He said that on many occasions..."
1
WR6-02 Iraq disarmament Bush

"...said that a disarmed Hussein could remain in power, because, in one artful phrase, it would mean "the regime will have effectively changed."..."

Dana Milbank (Washington Post):
"...The administration's return to its original goal -- ousting Hussein -- is a reflection that it no longer has hope of winning international support for its effort by describing its principal goal as disarmament. The objective, Cheney said plainly yesterday, "clearly is to get rid of his government and to put a new one in its place. And that's what we think is required in order to achieve the objectives of eliminating his WMD," or weapons of mass destruction.
1
WR7-01 Iraq planning Wolfowitz for Bush

"...[said that] the recent estimate by Gen. Eric K. Shinseki of the Army that several hundred thousand troops would be needed in postwar Iraq, [was] "wildly off the mark."..."

Eric Schmitt (New York Times) via GlobalPolicy.org:
"...Pentagon officials have put the figure closer to 100,000 troops. Mr. Wolfowitz then dismissed articles in several newspapers this week asserting that Pentagon budget specialists put the cost of war and reconstruction at $60 billion to $95 billion in this fiscal year. He said it was impossible to predict accurately a war's duration, its destruction and the extent of rebuilding afterward.
"We have no idea what we will need until we get there on the ground," Mr. Wolfowitz said at a hearing of the House Budget Committee..."

George Will (Washington Post):
"...Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense, was wrong in congressional testimony before the war. Although he said "we have no idea what we will need until we get there on the ground," he insisted that Gen. Eric Shinseki, a veteran of peacekeeping in the Balkans, was "wildly off the mark" in estimating that several hundred thousand troops would be needed in occupied Iraq. .."

1
WR7-02 Iraq planning Wolfowitz for Bush

"...Mr. Wolfowitz ticked off several reasons why he believed a much smaller coalition peacekeeping force than General Shinseki envisioned would be sufficient to police and rebuild postwar Iraq.
He said there was no history of ethnic strife in Iraq, as there was in Bosnia or Kosovo..."

Uncertain Principles - 2/28/03:
"...
There's no ethnic strife in Iraq, 'cause, y'know, that whole business with the Kurds is just a big misunderstanding. It's not like they need, I don't know, thousands of sorties by American and British pilots every year to prevent Saddam from attacking them... And, of course, the Shi'ites and "Marsh Arabs" in the southern part of Iraq are all shiny, happy people with no qualms whatsoever about remaining part of Iraq...
Why would anybody trust these clowns with the keys to a Volvo, let alone the most powerful military machine in the history of the world?..."
1

 

The U.N. and "COALITION" BUILDING <go back to the top>

Compassion Con credits total = 19

# Topic President Bush or his representative's Compassionate statement Some uncompassionate facts Compassion Con Credits
CO1-01 Second UN Resolution and France Bush

"...some permanent members of the Security Council have publicly announced that they will veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of Iraq..."

Compassiongate:
Bush's reference was clearly to the French. The French did not threaten to veto a resolution to compel disarmament (considering that the first resolution compels disarmament) but one that would mean automatic war if disarmament did not occur.

Stanley Hoffman (New York Review of Books):
"...Colin Powell stated that Jacques Chirac had said that France wouldn't go to war against Iraq "under any circumstances." In fact, as Powell must have known, and as I have been told on very good authority, the French President had earmarked French forces for war if the inspectors, after a limited number of weeks and after having followed a series of "benchmarks" not dissimilar from those Tony Blair had demanded, concluded that Iraq did have forbidden weapons and could not be disarmed peacefully. French diplomacy could be faulted for not making its positions clearer; but Chirac's statement referred only to the text of the second resolution drafted by the US and Britain for submission to the Security Council, and then withdrawn. On March 16, after the US turned down Chirac's proposal to consider using force if the inspectors reached an impasse in Iraq in thirty days, he told Christine Amanpour on 60 Minutes that if "our strategy, inspections, were failing, we would consider all the options, including war."..."

1
CO1-02 Second UN Resolution and France Bush

"...citing "an interesting phenomena taking place here in America about the French . . . a backlash against the French, not stirred up by anybody except the people."..."

Paul Krugman (New York Times):
"...Mr. Bush was disingenuous when he described the backlash against the French as "not stirred up by anybody except the people." On the same day that the report of his interview appeared, The Financial Times carried the headline, "Hastert Orchestrates Tirade Against the French." That's Dennis Hastert, the speaker of the House of Representatives. In fact, anti-French feeling has been carefully fomented by Republican officials, Rupert Murdoch's media empire and other administration allies. Can you blame Mexicans for interpreting Mr. Bush's remarks as a threat to do the same to them?..."
1
CO2-01 Iraq and U.N. in 1998  Bush administration

"...Iraq under Saddam has defied U.N. resolutions to give up its WMDs and to disarm for 4,199 days, Bush noted. U.N. weapons inspectors were kicked out of Iraq in 1998, and Bush pointed out that the Iraqis had "blocked effective inspections of so-called presidential sites..."

FAIR via WhoDies:
"...The story centers on the Iraq crisis that broke out on December 16, 1998. Richard Butler, head of the United Nations weapons inspection team in Iraq, had just released a report accusing the Iraqi regime of obstructing U.N. weapons checks. On the basis of that report, President Clinton announced he would launch airstrikes against Iraqi targets. Out of concern for their safety, Butler withdrew his inspectors from Iraq, and the U.S.-British bombing proceeded. 
The Washington Post reported all these facts correctly at the time: A December 18 article by national security correspondent Barton Gellman reported that "Butler ordered his inspectors to evacuate Baghdad, in anticipation of a military attack, on Tuesday night."
But in the 14 months since then, the Washington Post has again and again tried to rewrite history--claiming that Saddam Hussein expelled the U.N. inspectors from Iraq. Despite repeated attempts by its readers to set the record straight in letters to the editor, the Post has persisted in reporting this fiction.
Not only did Saddam Hussein not order the inspectors' retreat, but Butler's decision to withdraw them was--to say the least--highly controversial. The Washington Post (12/17/98) reported that as Butler was drafting his report on Iraqi cooperation, U.S. officials were secretly consulting with him about how to frame his conclusions..."
1
CO3-01 First U. N. Resolution (1441) Bush

"...signalled that he did not believe that a second resolution was absolutely necessary, and warned the Council that if it sits idle, he will lead a coalition of nations to disarm Iraq by force. "I've never felt we needed a resolution; 1441 speaks very clearly," he told reporters...."

Cheney for Bush

"...Last November, the U.N. Security Council passed a unanimous resolution finding Iraq in material breach of its obligations and vowing serious consequences in the event Saddam Hussein did not fully and immediately comply. When Saddam Hussein failed even then to comply, our coalition acted to deliver those serious consequences..."

Josh Marshall (Talking Points Memo):
"...But the wording which the other countries demanded and received was wording which they believed put them in charge of deciding when or if there would be war. At the time, Ireland's Ambassdor to the UN said the word changes kept "the hands of the council members as a whole on the steering wheel of the resolution in the future. It's of enormous significance." 
The problem for the United States is that we pretty clearly went on the record validating this other interpretation. Here's what America's UN Representative John Negroponte said at the UN on the day the resolution passed ...
"There's no 'automaticity' and this is a two-stage process, and in that regard we have met the principal concerns that have been expressed for the resolution. Whatever violation there is, or is judged to exist, will be dealt with in the council, and the council will have an opportunity to consider the matter before any other action is taken..."
What he was saying there was that 1441 was not self-enforcing. Its language and what counted as an infraction was to be decided by the Security Council. This was the price we paid for getting for getting the unanimous vote.
What this means pretty clearly is that we cannot claim that Resolution 1441 gives us any basis for doing what we're about to do..."

Oliver Burkeman and Julian Borger (The Guardian):
"...
International lawyers and anti-war campaigners reacted with astonishment yesterday after the influential Pentagon hawk Richard Perle conceded that the invasion of Iraq had been illegal.
In a startling break with the official White House and Downing Street lines, Mr Perle told an audience in London: "I think in this case international law stood in the way of doing the right thing."
President George Bush has consistently argued that the war was legal either because of existing UN security council resolutions on Iraq - also the British government's publicly stated view - or as an act of self-defence permitted by international law. 
But Mr Perle, a key member of the defence policy board, which advises the US defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, said that "international law ... would have required us to leave Saddam Hussein alone", and this would have been morally unacceptable..."

1
CO3-02 U.N. credibility based on resolution 1441 BEFORE THE INVASION

Bush

"...We'll see whether or not the United Nations will be the United Nations or the League of Nations when it comes to dealing with this man who for 11 years has thumbed his nose at resolution after resolution after resolution after resolution...My intent, of course, is for the United Nations to do its job...The choice is up to the United Nations to show its resolve.  The choice is up to Saddam Hussein to fulfill his word.  And if neither of them acts, the United States, in deliberate fashion, will lead a coalition to take away the world's worst weapons from one of the world's worst leaders..."

Fleischer for Bush

"...If the UN weapons inspectors "go in under the current regime, it is a fool's errand to call them inspectors," Fleischer added.  "They will be nothing more than tourists who get a run-around," he said..."

Bush

"...The credibility of the Security Council is at stake..."

Bush

"..."After 11 years during which we have tried containment, sanctions, inspections, even selected military action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons and is increasing his capabilities to make more...Clearly, to actually work, any new inspections, sanctions, or enforcement mechanisms will have to be very different," he added..."

BEFORE THE INVASION

Note: The U.N. has been very relevant for decades without explicitly authorizing many of the United States' military operations in other countries. War is not the only aspect that the U.N. was set up for. One of it's goals is world peace.

Joe Conason (Salon):
"...Has everybody seen the videotape of Colin Powell's remarks about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction on Feb. 24, 2001?...Here is what Powell told reporters on that day in Cairo at a press conference with the Egyptian foreign minister Amr Moussa. Asked about angry local reaction to his visit because of American policy toward Iraq, the secretary of state sought to explain: 
"We had a good discussion, the foreign minister and I and the president and I, had a good discussion about the nature of the sanctions -- the fact that the sanctions exist -- not for the purpose of hurting the Iraqi people, but for the purpose of keeping in check Saddam Hussein's ambitions toward developing weapons of mass destruction. We should constantly be reviewing our policies, constantly be looking at those sanctions to make sure that they are directed toward that purpose. That purpose is every bit as important now as it was 10 years ago when we began it. And frankly they have worked. He has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors."..."

David Corn (The Nation):
"...UN Security Council Resolution 1441 promised there would be "serious consequences" if Saddam Hussein did not comply with its disarmament orders. It did not define these consequences. What Bush has been saying is that unless the Security Council embraces his definition of "serious consequences"--war right now--it is a pointless body. "The credibility of the Security Council is at stake," he maintained. But what if the Security Council were to decide to toughen up the inspections and conduct them for another five months? Why would that be evidence of its meaninglessness? Indeed, it is Bush who is placing the Security Council in a position of irrelevance. Should he ignore the deeply-felt sentiments of its member-nations (and the populations they represent) and launch a war unsupported by the Security Council, it will be he who is declaring--and proving--that the United Nations does not really matter..." 

2
CO3-03 U.N. credibility

AFTER DAVID KAY'S REPORT

Kay for Bush

"...What I was not saying is that sanctions were working..."

Cheney for Bush

"...Twelve years of diplomacy, more than a dozen Security Council resolutions, hundreds of U.N. weapons inspectors, thousands of flights to enforce the no-fly zones and even strikes and against military targets in Iraq, all of these measures were tried to compel Saddam Hussein's compliance with the terms of the 1991 Gulf War cease-fire. All of these measures failed..."

Fleischer for Bush

"...If the UN weapons inspectors "go in under the current regime, it is a fool's errand to call them inspectors," Fleischer added.  "They will be nothing more than tourists who get a run-around," he said..."

Bush

"..."After 11 years during which we have tried containment, sanctions, inspections, even selected military action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons and is increasing his capabilities to make more...Clearly, to actually work, any new inspections, sanctions, or enforcement mechanisms will have to be very different," he added..."

Bryan Bender (Boston Globe):
"...David Kay, the Bush administration's chief weapons investigator in Iraq, said yesterday he believes United Nations inspections and international sanctions put in place after the 1991 Gulf War were more effective in frustrating Saddam Hussein's plans for weapons of mass destruction than the United States had realized...Kay told reporters that the 1,200 members of his Iraq Survey Group have been surprised "at how often" top Iraqi scientists and policy makers "refer to the impact of sanctions" in their interviews with the Americans. Kay added that it "may be necessary to reassess what we thought" about the effectiveness of the UN effort...
Blix, in an interview with BBC, said he doubted that Iraq could have easily developed weapons of mass destruction.
"I think one should have some caution there, because the Security Council had never intended to abandon long-term monitoring, so the Iraqis would not have been left alone to proceed with whatever they had started," he said. "If they can develop weapons of mass destruction in five years or 10 years, well, that certainly is not imminent."
David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector and now director of the Institute for Science and International Security, said: "Iraq did not comply, and I support the Bush administration statements to that effect. But the administration has not been able to substantiate its claim that the threat was imminent. I think Hans Blix and ElBaradei deserve an apology."..."

Bob Drogin (The New Republic):
"..."I think, by and large, that's close to where we are now," Kay had replied in his soft drawl when asked directly if U.N. sanctions had stymied Saddam's ability to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD). "I don't know if it's close to where we will be. We have been struck, in probably three hundred interviews with Iraqi scientists, engineers, and senior officials, how often they refer to the impact of sanctions and the perceived impact of sanctions in terms of regime behavior," Kay had gone on. "So it may well be necessary to reassess what a lot of us ... quite frankly thought was the eroding impact of sanctions over the years." 
Now, at the end of a 90-minute conference call with reporters on October 3, Kay clearly was having second thoughts--or had been urged to have them...
"What I was not saying is that sanctions were working," he declared, reversing his earlier statement. Kay said his progress report--most of which remains classified-- indicates that Saddam had concluded by late 1999 or early 2000 that he could work around U.N. sanctions and that convincing the U.N. Security Council to lift them "was no longer the most important thing."
Then Kay tacked back again. "So it's going to be a difficult thing to finally assess the impact of sanctions," he admitted. American intelligence officials, he added, "probably did not adequately assess the psychological impact over the years that sanctions may have had on decision-making" in Baghdad. Kay groped his way to a conclusion. "This is one that we're going to have to deal with in the final report because it is key to a lot of issues," he said.
As I listened to Kay that day, I felt a bit sorry for him...Kay found no evidence that Iraq had taken significant steps to build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material after 1991. No evidence that aluminum tubes had been used to enrich uranium. No proof that two trucks carrying laboratory equipment had been designed to produce biowarfare agents, as the president had claimed. No smallpox, anthrax, or VX. No chemical or biological weapons ready to fire in 45 minutes--indeed, no poison gases or germ weapons at all. At worst, Saddam had "aspirations and intentions" to acquire WMD. Even Pat Roberts, the dour Kansas Republican who chairs the Senate Select Intelligence Committee and is usually a staunch supporter of both the Bush administration and the CIA, announced he was "not pleased" with the results..."

Dana Milbank and Walter Pincus (Washington Post):
"...David Kay, the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq, presented a different view in his congressional testimony last week. For example, he said: "Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW [chemical weapons] munitions was reduced -- if not entirely destroyed -- during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of U.N. sanctions and U.N. inspections." ..."

James Pinkerton (Newsday):
"..."All of these measures failed," Cheney said.
No, actually, all those measures succeeded, which is why we haven't found anything resembling a weapon of mass destruction in Iraq..."

Council for a Livable World:
"...However, the inspectors were very effective in eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.  From 1991 to 1998, UNSCOM, the U.N. inspection agency, destroyed 38,537 chemical munitions, 690 tons of chemical warfare agents, 3,275 tons of precursor chemicals, biological growth media, the Al Hakam biological warfare facility, 48 missiles, 50 warheads, 20 tons of missile fuel, 5 combat mobile launchers, 56 fixed launch sites and 75 components for 350mm and 1000mm guns.  (Appendix I, 13th Quarterly Report of UNMOVIC, May 30, 2003)..."

1
CO3-04 U. N. credibility Bush

"...And because there were consequences, because a coalition of nations acted to defend the peace and the credibility of the United Nations, Iraq is free..."

David Corn (The Nation):
"...Bush also argued that the United States, by invading Iraq, had "acted to defend...the credibility of the United Nations," falsely suggesting that the UN had been unwilling to take any steps in the face of Iraq's violations of Security Council resolutions. But the UN was moving toward more intrusive and aggressive inspections when Bush launched the war. It might be that the UN actions would not have happened or might have ended up ineffective, but Bush has repeatedly maintained that there was only one choice: go to war or do nothing. That is a misrepresentation..."

Oliver Burkeman and Julian Borger (The Guardian):
"...
International lawyers and anti-war campaigners reacted with astonishment yesterday after the influential Pentagon hawk Richard Perle conceded that the invasion of Iraq had been illegal.
In a startling break with the official White House and Downing Street lines, Mr Perle told an audience in London: "I think in this case international law stood in the way of doing the right thing."
President George Bush has consistently argued that the war was legal either because of existing UN security council resolutions on Iraq - also the British government's publicly stated view - or as an act of self-defence permitted by international law. 

But Mr Perle, a key member of the defence policy board, which advises the US defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, said that "international law ... would have required us to leave Saddam Hussein alone", and this would have been morally unacceptable..."

Compassiongate:
Should I say something about "defend the peace"? Nah, the compassion there is obvious.

1
CO3-05 U.N.

Cheney for Bush

"...Another criticism we hear is that the United States, when its security is threatened, may not act without unanimous international consent. Under this view, even in the face of a specific stated agreed-upon danger, the mere objection of even one foreign government would be sufficient to prevent us from acting. This view reflects a deep confusion about the requirements of our national security. Though often couched in high-sounding terms of unity and cooperation, it is a prescription for perpetual disunity and obstructionism...So often, and so conveniently, it amounts to a policy of doing exactly nothing..."

Jay Bookman (Atlanta Journal-Constitution) via Atrios:
"...Then Cheney got to the core of his argument:
"Another criticism we hear is that the United States, when its security is threatened, may not act without unanimous international consent. Under this view, even in the face of a specific agreed-upon danger, the mere objection of even one foreign government would be sufficient to prevent us from acting."
With that statement, Cheney abandons deception and traipses merrily into the Land of the Completely Absurd. Nobody -- not the Democrats, not the United Nations, not even the French -- makes the argument that he describes. It would be insane to do so.
Cheney invents that argument to support his larger point: After Sept. 11, the Bush administration at least did something, while its less-than-manly critics would have done nothing.
And that is the ultimate falsehood.
The true policy choice is between actions that make things better for the United States and actions that make things worse. If we were to assess the invasion of Ira